

7006



A small token of my
gratitude for the pleasure
of doing research in the
U.P. State Archives —

24 June, '81. Veena T. Oldenburg

PERIL, PESTILENCE, AND PERFIDY:
THE MAKING OF COLONIAL LUCKNOW, 1856-1877

BY

VEENA TALWAR OLDENBURG

B.A., University of Lucknow, 1965
M.A., University of Lucknow, 1968
M.A., University of Bridgeport, 1972

THESIS

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History
in the Graduate College of the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1979

Urbana, Illinois

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
LIST OF FIGURES	iv
LIST OF TABLES	v
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	vi
PREFACE	vii
Chapter	
I. THE CITY AS BATTLEFIELD	1
Nawabi Lucknow	4
The City as Battlefield	14
The Urban Aftermath of Revolt	19
II. THE CITY MUST BE SAFE	24
Demolitions	26
Communications	35
The Cantonment	46
The Civil Station	55
III. THE CITY MUST BE CLEAN	61
Provincial Government	64
The Police	66
The Municipal Committee:	
History and Membership	77
The Municipal Committee: Activities	90
Sanitation	95
Control of Building	112
The Control of Intemperance and Other "Social Diseases"	119
IV. THE CITY MUST PAY	138
The Penal Tax	144
Octroi	146
Tax Assessment and Collection	154
V. THE CITY MUST BE LOYAL	174
The Penal Tax	176
The Hooseinabad Trust Case	184

The Making of a Loyal Elite	193
Pensioners and Wasiqadars	194
The Commercial Elite	205
The Taluqdars	207
Urban Taluqdars	223
Education	230
The Ruling Elite	235
Darbars	239
VI. CONCLUSIONS	253
SOURCES CONSULTED	262
CURRICULUM VITAE	273

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
1. Lucknow in 1857	11
2. Sir Robert Napier's Plan of Lucknow, 1858	32
3. Map of Firangi Mahal Mohalla	39
4. Plan of an Indian Bungalow	115

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. Lucknow Police Salaries and Miscellaneous Expenditure, 1862-63	68
2. Police Action in Lucknow 1867-1871	72
3. Crime in Lucknow City	73
4. Long-serving Members of the Municipal Committee, 1864-1877	83
5. Municipal Expenditures	92
6. Taxes Collected by the Lucknow Municipal Committee	142
7. Privately Endowed Charities Run by the Deputy Commissioner's Office in Lucknow, 1876	221
8. Savings of Private Individuals Invested in Government Paper	222

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BIA	British Indian Association
BRLD	Board of Revenue, Lucknow District
BROG	Board of Revenue, Oudh General
GOI	Government of India
IOL	India Office Library and Records
JNML	Jawaharlal Nehru Museum and Library
MCRR	Municipal Corporation Record Room
NAI	National Archives of India
PMC	Proceedings of the Municipal Committee
UPSA	Uttar Pradesh State Archives
VNR	Selections from Vernacular Newspaper Reports

PREFACE

A few years ago a friend of mine who was preparing herself for her first trip to Lucknow, a city 300 miles south-east of Delhi, said: "I can't find a history book that mentions Lucknow after the Mutiny of 1857. Has nothing new happened there since?" The remark cut close to the truth. It made me wonder why things -- like important historical events -- did not choose Lucknow as a stage in the latter half of the nineteenth century, and this study is, at one level, an investigation of the causes of the relative non-importance of the fourth largest city in British India. Why do present day Lakhnawis still draw upon the nawabi epoch to speak of the greatness of their city? Why is Lucknow more of a "state of mind" -- with its reputation for culture and refinement -- which is expressed in the anecdotal tradition but is very hard to substantiate from reality? Its crumbling nawabi monuments have not earned it a place on the official tourist map of India. People visit it chiefly for business with the state bureaucracy. This uneventfulness, I suspect, is also true of some other once-great cities of the northern plain where the "mutiny" raged in 1857. I hope I can arouse, and in a modest way satisfy, a morbid curiosity about the "death" of a city.

I began my fieldwork in 1976. The "Emergency" declared by Indira Gandhi was in full evidence: the elected municipal council had been suspended and the professional administrator was in command of civic government; there was talk among bureaucrats of all ranks of the pleasures of governing the city without "interference" from the elected representatives of the citizens of Lucknow; one heard a great deal about "discipline," "the rule of law," cleanliness, and the serious hazards of disloyalty to the Emergency Raj.

This set me digging for the colonial roots of present day Lucknow and, to my growing horror, I discovered indeed that the "mutiny" had set a pattern of life dominated by the needs of the military and bureaucracy. Even the government of 1976 demonstrated that it was best geared to cope with a political crisis, real or imagined, (this time the mysterious crisis that prompted the "Emergency"). The crisis-oriented machinery of government created after the "mutiny" was intact. I decided to end the study in 1877, by which time the task of restructuring the government and politics of Lucknow was nearly complete, and was followed by a dull, quiescent and stable period which continued well into the second decade of the next century. I have therefore chosen to fill only a small gap in the social history of Lucknow and to work out the significance of that single political event that shaped its future, and by extension the urban future of the "mutiny" zone.

I use the word "mutiny" within quotation marks to show that I understand that it was a rebellion and a mutiny, and not just a sepoy mutiny as the British chose to see it. I also spell "Oudh" as Oudh instead of Awadh (or Avadh) because the sources I use spell it that way and because I find it a very acceptable transliteration of the name. I have also retained the old fashioned spelling of Urdu words and names as I encountered them in the sources for the sake of convenience and to avoid errors in the typescript. I use the word "native" both in its regular and its pejorative sense; in the latter case it is always within quotation marks.

My intellectual and material debts since the inception of this project have been numerous. Blair B. Kling (my adviser), Harold A. Gould and Philip K. Oldenburg (later my spouse) shaped my thinking in various ways: Blair's economic orientation to history, Hal's radical anthropology and

Philip's deep interest in politics and city government fed directly into the formulation of my own thesis. They also sustained me for three years variously as their teaching and research assistant. Blair guided my writing and smoothed out the roughness from the draft of this thesis, and both he and Hal served on my dissertation committee. To Blair and Julia I owe the deepest thanks for taking on, in addition, the extra-curricular responsibilities of looking after a "foreign student," and hosting for me champagne-enlivened events in their home. I want to thank Walter L. Arnstein and Frederick Jaher for the great care they took in reading my thesis and making very constructive suggestions to improve it. The History Department at the University of Illinois gave me a research grant that made my research in England possible, and the American Institute of Indian Studies generously supported the fifteen months of fieldwork in India. The Delhi staff of the AIIS went out of their way to help us in every way.

The staff at various libraries and archives were helpful and considerate and made this quest a pleasure: these were, from west to east, at the University of Illinois library, the Regenstein Library at the University of Chicago, particularly Maureen L. P. Patterson, the New York Public Library, the Indian Office Library and Records, especially Mrs. R. Seton, the British Museum, the National Archives of India, the Jawaharlal Nehru Museum and Library, where Mr. Abdi helped me with deciphering the documents of the British Indian Association, the U.P. State Archives, particularly the Assistant Director, Mr. Rajendra Bahadur, the U.P. Secretariat Library and Record Room, the Amir ud Dowlah Library, Mazhar Alam Library (where curiously enough all books and manuscripts had a single "auspicious" call number) and the Tagore Library at the University of Lucknow. Mazhar Alam, and Taqi Ali Khan (Chajju) helped me in reading some of the source material in Urdu and Persian.

Karbalai Nawab and Pratap Singh Nahar (Bichi Babu) served as my guides to the old city and arranged several interviews.

I owe to "Gulbadan" and her friends a "consciousness raising" experience about the nature of prostitution in a traditional society. My friend Shamim Khan regaled me with a dramatic reading of Fasane Azad. I am very grateful to Mr. Mahmood Butt, the chief secretary of Uttar Pradesh, to grant me free access to old records in the Board of Revenue and the Collectorate. Anis Mian of the Lucknow Collectorate gave me invaluable help in reading the historic Bandobast of 1862. And there are countless other informants I interviewed in the course of my fifteen months of work in the field that supplied the tesserae of this piece.

The discussions at the Jawaharlal University Centre for Historical studies, particularly with Professor Bipan Chandra, helped me discard some early formulations. Michael Fisher and I crossed paths several times during our concurrent field trips and his research interest in nawabi Oudh proved very useful to me. He has also read the draft of this thesis with great care and given prompt and valuable suggestions. Geraldine Forbes was exploited in the same manner on her "fun" trips to New York; she patiently read my thesis when she could have been at the Met. Eileen Haas spent two long and painstaking sessions to fix my odd punctuation and frequent lapses into the passive voice. Marguerite Freund performed the last rite: she transfigured a blotchy draft into an exquisitely typed piece.

There were family and friends in Lucknow and Delhi who made work a pleasure: My parents welcomed us home, and we stayed with them for eleven months in Lucknow liberated from all housekeeping chores; in Delhi it was the Oberois, the Sarans and the Shouries. To my friend Malini Saran I owe an unspeakable debt for frequent therapeutic discussions without which

I might have despaired of this whole project. Peter and Hilde Oldenburg offered us hospitality and friendship in many a long interim between moves.

And what can I say of Philip Oldenburg, my aforementioned spouse, which will be remotely adequate? His friendship, guidance and philosophy made this endeavour possible. He accompanied me on the field trip to England and India, he typed all my field notes in triplicate (some 9.7 kg. in weight); he rescued me from dissertation-related philosophical doubts and depressions; he even made a heroic but vain bid to catch a dacoit on the train who, alas, made off with a quarter of my toil; he argued and reasoned and suggested ways out of dead-ends, and was in the end my finest critic. Through all this he remained perfectly good-natured and affectionate.

As they say in New York in disbelief at the goodness of people:

"What can I say?"

New York

Veena Talwar Oldenburg

CHAPTER I

THE CITY AS BATTLEFIELD

"A madness ate into all the Army, and they turned against their officers. That was the first evil, but not past remedy if they had then held their hands. But they chose to kill the Sahibs' wives and children. Then came the Sahibs from over the sea and called them to most strict account."

"Some such rumour, I believe, reached me once long ago. They called it the Black Year, as I remember."

"What manner of life hast thou led, not to know The Year? A rumour indeed! All the earth knew, and trembled."

"Our earth never shook but once -- upon the day that the Excellent One [the Buddha] received Enlightenment."

-- Dialogue between a retired soldier and the lama, in Kim¹

Lucknow, the nawabi city and capital of Oudh, was transformed into a colonial provincial town in the two decades that followed the annexation of the province by the British in 1856. This shift in political power and the needs of the new colonial government altered the basic physical, economic and social structure of the court city and the nature and style of its local politics. This study examines the causes, processes, and effects of

¹Rudyard Kipling, Kim, in Kipling; A Selection of His Stories and Poems, by John Beecroft, 2 vols. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1956), vol. 1, p. 41.

these changes -- the sum and substance of the extension of colonial urbanization into an indigenous city. The "mutiny" and rebellion of 1857 quickened the transition from nawabi city to British provincial town. This period saw the formulation of very deliberate and conscious policies that aimed to achieve complete political control and a crisis-free urban future. It is necessary, therefore, to place Lucknow in its historical and political context and portray the trauma it endured before proceeding to outline the major themes and issues addressed in this study.

The nawabi city of Lucknow had shared the fate of several non-British inland cities in eighteenth century India.¹ The declining authority of the Mughal empire had enticed the governors of imperial provinces such as Oudh to assume de facto sovereignty. Cities like Murshidabad in Bengal, Lucknow in Oudh, Hyderabad in the Nizam's territories, and Poona in the Maratha confederacy blossomed into important administrative and commercial centres for their own hinterlands. The growth and vitality of these cities were closely tied to the fortunes and policies of local rulers. Dacca, for example, declined precipitously from its position as an important commercial centre when the nawab of Bengal shifted his administrative centre to Murshidabad.² Murshidabad in turn declined with the development of

¹The generalizations that follow are based on Bernard S. Cohn, "Urbanization and Social Mobility in 'Early Modern' India: An Exploration," (paper presented at the Conference of International Comparisons of Social Mobility in Past Societies, Institute for Advanced Studies, Princeton, New Jersey, 1972).

²Philip Calkins, "The Role of Murshidabad as a Regional and Sub-Regional Center in Bengal," in Urban Bengal, ed. by Richard L. Park, South Asia Series Occasional Paper no. 12 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Asian Studies Center, 1969), pp. 19-28.

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh

Calcutta and the growth of British imperial power.¹ Lucknow, too, grew in response to a similar nawabi whim. Asaf ud Dowlah (reigned: 1775-1797) moved the capital of Oudh from Faizabad-Ayodhya to Lucknow in 1775 in order to escape his domineering and politically influential mother.² It declined as we shall see, after its annexation by the British.

It is not within the scope of this study to explain the very complicated history of the stratagems of successive governors general and residents (the envoys of the East India Company to the court of Oudh) employed against the nawabs of Oudh, which culminated in the outright takeover.³ Suffice it to say that Oudh was one of the richest of twelve provinces of the Mughal empire and the British longed to control its revenues. They eagerly sought alliances with the strong and able early nawabs and their intentions and ambitions in Oudh were whetted by the regular morsels received from the nawabs in the shape of military subsidies and loans.

Lord Dalhousie, the governor general from 1848 to 1852, who was quite unabashed in his desire to annex as many Indian states as he possibly could, alluded to Oudh as the "cherry that will drop into our mouth one day,"

¹Gautam Bhadra, "Some Socio-Economic Aspects of the Town of Murshidabad (1765-1793)," (unpublished M.Phil dissertation, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 1972).

²H.C. Irwin, The Garden of India, or Chapters on Oudh History and Affairs, 2 vols. (1880; reprint edition, Lucknow: Pustak Kendra, 1973), vol. 1, p. 76.

³For an excellent insider's view of the British connection in pre-annexation Oudh, written by an acting resident, see R.W. Bird [pseud.: Samuel Lucas] Dacoitee in Excelsis; or the Spoliation of Oude by the East India Company (1857; reprint edition, Lucknow: Pustak Kendra, 1974). For a scholarly analysis of the same period, see Michael H. Fisher, "The Imperial Court and the Province: a Social and Administrative History of Pre-British Awadh (1775-1856)" (PhD dissertation, The University of Chicago, 1978).

if the British continued "shaking the tree to help it down."¹ On February 13, 1856, after weighing other alternatives, the British annexed Oudh on the righteous ground that "the British Government would be guilty in the sight of God and man, if it were any longer to aid in sustaining by its countenance an administration fraught with evil to millions."²

Nawabi Lucknow

The use of a series of British perceptions of the city contrasted with the self-perceptions of the court elite -- instead of an exclusive dependence on abstract definitions and statistics -- is an effective way of recreating the character and ethos of the entity that is referred to as nawabi Lucknow. This impressionistic sketch of Lucknow will serve as a necessary point of reference when viewing the two decades of urban change that followed.³ After sorting and sifting the observations of Europeans about Lucknow in the first half of the nineteenth century, the portrait that emerges is of a city that was exotic, rich, populous and hostile. Let us briefly examine the picture.

That the city was seen as an exotic place by Europeans was chiefly

¹J.G.A. Baird, The Private Letters of Marquess Dalhousie (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1911), pp. 33 and 169.

²As cited in G.W. Forrest, Cities of India (New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, 1903), p. 217.

³The use of literary images of cities as data for the social scientist has been endorsed in three important articles on the subject collected in Urban India: Society, Space and Image, edited by Richard G. Fox (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Program in Comparative Studies in Southern Asia, 1970): Mahadeo L. Apte, "Reflections of Urban Life in Marathi Literature;" Eleanor Zelliot, "Literary Images of the Modern Indian City;" and A.K. Ramanujan, "Toward an Anthology of City Images."

due to the Islamic architecture of some of its principal buildings.¹ An Englishwoman who married a Lucknow nawab and lived there for twelve years was frequently "reminded in these scenes of the visionary castles conjured to the imagination, whilst reading 'The Arabian Nights' Entertainments'."² Russell's first view of the city from the rooftop of the Dilkusha palace just before the end of the siege of Lucknow in 1858 excels anything written about Lucknow in this genre:

A vision of palaces, minars, domes azure and golden, cupolas, colonnade, long facades of fair perspective in pillar and column, terraced roofs -- all rising up amid a calm still ocean of the brightest verdure. Look for miles and miles away, and still the ocean spreads, and the towers of the fairy-city gleam in its midst. Spires of gold glitter in the sun. Turrets and gilded spheres shine like constellations. . . . Is this a city in Oudh? Is this the capital of a semi-barbarous race, erected by a corrupt, effete, and degraded dynasty? I confess I felt inclined to rub my eyes again and again.³

Close up the view was less enchanting:

When visited in detail, the gorgeousness of the picture is obscured by the more than ordinary degree of dirt, filth, and squalid poverty, which are placed in juxta-position with its grandest feature: the lanes leading from the principal avenues are ankle-deep in mud and of the many hovels, which afford an insufficient shelter to a swarming population, are in the most wretched habitations the imagination can conceive.⁴

These incredible extremes of wealth and poverty were typical of the feudal,

¹I do not plan to give a guidebook description of the landmarks on the nawabi citiscape. For that see G.H. Rouse, ed., The Lucknow Album (Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press, 1874).

²Mrs. Meer Hasan Ali, Observations on the Mussalmauns of India, edited with notes and an introduction by W. Crooke (1917; reprint edition, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 20. The first edition was published in 1832.

³W.H. Russell, My Indian Mutiny Diary, edited by Michael Edwardes (London: Cassell & Company, 1957), pp. 57-58.

⁴"Oude," The Asiatic Journal and Monthly Register (Calcutta), vol. 15, new series (September-December 1834), p. 216.

or preindustrial civilized city which was "dominated by a small, privileged upper stratum" where the sovereign personage, his numerous dependents, and the administrative elite bask in "comfort, splendor and luxury."¹

The quarters closer to the royal palaces, the mosques and imambaras (sacred buildings commemorating the Shia imams [high priests]) and the seat of government are consistently described as "splendid," "fairy-like," "luxurious," but the stately ruins that dot the present day Lucknow confirm that these buildings did not equal the marble and sandstone splendours of Agra and Delhi. Even the best buildings in Lucknow were built of brick and plaster in the whimsical architectural styles introduced by European favourites at the Oudh court.

The nawabi city of Lucknow formed the administrative and cultural core of a vast and rich hinterland. The court city thrived parasitically off the hinterland which supported its lavish consumption of goods and services, workshops of artisans, craftsmen, jewellers, bankers and tradesmen accreted around the court to supply its needs and Lucknow became the locus for the largest complex of luxury industries in northern India.² Approximately a crore of rupees (one million pounds sterling)³ was spent by the nawab and his nobles in the city of Lucknow in legendary prodigality

¹Gideon Sjoberg, The Preindustrial City, Past and Present (New York: The Free Press, 1960), p. 220. This work is a profound and stimulating theoretical analysis of the preindustrial city. Sjoberg's careful formulations of prevalent generalizations on cities have given them width and depth that fit the Indian preindustrial city, particularly the case of Lucknow, very well.

²For a survey of these industries, see William Hoey, A Monograph on Trade and Manufactures in Northern India (Lucknow: American Methodist Mission Press, 1880).

³I will use the Indian units of lakhs and crores: one lakh equals 100,000 and one crore equals 10,000,000; in the mid-nineteenth century, ten rupees equalled one pound sterling.

on luxury goods and the patronage of urban culture.

For the native elite the nawabi city represented the special environment of the Indo-Mughal cultural epoch. The court was the hub of city life, and the city was the centre of the administrative, commercial, and military life from where the regional kingdom was controlled. If the court moved, like the court of Oudh did in 1775 from Faizabad to Lucknow, it was as if the kernel of the court discarded its old husk and grew a new one in Lucknow. When the court physically relocated itself in Lucknow the city was largely built in and around the existing town to accommodate the influx of the court. The nawab constructed the large palace-garden complexes, the major mosques and gateways, the imambaras, the chowk (literally square; the main bazaar for luxury goods) and a dozen major gunjes (markets) to form the core of the royal quarter of the city. The administrative and military elite was concentrated in and around the royal quarter including the Machhi Bhawan fort, in lesser palaces. The nobility built their own residential palaces and created mohallas (neighbourhoods) with their own mosques and bazaars.¹ These in turn attracted merchants, traders, and craftsmen, who serviced the needs of the households and retinues of the nobility, and a city would replicate itself in miniature around each royal or noble residence. Stephen P. Blake, in describing the development of the Mughal padshahi shahar (imperial city) of Shahjahanabad (old Delhi) concludes that the amiri (noble) mansion or amiri mohalla constituted the dominant form of residential organization within the city and the patron-client form of social organization characterized the economic life of the city. Of the

¹For a detailed list of the nobles and their eponymous mohallas for the years 1775 to 1856, see Sharar, pp. 36-74.

two hundred mosques in Shahjahanabad, all the large ones and more than half of the mohalla mosques were built by the Emperor Shahjahan or his great dependents.¹ The nawabi city of Lucknow followed this general pattern of growth and was enlarged by each successive nawab.

The wealth of the nawabs and their propensity to "squander" it had been roundly condemned by western observers. Wajid Ali Shah (1847-1856) for example, ". . . spent his revenues right royally. . . . So one could tell of a purse of gold flung at a beggar, another of a life pension granted to a tailor for inventing a new way of sewing spangles to a waistcoat; for there was no lack of insensate munificence. . . ."² Nasiruddin Hyder (1827-1837), who was allegedly under the influence of a wily European barber, paid "nearly nine thousand pounds a month for the barber's bills" from the annual revenues of Oudh, which were reputed to be "upward of a million and a half [pounds]."³

The townspeople viewed the nawabs from a different perspective. Asaf ud Dowlah (1775-1797), the city's founder-patron, whom Lakhnawis remember with the greatest affection, was best known for his munificence. Shopkeepers in Lucknow, even to the present day, are reputed to repeat the couplet: "jis ko na de Maula/ tis ko de Asaf-ud-daulah" which means "who from Heaven nought receiveth/ to him Asaf-ud-daulah giveth."⁴ The nawabs of

¹Stephen P. Blake, "Dar-ul-Khilafat-i-Shahjahanabad: the Padshahi Shahar in Mughal India, 1556-1739," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Chicago, 1974).

²Flora Annie Steel, On the Face of the Waters (3rd ed.; London: William Heinemann, 1897), p. 3.

³W. Knighton, The Private Life of an Eastern King (New York: J.S. Redfie 1855) p. 104. This quasi-fictional account of the Oudh court, more than any other work, popularised in England and America the image of the Oudh Kings as debauched, cruel and profligate.

⁴As quoted and translated in H.C. Irwin, The Garden of India, vol. 1,

Lucknow were renowned country-wide for the distinctive culture they developed in Lucknow -- an exaggerated version of the highly Persianized Indo-Mughal style of living and consumption that had flourished in the imperial court in Delhi. Lucknow gained a reputation for the finest cuisine, for more local Urdu poets than lived in the rest of India, as a centre for music and dance, for religious men and litterateurs, for fairs and grand Moharram processions, and for what was considered the best in taste, manners, refinement, and culture.¹

Western observers did not fail to notice the "beggar-plague" in the city -- a lamentable and incongruous feature in so rich a city.² The majority of these "diseased, deformed, diminutive wretches" were "old women"³ -- which suggests that the beggars were indeed those who were old and infirm and unable to work. Begging was among the generally misunderstood eastern institutions. The presence of beggars was more the result of the Islamic injunction of giving alms than a reliable indicator of poverty.

Lucknow was invariably perceived as a densely populated city with areas where extreme overcrowding made it almost distasteful. The "oily, steaming crowd, redolent of unsavory odors"⁴ made it a very unattractive

p. 85. Oñe Nizam of Hyderabad had a similar reputation; see Harriet R. Lynton and Mohini Rajan, The Days of the Beloved (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974), pp. 71-82.

¹Abdul Halim Sharar, Lucknow: The Last Phase of an Oriental Culture, translated and edited by E.S. Harcourt and Fakhir Hussain (London: Paul Elek, 1975), p. 193. Sharar's work studiously recaptures the society, manners, morals, and extravagances that characterized the nawabi. His work has become the source of historical myths in circulation among the descendants of the Oudh courtiers today.

²Knighton, p. 112.

³Ibid.

⁴Knighton, p. 149.

place for Europeans. Mrs. Meer Hasan Ali, an avid spectator of religious processions, saw Lucknow filled with "vast multitudes of people parading backwards and forwards, on horseback, in palkies [palanquins], and on foot."¹ In its ". . . narrow but picturesque streets bazaars were abundantly stocked, the population was literally 'teeming,' so that it was impossible to ride or even drive in the streets save at a walk. . . ."² The physical structure of the city defied comprehension. In a British map of Lucknow reproduced in Fig. 1, there is no attempt to delineate more than a few major thoroughfares; the city is simply a shaded patch labelled "dense."

These impressions of Lucknow being a place with "swarming," "teeming" throngs has led to gross overestimations of its population.³ In 1858, Russell cited the generally accepted view that "the city is said to contain about a million of people, and 150,000 armed at the very least."⁴ The perception was probably aided by the fact that the British strongholds in the city were under siege and the enemy appeared more numerous than they really were. The precise figure of the population, had there been one, would probably not have affected these perceptions. In fact, in 1867, when the population of the city was officially estimated to be well below 300,000, the Lucknow correspondent for the Pioneer was still talking of "the teeming population of Lucknow, said to be nearly a million. . . ."⁵

¹Mrs. Meer Hasan Ali, p. 16.

²Rouse, p. 6.

³See Cohn, "Urbanization and Social Mobility," pp. 21-22, where he finds this to be true of Benaras . and suggests that the narrow streets and small chauks (squares) and bazaars which formed the commercial areas gave a sense of huge crowds. See Blake, p. 153, for the case of Shahjahanabad.

⁴Russell, My Indian Mutiny Diary, p. 59.

⁵Pioneer, 13 November 1867.




Fig. 1. Lucknow in 1857

Source: Lt. Gen. McLeod Innes, Lucknow and Oude in the Mutiny (London: A.D. Innes and Company, 1895).

A more realistic figure for the population of Lucknow at the time of annexation in 1856 would be around 400,000. The 1872 census of Oudh states that the city, in 1856, had 370,000 inhabitants, with the caveat that most government and nawabi records were destroyed during the mutiny and therefore it was "not known" on what data this estimate was based.¹ The first official count, made for tax purposes in 1862 and repeated in the census of 1872, showed that the population was 284,779.² The population continued to decline marginally for the next forty years. In 1911 it was 259,798, but it was still greater than that of Delhi.³

In spite of the decline the city suffered first by its annexation to the British empire and the departure of the Oudh court into exile, and a year later in the full-scale "mutiny" and rebellion against the new rulers, Lucknow managed to keep its rank as the fourth most populous city in the Indian empire. Only the presidency towns of Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras were more populous. The area of the city was nearly 29 square miles of which the cantonment comprised 9.25 miles.⁴ The city also included some thirty-three villages within the city limits (more than half privately owned) which yielded a total of Rs. 13,500 as revenue.⁵ The city had, therefore,

¹Report on the Census of Oudh, compiled by J. Charles Williams (Lucknow: Oudh Government Press, 1872), Appendix E, p. i.

²Census of India, 1911 (Calcutta: Superintendent of Government Printing, 1913), vol. 1, part II, p. 16 (table 4).

³Ibid.

⁴Lucknow: A Gazetteer, vol. 37 of the District Gazetteers of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh (Allahabad: Government Press, 1904), p. 63.

⁵Letter no. 3476, from Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, to Secretary to GOI, Home Department, 11 August 1869, basta no. 69, "municipal," Municipal Corporation Reading Room (hereafter: MCRR), Lucknow.

wide stretches of open space. Some of these were, as we shall see, gradually acquired and developed. The decline in the city's population, as well as in its prosperity and political significance, marked the beginning of the colonial epoch in Lucknow's history.

Another pervasive, and perhaps the most enduring image was that of Lucknow as a city noticeably hostile to Europeans. Bishop Heber reported that "the English . . . often spoke of the anarchical condition, the frequent affrays, the hatred of the European and Christian name, the robberies and murders" in Lucknow.¹ He was, on his visit, "cautioned expressly, by more people than one, never to go into the populous parts of the city except on an elephant, and attended by some of the Resident's or the King's chuprassees [guards]," even though his own experience in the city convinced him that Lucknow had shown

a far greater spirit of hospitality and accommodation than two foreigners would have met with in London. . . . Some instances, indeed, which related of Europeans being insulted and assaulted in the streets and neighbourhood of Lucknow, were clearly traced to insolent or overbearing conduct on the part of the complainants themselves.²

This impression was undoubtably created by the fact that men went about armed with either matchlocks, guns, or pistols or "with a short bent sword called a tulwar and a shield certainly."³ The nobles were

usually accompanied about the streets with their armed retainers, the more numerous in proportion to their rank; and it is by no means an unusual thing to witness

¹Reginald Heber, Narrative of a Journey Through the Upper Provinces of India, 3 vols. (4th ed.; London: John Murray, 1829), vol. 2, p. 63.

²Ibid.

³Knighton, p. 11.

fight between such bands in narrow streets of the lower town. . . . Much blood is often thus shed.
1

The hostile city found its apotheosis in 1857, when it was turned into a battlefield swarming with thousands of armed sepoys.

The City as Battlefield

The role of political vicissitudes in the life span of the nawabi city is patent. It is therefore surprising that studies on colonial urbanization have neither systematically scrutinized nor appreciated the most significant historical event for the colonialists in India.² I hope to employ this unused perspective -- and relate the experience of the "mutiny" to the colonial urbanization that ensued in Lucknow.

In just over a year of British rule in Oudh, most of northern India was convulsed with the "mutiny" and rebellion of 1857. This event proved traumatic for the tiny number of British rulers who controlled the vast Indian empire. It is necessary to recall this trauma in some of its horrifying detail, to understand how the siege of Lucknow in 1857-58 was to transmute and shape the form and function of the city. The story of the 140 day long siege of Lucknow has been told in letters, diaries, memoirs, reminiscences, plays, poems, novels, newspapers, government documents, military histories, and scholarly accounts, and the "mutiny" is the most written about event in Indian history.³ I will present only a few selected

¹Ibid., pp. 110-111.

²This is, perhaps, due to the same reasons that literature on Indian cities is at best scanty: India was perceived by the British as essentially a rural society, and the "real" Indian was the peasant. See Cohn, urbanization and Social Mobility," pp. 1-2.

³Obviously, it would be both impossible and unnecessary to list even

flashbacks from contemporary sources, to recreate the city as battlefield.

In Lucknow, the "mutiny" began in the cantonment a few miles north of the river (see Figure 1). Indian sepoy, acting on a prearranged signal, set fire to the lodgings of officers and soldiers of the 32nd Foot, the only European regiment in Lucknow. In the heat of June the Europeans were hastily evacuated from the cantonment, and European women and children from lesser stations in Oudh were also ordered to Lucknow. The residency and the Chattar Manzil palace complex served as the ill-protected retreat for the dwindling numbers of the besieged. In October 1857 the exact count was: 2,396 European men -- soldiers, civilians, and local inhabitants -- 755 native soldiers, 245 European women, 227 European children, 2,706 camp followers, and 611 native servants -- a total of 6,938 people.¹

Fear was pervasive because the residency was located in the thick of the city, albeit on an eminence:

We were in no fort at all: we occupied a few houses in a large garden with a low wall on one side and only an earthen parapet on the other, in a middle of a large city . . . swarming with thousands of . . . foes.²

Civilians and military men, cooped within the residency compound, acted in terror and desperation. Martin Gubbins, the "short-tempered and even more stubborn" financial commissioner, converted his large house into a veritable

a small part of this literature. The most recent narrative of the "mutiny" as a whole is Christopher Hibbert, The Great Mutiny; India 1857 (New York: The Viking Press, 1978). On the Lucknow siege, see the popular account by Michael Edwardes, A Season in Hell; the Defence of the Lucknow Residency (New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, 1973).

¹F.C. Maude and J.W. Sherer, Memories of the Mutiny, 2 vols. (2nd ed.; London: Remington and Company, 1894), vol. 1, p. 324.

²G. Harris, A Lady's Diary of the Siege of Lucknow (London, 1858), p. 192.

fort. He found that "a volume of Lardner's Encyclopaedia could stop a musket ball after passing through 120 pages," and Sir Henry Lawrence's military secretary sacrificed for the barricades his "splendid library . . . of priceless Oriental manuscripts."¹ The residency gardens were uprooted, and giant trees cut down to dig trenches and lay mines. The city -- the old, dirty, native city with its crooked streets and closely-built houses -- seemed almost impenetrable by contrast.

Many of the thrusts against the rebels in the city were disastrous. A lengthy account of the progress of a relieving column making its way to the residency vividly reveals the frustrations of the men who had to defend the key city in the province against itself:

The city [on the south side] . . . is skirted by very thickly wooded gardens, with high walls of mud, and long, narrow lanes, with straggling lines of houses and mud huts, forming excellent covers for the enemy, who only fight behind mud walls. Well, we had to go through at least three miles of this . . . and thousands and thousands of rebels were lurking in the thick sugar canes on all sides.

Well, we went on . . . losing men left and right; on and on through the most intricate places [with] halts innumerable . . . while roads were picked and routes determined. . . . [We] had to pass under the very walls while the rebels on the walls hurled down stones and bricks, and even spat [at us] . . . a fierce fire being kept up from the loopholes. . . . It was cruel work; brave troops being exposed to such unfair fighting. What can men do against loopholed houses? . . . We ran the gauntlet regularly through the streets. . . . Our men were knocked down like sheep without being able to return the fire of the enemy with any effect. . . . Excited men can seldom fire into loopholes with any certainty . . . with sheets of fire shooting out from the houses. On we went about a quarter of a mile, being peppered from all sides. . . . Their guns poured in round-shot day and night, being placed in such dodgy places that our batteries could make no

¹Hibbert, pp. 219, 224-225.

impression upon them. The engineers had so little time to run them up, that most of them were, from a military point of view, quite useless, being exposed to the fire of guns from positions which they had no power of commanding.¹

The besieged, nearly maddened with fear, waited for the enemy to falter and for fresh relieving forces:

There would be heavy cannon fire and musket balls would hammer and dance on walls "like peas in a frying pan." . . . The [European civilian] volunteers would peer into the darkness, listening for the sounds of bodies creeping through the long grass, fancying they saw figures which would then disappear, mistaking the moonlit leaves of the castor-oil tree for the folds of turbans, and opening fire at phantoms.
...²

The hardships of the siege, drove the soldiers to drink -- since alcohol had been abundantly stocked -- and they were often too drunk to fight. Shortages of provisions, clothing, soap, tobacco, medical supplies, and an average of ten deaths of Europeans a day added to the war of nerves inside the residency. A dead soldier's possessions were quickly sold almost before he had been buried in a hastily dug grave. The sight of death was ubiquitous. While in a trench conversing with a colleague, a shot "took away the whole of the back of Captain Fulton's head, his face like a mask still on his neck."³ Another, while eating his breakfast, was struck by a round-shot that came through two brick walls "and when the dust cleared away we found him lying in a crushed heap on the floor as if a suit of clothes had been thrown down. . . ."⁴

¹Extract from a letter by Henry Davis Willock, as printed in Maude and Sherer, vol. 1, pp. 542-546. Emphasis in the original.

²Hibbert, p. 245.

³Hibbert, p. 249.

⁴Ibid.

Others were dying not so dramatically or heroically but wretchedly, of disease. There was an outbreak of cholera and smallpox during those terrible months. Women and children were sickening and dying constantly. Mrs. Brydon's diary has the following entries:

25 July . . . Poor little Helen Grant died yesterday of cholera. . . . Baby still ailing and so thin. Mary Anne drooping sadly, quite lost her appetite . . . very feverish. . . .

August 17 . . . Mrs. Green died last night and Mrs. Levin's baby the night before. Major Bird's baby was buried this evening . . .

August 30 . . . A sergeant's wife and baby both died today . . .¹

Mrs. Boileau's account of her daughter's death is equally moving:

September 1st. My darling Ina very ill, with ulcerated sores and diarrhoea. . . . I fear she can never get over this. . . .

September 2nd. Baby is no better. . . . I get a little milk for her and break up a hard ration biscuit in it. . . .

September 13th. . . . My little darling was taken from me at five o'clock after such a night of agony and painful watching as I pray God I may never spend again. . . .

Sergeant Court made her a little coffin. . . . I put her into it with my own hands. . . . She was carried away to that wretched, mournful churchyard. . . . Oh, God Almighty comfort me. . . .²

There was in the makeshift hospital "squalor and disagreeable fetid smell which pervaded the long hall of the sick;" latrines were full and since the sweepers had deserted there was no one to empty them. "To the smell of these was added the stench of corpses and carcasses of animals left rotting in the heat."³ There were mosquitoes and flies, and other vermin:

I have never before appreciated how terrible a thing a plague of flies can be; they have been bred by the

¹As excerpted in Ibid.

²As excerpted in Ibid., pp. 249-250.

³Ibid., p. 241.

innumerable dead bodies of men and animals. The moment one sits down they settle on every exposed part of the body: they drown themselves in tea and gravy, immolate themselves on the ends of cigars, accompany to one's mouth all one's food and render sleep next to impossible.¹

These encounters with disease and dirt and death were etched on the minds of the survivors and were commemorated in their attempts at city planning after their almost miraculous relief and eventual victory in 1858.

The Urban Aftermath of Revolt

After Lucknow was recaptured by the British, the keystone of imperial urban policy was laid: the crucial first step in the process of reconsolidation of power was to hold firmly the principal city in the province, the seat of regional authority in Oudh. Here they were to perfect a system of political, economic and social control that would make future "mutinies" impossible. This system would then serve as a model for the organization of other towns in Oudh which were centres of indigenous local authority.

In the next two decades thoughts and energies were devoted to evaluating the failure of past policies and to hammering out fresh, bold ones to bolster the shaken foundations of the Raj in Oudh. The crisis left its mark on policy and praxis, and in its lengthening shadow the urban world of Lucknow was transformed. This study will, it should be reiterated, concentrate on examining the dynamics and mechanism of this transformation in the nawabi city of Lucknow -- the urban aftermath, as it were, of revolt.²

¹G.L. Verney, The Devil's Wind: The Story of the Naval Brigade at Lucknow (London: Hutchinson and Company, 1956), pp. 139-140.

²Apologies to T.R. Metcalf.

Civic planning in a post gunpowder-treason-and-plot era naturally reflected the insecurity and fear that pervaded the counsels of those who undertook the task of evolving a more effective form of government in the city. Whatever the economic and social costs, the desired end was to achieve the creation of a rebellion-proof environment that would restore the confidence of the ruling class and make the capital a solid base from where the rest of the province could easily be governed and the revenue collected. The goal was unambiguous: it would take unambiguous military bureaucrats to achieve it.

The situation was summed up by the financial commissioner of Oudh, an astute participant observer of that time:

The importance of holding Lucknow . . . could not be exaggerated. . . . If Lucknow, the most important city in Upper India next to Delhi, could be held, and the British flag still made to float over the battered seat of British authority in Oudh, the effect would be immense.¹

Three imperatives came to dominate policy, determine legislation, and supply the rationale for action in the urban context: safety, sanitation, and loyalty. During the ten horrible months of revolt, the city of Lucknow had demonstrated to the British that it was physically impossible to defend, that its insanitary conditions had nurtured disease that had claimed a large number of European lives, and that virtually all its citizens were tainted in varying degrees by rebelliousness. Nothing was more urgent, therefore, than to make it safe, clean and loyal.

These three themes, therefore, rather than chronology, supply the focus for this thesis. Each is the subject of a major chapter divided into several subsections to illustrate how various facets of urban development

¹M.R. Gubbins, An Account of the Mutinies in Oudh and the Siege of the Lucknow Residency (London: R. Bentley, 1858), p. 350.

were inspired by the need for political control. Some overlapping is inevitable -- for instance, the police, though chiefly responsible for civic safety, also played a role in enforcing sanitary laws and were a constituent party of the municipality -- and such purely organizational dilemmas have been resolved arbitrarily, in the interest of maintaining a balance between competing themes. It will be of added interest to see how the newly created institution that incorporated these disparate functions operated in the civic arena.

From the point of view of the new rulers, the city, first of all, had to be safe. The danger perceived was not from external attack but from internal conspiracy, rebellion, or sabotage. We have seen how the densely populated part of the city had been a frightening maze of narrow streets and blind alleys where many an ill-fated sortie had been undertaken. The second chapter of this study will examine in detail the military plans to improve civic defence and communications, the construction of the cantonment and civil station as the new sections of the city juxtaposed to the half-ruined old, and the emerging colonial morphological pattern. If the structure of the old city had affected the course of the rebellion and prolonged the siege, the traumatic experience of the siege would exert a profound influence on the new urban form.¹ The second chapter will examine the extent of the actual demolitions in the city, its colonial-style rebuilding, and whether, in fact, this made the city safe for its new rulers.

Cleanliness was the Victorian shorthand for a variety of related concerns: morbidity, disease, sanitation, salubrity, drainage, conservancy,

¹For an excellent discussion on how European cities were redesigned to make rioting difficult, particularly in Vienna and Paris after the Revolution of 1848, see Eric Hobsbaum, Revolutionaries: Contemporary Essays (New York: The New American Library, 1975), pp. 220-223.

"social disease," hospitals, water supply, vegetation, clean air, parks, gardens, density and over-crowding. Indian cities were notoriously "unhealthy" and Lucknow was particularly so. Disease had accounted for a greater number of European dead than enemy action. These concerns were articulated in institutional form, but questions remain of whether the civic government was effective in making the entire city clean and what the financial and social costs of implementing these new policies were. These major issues are discussed in chapters three and four, with special emphasis on the evolution of a centralized civic authority and civic taxation as important features of colonial urban development. An attempt will be made to describe, wherever the available evidence permits, the ways in which the new government impinged upon the lives of the ordinary citizen. Colonial policies will be evaluated for their overall effect on the local population as well as for the extent to which they fulfilled the goals of their authors.

Finally, though in no way less urgent than safety and salubrity, there was the need for native stalwarts to support the Raj. Disaffection had spread like a disease and the entire urban environment had to be politically sanitized. Disloyalty, surmised or proven, was punished and loyalty rewarded. Chapter five will deal with a number of questions: Which of the native elite groups did the British seek as their allies? What inducements did they offer for future "collaboration" and support? What realignments and regroupings occurred among the old elite groups?

The introduction of Western education, to a large extent, was to be the sure tool in fashioning a loyal elite. These men would give handsomely to charitable and "progressive" causes, like hospitals and schools, and perhaps even give up traditional extravagance and become the pillars of the

new urban society. The periodic darbars (court assemblage) provided splendid opportunities for the ritualistic and gaudy display of loyalty, as they had done in the past, to impress both participants and observers alike with the legitimacy and power of the new regime. For the bureaucrat, loyalty, or pledges of loyalty in the future, was the criterion that distinguished the good from the bad, the Ariels from the Calibans. For the citizens it was the familiar route to elite status and wealth. Chapter five also deals with these various modes of accommodation and survival adopted by the ruling and indigenous elites.

The process of reconstruction and repression in the city took two decades to realize. In 1877 Oudh was amalgamated with the North West Provinces to form one administrative unit, and Lucknow lost its position of capital city to Allahabad and remained, for the next three decades, an uneventful provincial town. Eighteen seventy-seven is, therefore, a logical year at which to conclude this study. The effects of these two urgent decades, 1857-1877, are visible in Lucknow even today; the colonial legacy of urban government and the patterns, trends, and direction of civic policies have undergone no radical or qualitative change, even though the motivating force behind them disappeared long ago.

CHAPTER II

THE CITY MUST BE SAFE

The army of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief is in possession of Lucknow, and the city lies at the mercy of the British Government, whose authority it has for nine months rebelliously defied and resisted. . . . From this day it will be held by a force which nothing can withstand, and the authority of the Government will be carried into every corner of the province.

-- Lord Canning, Viceroy¹

To the British, the old nawabi capital of Lucknow was a sinister and dangerous city. It had all the characteristics that had made rebellion easy. As Eric Hobsbawm writes:

Suppose, then, we construct the ideal city for riot and insurrection. . . . It ought to be densely populated and not too large in area. Essentially it should still be possible to traverse it on foot. . . . It should perhaps not be divided by a large river, not only because bridges are easily held by the police, but also because it is a peculiar fact of geography or social psychology that the two banks of a river look away from each other, as anyone living in South London or on the Paris left bank can verify. Its poor ought to be relatively homogenous socially or racially, . . . It ought to be centripetal, that is to say, its various parts ought to be naturally oriented towards the central institutions of the city, the more centralized the better. The medieval city republic which was the system of flows towards and away from the main assembly place, which might also be the main ritual centre, the main market and the location of the government,

¹Proclamation, 26 March 1858, Foreign/Secret nos. 71, 72, NAI.

was ideally suited to insurrection for this reason.¹

He goes on to say that in cities where "palaces, town houses of the great nobles, markets, cathedrals, public squares and slums were intermingled" a riot could be organized fairly quickly and the rulers would be at the mercy of the mob.² By these standards, the nawabi city of Lucknow, with some distinctly "Islamic city" features,³ such as a central Friday mosque, tortuous lanes and teeming population, unseparated buildings that served both residential and commercial needs, and several smaller mosques, temples, and public assembly halls, provided, in 1857, an open invitation to a riot. City structure, however, can only be conducive to riots; it cannot cause them. The causes lie in the social, economic, and political structures. In Lucknow, although the attempt in 1857 to overthrow the British had eventually failed, the factors that had fuelled it remained, though in a somewhat attenuated form. Therefore it was logical and necessary to modify the form of the city to make it less congenial to rioting.

Even before the revolt, living in Lucknow had made the Europeans somewhat uneasy. In April 1856, Captain Moorsom of the 52nd Regiment was commissioned to undertake a detailed survey of the city and prepare a map for the better understanding of the layout of the closely built up areas of the city.⁴ His services as an intelligence officer proved invaluable during the revolt, since he was probably the only European who understood

¹Eric Hobsbawm, Revolutionaries (New York: New American Library, 1973), p. 222.

²Ibid., p. 224.

³See Xavier de Planhol, The World of Islam (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1959), pp. 1-41, for a persuasive discussion on the Islamic city.

⁴Letter, Col. C. Campbell to Lt. W.R. Moorsom, 5 April 1856. Ms. Moorsom papers, IOL.

the structure of the "native city."¹ During the siege it became obvious to the military that mosques and larger residences must be seized and demolished as these provided convenient shelter for the rebels. Sir Henry Lawrence, who was the commanding officer in Lucknow until he was killed during the siege, resisted the sound tactical advice of the Bengal Engineers and Brigadier Inglis was not loath to point out the harm done by his "conciliation policy" and the "tenderness" shown to "the religious prejudices" of the rebels:

Indeed, our heaviest losses have been caused by the enemy's sharp shooters stationed in the adjoining mosques and houses of the nobility, the necessity of destroying which had been repeatedly drawn to the attention of Sir Henry by the staff of the Engineers. But his invariable reply was -- 'Spare the holy places and private property too as far as possible,' . . . The fact is of itself sufficient to prove that without new men we shall have no new system, that it is not sufficient to change merely the laws of our regime.²

These counsels were quickly heeded after the siege was over. The daily toll of European lives reflected a grim and hardening experience: Sir Henry's death in July 1857 removed the obstacle to the "new system" to be deployed by the "new men."

Demolitions

The most ambitious of these "new men" was Col. Robert Napier of the Bengal Engineers, who arrived with the relieving force "in the nominal capacity of Military Secretary in Chief . . . but practically as Chief Engineer and Chief of Staff."³ In the ensuing months, Napier planned and

¹Dispatch, Sir J. Outram, from Camp Alam Bagh, 25 November 1857, London Gazette Extraordinary, 17 February 1858. Cutting among Moorsom papers, IOL.

²Friend of India (Calcutta), 9 January 1858.

³H.D. Napier, Field Marshal Lord Napier of Magdala, G.C.G., G.C.S.I. (London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1927), p. 71.

executed many offensives against the rebels, and immediately after the capitulation of Lucknow, he produced, in conjunction with his equally impatient subordinates, his little known "Memorandum on the Military Occupation of the City of Lucknow," dated March 26, 1858.¹ The plan was simple and effective, and judging from the identical pattern of defence activity that went on in Delhi, may well have been the inspiration behind that as well.²

"The city of Lucknow," wrote Napier, in his master plan for civic defences, "from its vast extent, and from the absence of any very prominent features of the ground on which it stands, must always remain difficult to control except by a large body of troops."³ This difficulty could be overcome by establishing several military posts in prominent buildings, "clearing" all buildings and habitations around these posts and along their lines of communication with the countryside for permanent access. And "by opening broad streets through the city, and practicable roads through and around the suburbs," troops would move efficiently and quickly to any danger spot in the city. The nawabi Machhi Bhawan fort, which had a commanding view of the two bridges and the dense native city would be

¹Sir Robert Napier, "Reports on the Defences of Lucknow," Professional Papers [of the Royal Engineers], New Series, vol. 9 (1860), pp. 17-38.

²Percival Spear, Twilight of the Mughuls (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951), pp. 218-221. See also Narayani Gupta, "Military Security and Urban Development: A Case study of Delhi 1857-1912," Modern Asian Studies, 5,1 (1971), pp. 61-77. She, however, does not discuss the author of the Delhi plan, but it is plausible that Napier's ideas influenced the re-designing of Delhi. Napier also wrote a lengthy memorandum on the defences of Kanpur, while convalescing from a wound in that city. See H.D. Napier, p. 93.

³R. Napier, p. 19.

converted into the principal post in the city. He also proposed "to form an esplanade of 600 yards in width" around the Machhi Bhawan "and to open . . . roads radiating from it through the city."¹ This was not all: "every building and garden-enclosure not required for the use of our troops, which exists between the Martiniere and the Gumtee [River], will be cleared away."²

The ruthless logic of the victor seems to pervade the document. "Hardship," mused Napier, "will no doubt be inflicted upon individuals whose property may be destroyed, but the community will generally benefit, and may be made to compensate the individual sufferers."³ How the community would "generally benefit" was not explained, but Napier apparently believed that any militarily motivated structural change made in the city would also make it more livable by opening up bigger and wider spaces. No officer of the Raj, and particularly one as conscientious and God-fearing as Napier, could afford to believe that this enormous destructive activity served merely the selfish ends of the rulers and not the community that was ruled and that paid the bill. Another justification for the plan was sought in the implication, if not in the hope, that the dangerous "over-crowding" inside the old city would automatically be reduced with the intensive effort to demolish large parts of it:

With reference to the extensive removal of parts of the city, both for esplanades and for roads, it must be

¹Ibid. An "esplanade" has been defined as "an open space of ground separating the citadel of a fortress from the town and intended to prevent any person approaching the town without being seen from the citadel," in J.H. Stocqueler, The Military Encyclopedia (London: W.H. Allen, 1853).

²R. Napier, p. 18.

³Ibid., p. 19.

remembered that a very considerable part of the population was supported by the Court and its dependents. Their houses are for the greater part in ruins. Their property has been removed or plundered, and there will exist no inducement for them to return to their former places of residence. The ruins and few deserted houses, if suffered to remain, would harbour the lowest part of the population and become an intolerable nuisance.

With the cessation of the lavish expenditure of a large Eastern Court, the population of Lucknow must diminish very considerably. The demolition proposed therefore will hardly anticipate the inevitable results of the change in the fortunes of the city.¹

The memorandum encapsulated Napier's vision of a safe city on 26 March, 1858 and it took two decades and vast sums of civic revenue to realise. His plan, with only minor changes in the routes of certain roads and a hundred yard reduction of the proposed esplanade to 500 yards "in order to avoid cutting into the Chowk,"² was fully implemented.

Though there is no evidence of any citizen being consulted, these modifications may possibly have been achieved by local pressure, because the Chowk was the heart of the commercial world of the old city.³ Later, when Urdu newspapers were available to record protest, we have several instances of complaints against the plan that had called for such wanton destruction:

After the Mutiny, when the houses of the city were levelled to the ground, the graveyard, passing by the home of Tukya Hazrat Shah Peer Jaleel, was dug out in the middle, four feet deep, to form a road 150 feet broad, thereby destroying hundreds of graves. . . . The few remaining sepulchres have

¹Ibid., pp. 18-19.

²Ibid., p. 20.

³In Delhi, the Dariba, the street of the silversmiths, was reprieved on a petition from city panchayats (neighbourhood committees). See Spear, Twilight of the Mughuls, p. 222.

recently been dug out by a European, who chose their clay to build his house with, and had it removed to the Kaiser Bagh in carts.¹

Everything that came in the path of a proposed road, be it a house, cemetery, or mosque, was expeditiously levelled. A stern memorandum by the Chief Commissioner of Oudh implied that these demolitions disrupted normal life and spread chaos in the city. "Lucknow," he suggested, "requires emergently [sic] and at once a Civil organization vigorous and complete," because, "what with demolitions, Prize Agents, uncontrolled police, oppression of the soldiery, etc. the wonder is not that there is an exodus, but that any people are left at all."² The memo suggests that demolition squads would arrive in an area destined for clearance and proceed to engage in their work, often without taking even the elementary precaution of making sure that the houses about to be razed were empty. The city magistrate should ascertain "the lines of demolition absolutely in progress" and "give to the inhabitants on such lines three days notice and point to them suitable localities now empty where they may reside unmolested." He was also to ensure "that houses marked for demolition are empty" at the time of the actual blasting. The people, however "must distinctly understand that the parties evacuating their houses on foolish alarms are subject to the confiscation of the houses so left."³

¹Karnamah (Lucknow), 25 November 1872, VNR.

²Memorandum of the Chief Commissioner, "Civil Organization of the City of Lucknow," 23 July 1858; no. 186, Foreign/Political, NAI.

³Ibid. The research for this thesis was done in Lucknow and Delhi from October 1975 to December 1976 -- the era of Mrs. Gandhi's Emergency. It was not difficult to visualize the demolitions of 1858 -- because in 1976 municipal demolition squads accompanied by truck loads of policemen would descend upon a locality where a road-widening or slum-removal plan was being executed. Though, presumably, notice of the demolitions was given, the actual bulldozing would take place at 7 a.m. or earlier and people were surprised

The nawabi buildings taken over for military purposes were to have individual esplanades with "all suburbs and buildings not required for our establishments" cleared away so that "the buildings occupied by our troops" may not be approachable under cover and "may command as great a range as possible."¹ These were "the palaces extending along the line of the river from the Residency to near the 'Kaiserbagh,' including "Teree Kotee," "Chutter Munzil" and "Fureed Baksh."² (See Figure 2.)

The Napier plan exceeded the bounds of strategic necessity. It was implicitly punitive against the Muslim community whose role in the revolt was perceived as being far more culpable than that of the Hindu. The two main sacred targets were the Jami Masjid and the Asafi Imambara. The imambara was seen as a "strong building" which could readily be fortified to command the approach to the city from the north and to shelter an entire regiment.³ In the case of the Jami Masjid, however, there seemed to be little or no justification from the military point of view to divest it of its ritual purpose. It could billet only a hundred men, was only 800 yards from the next post, and its conversion into a barracks, even Napier conceded, was "not absolutely necessary."⁴


in their houses. I was, in fact, interviewing a small shopkeeper early one morning, when the entire Nakhas bazaar, declared to be an encroachment on the edges of Victoria Street, began to be dismantled. There was panic for some moments but soon the shopkeepers began to voluntarily remove their portion of the "encroachments" to save their merchandise and to avoid any direct confrontation with the police and the "Emergency Raj."

¹R. Napier, p. 20.

²Letter, James Outram to Colin Campbell, The Times (London) 30 September 1857.

³R. Napier, p. 21.

⁴Ibid.



No restraining conscience or voice of moderation spoke out in favour of "the holy place" immediately after the revolt. The implications of using the imambara, which was also the tomb of one of the best loved nawabs of Oudh, as a regimental barracks, was to add the ultimate insult to injury. British troops ate pork, swilled alcohol, trampled the sacred hall in regimental boots, and manifested every other kind of contempt for the religion of the old rulers of the province.¹

The takeover of the Jami Masjid, which seemed merely wanton at the time, had far more damaging effects on the city as a whole and on the Muslim community in particular. It had been the heart of Muslim religious life in the city² where Shia and Sunni, rich and poor alike, congregated several times a day and for the namaz on Friday. The corollary to the decision to appropriate the mosque was to extend the esplanade well beyond the main post, as is evident from the plan (see Figure 2) which destroyed several mohallas that formed the core of the city. Today the Jami Masjid is no more than a picturesque ruin on a barren eminence with an unpeopled esplanade around it. Periodic attempts at rehabilitating it have failed since it now stands on the periphery of what remains of the

¹The Asafi Imambara today may be visited by tourists, but no footwear is permitted inside the main vault. The tourist guide's Urdu commentary includes details of the desecration wrought by the soldiers during the occupation of the Imambara for nearly thirty years after the revolt.

²The role of the Friday mosque in any "Islamic" city is well established in de Planhol, p. 6. "First of all, the cornerstone of Islam is prayer, and communal prayer. The most important prayer of all occurs on Friday, when the whole community assembles to pray. Such a custom requires a permanent mosque, where an important assembly like this can take place. Originally the [Islamic] city was simply the place of the great Friday-prayer mosque, as opposed to several little mosques for daily prayer. . . ."

old city and is no longer the convenient locus it once was. Lucknow has no Friday mosque. The small mohalla mosques only serviced the normal mohalla clientele, because they were restricted in space and privately owned. None of these could physically or symbolically replace what had specifically and grandly been built as Lucknow's Friday mosque and maintained by the largess of the nawabs of Oudh.¹ The seizure of the venue for the traditional weekly rituals of congregating, praying, and socializing for the Muslim community as a whole probably led to a greater polarization between Shiites and Sunnis. They were as a consequence forced to use only the smaller mohalla mosques that had a more sectarian character.²

The demolitions were a slow and expensive business and the citizens learned to resign themselves to the desolate rubble heaps, disintegrating neighbourhoods, and the financial burden of these operations. A thoughtful municipal committee put on the register a resolution to remove the ruins more expeditiously. It stated:

The levellings and smoothings consequent upon the war, have long since been effected at very heavy expenditure by local funds. . . . These operations destroyed about a fifth of the best habitations in the city. . . . The committee cannot too strongly impress upon the government the imperative necessity of obliterating from the minds of the inhabitants of this town the remembrance of their losses in demolished houses.³

¹Several small mosques had been seized and used as shops and homes for non-Muslims. The demand for their restitution became the Muslim cause celebre for the next two decades (see sections on mosques, pp. 204-205, burial grounds, pp. 107-111, below).

²This conclusion is based on several interviews with Muslims of both sects in the city; it remains to be substantiated by direct documentary evidence. I did find a great number of written complaints, both to the government and in the Urdu newspapers, against the desecration of mosques.

³Resolution no. 334, 29 May 1861, Proceedings of the Municipal Committee (hereafter: PMC), MCRR.

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Presevation Foundation, Chandigarh

In May 1865 the "demolition improvements were still in progress,¹ and remained so well beyond the period under consideration.

Communications

The rebuilding and extension of communications in Oudh, with Lucknow as the centre of the network, was the next item on the Napierian agenda. It was not that the official world was unaware, before the rebellion, of the fact that good communications were basic to firm political control in Oudh; it was just that this truth glared with uncomfortable intensity after the failure of existing communications had put an empire in jeopardy. Precipitate action was taken to build inter- and intra-city roads, to open Lucknow to rail, telegraph, and postal systems, and to mend and rebuild bridges, while maintaining controlled access to the city.

The building of roads, to make Lucknow district more accessible to the capital city and to facilitate troop and vehicular movements within the city, was an integral part of the plan to strengthen civil defences. The chief commissioner, Mr. Montgomery, reiterated this intent in his report to the governor general in 1859, stating that the roads from Lucknow to Faizabad, Bahramghat, Sitapur, Rai Bareli, and Sultanpur, which were essential for "rapid communications," for "military purposes," and for the "furtherance of commercial traffic," would be metalled and kept in good repair.² Lucknow would, by this enormous expansion, be linked not only to

¹Pioneer, 10 May 1865, p. 4.

²As cited in V. C. Sharma, ed., Lucknow, vol. 37 of the U.P. District Gazetteers (Allahabad: Government of Uttar Pradesh, Revenue Department, 1959), p. 182. For a detailed account of road and river traffic between Lucknow and its hinterland, see William Hoey, A Monograph on Trade and Manufactures of Northern India (Lucknow: American Methodist Mission Press, 1880), pp. 28-31.

its hinterland, but also to the rest of the Indian empire. For inter-city connections three major roads (nos. 1, 2, and 4 in Figure 2) and seven lesser ones were to be driven through the "dense parts of the city" to form

the main arteries . . . [and] should not be less than 150 feet broad; they are absolutely necessary in a military point of view to reduce to order a large and turbulent city, of which not a single inhabitant came forward to our assistance, either openly or secretly, during the time of our misfortune.¹

Road building within the city was given top priority, as evidenced by the chief engineer's report on the progress of Napier's recommendations,² and had some unexpected social consequences.

The new roads were qualitatively and functionally different from the streets, lands and alleys which the people of Lucknow traversed and used for a variety of purposes. Streets in the old nawabi city were neither broad nor straight. If anything, they were narrow and meandering and often had blind curves and encroachments to make movement very slow. For instance, road no. 8 in Napier's scheme was "very urgently wanted" because "the only existing road wanders through the suburbs [mohallas] and may be altogether condemned."³ Many such tortuous streets disappeared. "The winding street is gone," reminisced a veteran of the Lucknow siege about one of the daring probes along a twisting alley, "and a broad thoroughfare takes its place, and the visitor finds it difficult to realise [how] the tormented column struggled along. . . ."⁴ This was characteristic of streets in all old cities

¹Ibid., p. 19.

²Ibid., p. 28.

³Ibid., p. 20.

⁴W.H. Fitchett, The Tale of the Great Mutiny (2nd ed.; London: John Murray, 1912), p. 422.

37

Streets served principally as areas where people milled and mingled and socialized, where itinerant hawkers lined the curbs, where goods and services were bought and sold, and where traffic, which chiefly comprised pedestrians or beasts-of-burden, was slow-moving and yielded to those who were standing and transacting business. The street was a public space with social and recreational functions. In Lucknow, the custom was often to go to the street not to get anywhere; the street itself was a destination and an event.¹

Another feature of the old city that proved fatal to British forces were the innumerable cul-de-sacs in which the meandering lanes would abruptly end. The concept behind the new streets, therefore, was not only to widen them for quicker troop movement, but to build them from one end of the city to the other, so that there would be an uncircuitous exit from the maze of the old city. The cul-de-sacs were structurally very important in keeping a mohalla compact and intimate, to control and limit traffic, and to preserve the neighbourly spirit and integration that was typical of the city's neighbourhoods.² The new streets

¹The present day equivalent of this custom is called "gunjing" by the Anglicized elite, (gunj=market) but the strolling and walking is done on the footpaths rather than the street itself. For an eloquent account of the sidewalk in American cities, see, Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), pp. 29-87.

²Many colorful descriptions of Lucknow's mohallas, bazaars and streets have been immortalized in accounts by travellers and citizens. The following works are specially recommended as first hand descriptions of nawabi Lucknow: Mrs. Meer Hasan Ali, Observations on the Mussalmauns of India, ed. W. Crooke (2nd ed.; London: Oxford University Press, 1917); Reginald Heber, Narrative of a Journey Through the Upper Provinces of India, from Calcutta to Bombay, 1824-1825, 3 vol.; (4th ed.; London: John Murray, 1829), vol. 2; and Abdul Halim Sharar, Lucknow: The Last Phase of an Oriental Culture, trans. and ed. by E.S. Harcourt and Fakhir Hussain (London: Paul Elek, 1975).

through the organic unity of a mohalla, disrupting its very organization. These social effects were not calculated as the cost of efficient communications.

The traffic now moved on the left, as in the metropolitan society, and policemen (the recent invention of Sir Robert Peel in Britain) regulated traffic and controlled conduct.¹ The direction and dimensions of the military roads were conspicuously unsuited to both the proportions of the mohallas and the river-oriented logic of the vast spread of the city. The older main streets ran in an east-west direction, from the densely populated neighbourhoods in the west to the low-lying, flood-prone east side, where there were scattered orchards, groves, and the main karbala (burial ground), several smaller burial grounds, and suburban homes of the nobility. Victoria Street (road no. 2 in Figure 2), to take only one example of a military road, had a deliberate north-south orientation; it emanated from the Machhi Bhawan fort and cut a swath through the old city, dissecting mohallas (see the map of mohalla Firangi Mahal, Figure 3) and ending in a bridge on the Ghaziuddin Hyder Canal at the southern edge of the city. In time, the small karbala near this bridge became the chief Shiite burial ground and the termination point for the Mohurram procession, which now travelled along Victoria Street since the accustomed route and karbala had been physically obliterated by the development of the civil lines.² The eastern section grew to be an exclusive enclave, forming

¹See sections 31 and 34 of The Police Act, No. V of 1861.

²Evidence for this has been deduced from a study of pre-1858 and later maps and interviews with prominent Shiites in Lucknow, particularly two lawyers, Mirza Raza Ali Khan and Afsar Husain. Both testified to the drastic effects of the demolitions and the fact that Victoria Street and the imambaras along it have become the hub of the Shiite world in the city. The interviews took place between August and December, 1976.




Fig. 3. Map of Firangi Mahal Mohalla

Source: Ms volume, Firangi Mahal mohalla, Lucknow Bandobast of 1869,
Lucknow Collectorate Record Room.

a detached colony for the ruling elite.

While some mohallas tended to wither away, new and uniform rows of shops were built along the edges of the new arteries in an attempt to stem the decay of the old city. The small bazaars, built around twisting and often blind alleys shaded by the height of the buildings on both sides where people worked and lived, bought and sold, prayed and played, were dislocated in the execution of the grandiose and tidy schemes of a generation of military town planners.

Together with modern roads, mechanical communications came to pre-industrial Lucknow. Already during the nawabi, between March and September 1855, there had been abortive negotiations between Wajid Ali Shah, who was anxious to establish a telegraph line between Kanpur and Lucknow, and the British government. The latter refused to sell their technology and expertise to the nawab, but pressed instead for exclusive rights to control the enterprise (which would have included the investment, the laying down and operating of the line and receiving the revenue for it) because its utility at this stage was strictly strategic in nature.¹ The King declined permission, and the arrival of the telegraph era in Oudh had to wait until the next year, when the British took over the entire province, its protesting King and all. The telegraph pole was soon to become a permanent and ubiquitous feature of the townscape.

The railway, which was the symbol, if not the substance, of Britain's industrial revolution, arrived in Lucknow in 1862 as part and parcel of

¹For details of these negotiations see the correspondence between the two parties indexed as: India Foreign/Political Consultations, dated 22 March 1855, 7 August 1855 and 25 September 1855. Ms, IOL. I am grateful to Michael Fisher for bringing this exchange of letters to my attention.

the military establishment.¹ The Oudh and Rohilkhund Railway Company, which began its existence as the Indian Branch Railway Company in that year, held the railway monopoly for the province during the period in question.² The railway was not introduced as the incipient infrastructure of modern India, as apologists of the Raj claim with monotonous regularity. Its prime function was to facilitate troop and commodity movements in a rich but obstreperous part of the empire. In Lucknow it was a necessary auxiliary of the military machine. The officials themselves doubted its value as a stimulant to the flagging commercial pace of the city:

On the contrary, it is expected that the railway, on its completion, will carry past the city such trade as is at present being carried on, and that it will be more concentrated at the two ends of the line, Byramghat and Cawnpore, as the one will be the point of collection and the other of distribution of the commodities.³

These doubts proved to be well-founded because Kanpur quickly outdistanced Lucknow as the centre for trade and industry in the region. The volume of trade on the Lucknow-Kanpur line in 1868-69 was 218,302 maunds (1 maund= approximately 85 lbs.) to Lucknow and 587,963 to Kanpur, or nearly three times the weight destined for Lucknow.⁴

In November, 1865, Col. Crommelin, who had served as chief engineer of Oudh under Brig. Robert Napier, was despatched on special duty to Lucknow to consult with the secretaries of the Public Works departments (PWD) of

¹PMC, 15 March 1877; MCRR.

²P.C. Mukerjee, The Pictorial Lucknow, (unpublished galley proofs, dated 1883), p. 81, U.P. Sanghralaya, Lucknow.

³Annual Report on the Administration of Oudh, 1868-69. (Lucknow: Government Printing Press, 1869), p. 150.

⁴Ibid., p. 105.

Oudh and the North West Provinces, the chief engineer of the branch railway and the executive engineer of the PWD, Oudh, "to take into consideration the best measures for the formation of the great Military Post which is to be made in the South Side of Lucknow . . . to include the Railway Station, Magazine, etc."¹

The railway station was located in a vast open garden called the Charbagh, which was contiguous to the cantonment. The site was thought to be "commercially central and strategically good, with the Cantonments in its rear."² The rebellion had prompted the official decision to convert "all railway stations to military posts."³ This entailed considerable expenditure to redesign and fortify existing railway stations which had been built "without this point in view."⁴ The Lucknow railway station was conceived at the right historical moment to fulfill the decision admirably well:

We shall have model Military Station, including fort, arsenal and barracks, and room for the accommodation of Christian inhabitants in this city in the event of an outbreak. Muchee Baun will, I believe, be simply held as our outpost, or rather as a city post. The magazine will not remain there and it may be abandoned and demolished.⁵

Its primarily military function made the railway station a restricted area where only bona fide passengers were allowed onto the platform. Ordinary citizens were not allowed to receive or see off friends or relatives who

¹Pioneer, 15 November 1865.

²Pioneer, 30 October 1865, p. 4.

³Pioneer, 18 September 1865. "All larger stations were turreted and fortified in case of another mutiny," wrote George Wheeler in his India in 1875-76: The Visit of the Prince of Wales. (London: Chapman and Hall, 1876) p. 217.

⁴Pioneer, 18 September 1865.

⁵Ibid.

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Presevation Foundation, Chandigarh

were travelling. Public discontent about these strict regulations was editorialized in the Akhbar Anjuman, the Urdu newspaper of the otherwise extremely loyal British Indian Association of Lucknow.¹ Passengers, "after much pushing and elbowing," would get their turn at the ticket window, only to be shortchanged or insulted. There was no time to "seek redress" with the station master

since so little time is allowed for the distribution of tickets that the train frequently approaches the platform before all who require them have been supplied. . . . At some stations it is customary to prevent travellers from approaching too near [the Station] and only when tickets are being distributed are they allowed to go near the Station.

In Lucknow a warning bell was sounded but this was often so faint that travellers missed the opportunity of buying tickets at all. After the tickets were bought, ticket holders "were placed in a room and locked," and when the train arrived they were "opened out," but the confusion and panic this system created could not be checked. Then, as a further service, railway peons "order travellers into carriages, and use force if they do not do so quickly, whether there be room for them or not."

Third class compartments, in which no Europeans travelled, were overcrowded, since no reservations were permitted in that class. Theoretically, of course, Indians could travel in the first or second class carriages, but at their own peril, for in practice they were unceremoniously and sometimes violently thrown out of a compartment in which a European held a seat. A further informal practice was "to lock up people in the carriages, so that if anyone wishes to get out at any station, and asks

¹Akhbar Anjuman (Lucknow), 29 February 1868, VNR. The quotes in the following account are excerpted from this editorial.

the peon to open the door, it depends entirely on the temper of the peon whether he will do so or not." The editor suggested that some of the inconvenience to the public would be reduced by permitting general admittance to the platform for the price of a one pice ticket (one pice = 1/64 of a Rupee) which would discourage those who wanted to come to the station out of curiosity, and the peons be reprimanded for their rudeness and be told to perform their duties civilly. It was common for "European ticket collectors . . . [to] beat or rather kick" the passengers, and those who go to the station to see friends off "are very harshly treated by the police, turned out of the station, beaten and kept in restraint . . ." so it was very humiliating for "any respectable Hindustanee to travel by railway."¹

It is abundantly clear from these first hand accounts of the experiences of Indian passengers that the Oudh and Rohilkhund Company did not attract customers by the quality of its services; it exploited them because of its monopoly and because it was, indeed, far quicker and more comfortable than the closest native equivalent, the bullock-cart. The crowds in the third class compartments testify to the growing demand for fast and cheap means of travel, even though trains became a prolific source of racial friction and confrontation.

A glimpse of how the railway impinged on the consciousness of the native gentry is provided in a contemporary picaresque novel, Fasane Azad, set in Lucknow and written by one of the best known men of letters of the time.² Azad, the cultured and open-minded hero, plans a train journey from

¹ Ukmil-ool-Ukbar (Delhi), 15 September 1869, VNR.

² Rattan Nath Sharshar, Fasane Azad, (New Delhi: Maktabah-yi Jami'ah Ltd. 1970), pp. 192-200. This was originally published in four volumes, by the Newal Kishore Press at Lucknow in 1880, in Urdu.

Lucknow to Delhi with a companion in about 1875. They arrive at the station only to be informed that the train was delayed because of an accident caused by a drunken European engine driver. Azad happily goes into the railway restaurant to sample the fare even though his friend refuses to accompany him because pork and liquor (both forbidden in Islam) are served on the premises. When Azad emerges from the restaurant, he is surrounded and queried at length by other Muslim passengers, who had eaten from the various licensed food vendors on the platform. Azad admits to having used a knife and fork, in the British fashion. He tells them how wonderfully clean and comfortable the restaurant was and how tasty the food, but he convinces none of them. They jeer at him for compromising Islamic principles and betraying his own culture. Azad privately decides that he will never again venture into a "forbidden" place when in the company of his obscurantist friends.¹ There can be little doubt that the metropolitan culture, with its sophisticated technology, was envied and admired by a growing number of Indians who had the opportunity to be exposed to it. Yet, pressure from conservative friends inhibited even irrepressible characters like Azad from practising their predilections openly, and British racism made them even more ambivalent to the situation.

The railway was designed more to transport freight than to carry passengers, and the government was its biggest customer. Local mechants remained wary of entrusting their goods to railway authorities because of

¹Ibid., p. 198.

the high incidence of "loss and inconvenience suffered by the people in the transport of their goods by rail . . ." and continued to "transmit their goods largely by means of boats and carts."¹

By 1875 Lucknow had become an important junction and was linked by rail to Kanpur (a 42-mile track was completed in 1867), to Nawabgunj (18 miles, completed in 1872), Shahjehanpur via Hardoi and Sandila. It was a major link in a network of 332 miles on the main line and 210 miles on the branch line, and more miles of track on both lines were under construction.²

The Cantonment

Beyond the railway station lay the new Lucknow cantonment. "The cantonment or permanent military station" as defined by King, "was the institutionalised form of settlement for the military representatives of British colonial power in India from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries."³ A full half century before Oudh was formally annexed in 1856 the British had solidly entrenched their military machine in a cantonment they had developed to the north of the Gomti and a few miles distant from the nawabi capital. A contemporary historian summed up this early relationship:

Of the earliest history of British connexion with the Court of the [nawab] Wuzer it is not necessary to write in detail. There is nothing less creditable in the annals

¹Akhbar-ul Akhbar, 10 February 1874, VNR.

²Oudh Administrative Report, 1874-75, pp. 50-51.

³Anthony D. King, Colonial Urban Development (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976) p. 97. For a fine account of the cantonment in colonial urban development see the entire chapter, pp. 97-121.

of the rise and progress of the British power in the East. The Newab had territory. The Newab had Subjects, The Newab had neighbours; more than all the Newab had money. But although he possessed in abundance the raw material of soldiers, he had not been able to organize an army sufficient for all the external and internal requirements of the State, and so he was forced to avail himself of the superior military skill and discipline of the whitemen, and to hire British Battalions to do his work. At first this was done in an irregular, desultory kind of way, job-work, as in the infamous case of the Rohilla massacre, but afterwards it assumed a more formal and recognised shape, and solemn engagements were entered into with the Newab, by which we undertook, in consideration of certain money payments, known as the subsidy, to provide a certain number of British troops for the internal and external defence of His Excellency's dominions.

In truth it was a vicious system, one that can hardly be too severely condemned. By it we established a double government of the worst kind. The Political and Military Government was in the hands of the Company; the internal administration of the Oudh territories still rested with the Newab-Wuzeer. In other words, hedged in and protected by the British battalions, a bad race of Eastern Princes were suffered to do, or not to do, what they liked. Under such influences it is not strange that disorder of every kind ran riot over the whole length and breadth of the land.¹

When the capital of Oudh was transferred from Faizabad to Lucknow by the nawab-wazir Asaf ud Doulah in 1775, the British military establishment followed suit. Land for the Lucknow cantonment was reluctantly granted by the nawab in 1806, in Muriaon village north of the river.² The British military was initially supported by a nawabi subsidy of thirty-four lakhs of rupees (340,000 pounds sterling) which escalated, as a result of threats and flattery, into an incredible million pounds sterling and the virtual disbanding of the nawab's forces by 1801.³ The annexation ended

¹J.W. Kaye, *A History of the Sepoy War in India, 1857-58*, 3 vols. 3rd ed.; London: W.H. Allen & Co., 1865) vol. 1, pp. 113-114. See also R.W. Bird, *Dacoitee in Excelsis* (1857; reprint ed., Lucknow: Pustak Kendra, 1974), pp. 1-40.

²Bengal Political Consultations, 10 October 1786 and 13 November 1806, IOL.

³For a detailed account of these negotiations see Bird, pp. 22-28.

this era of machinations, and the mutineers destroyed the Muriaon cantonment in 1857. Its bungalows were set on fire and the entire habitation was quickly abandoned.¹ After the rebellion was suppressed, the prominent buildings, which had once been palaces, harems, or religious edifices, were captured, vacated and converted into a string of armed camps made tenable by the smallest number of troops by the summary demolition of all vestiges of habitation in their immediate vicinity. There were fourteen such "emergency" posts created and the number of men allotted to each varied from 150 to 600.² These posts were retained till 1877, even though they were neither strategically necessary in the halcyon times that followed 1858, nor politically wise because they continued to rankle and offend the aggrieved Muslim community and were a potential cause for rebellion. In July 1869 Colonel Nicholson, a veteran of the "mutiny" and now the engineer in charge of the military works of the PWD, drew up plans to reorganize the chief post at Machhi Bhawan, strongly recommending the return of the Asafi Mosque and Imambara to the Muslim community.³ Two years later the restitution was still pending and the commander-in-chief at Lucknow urged in a note that the religious places be returned without delay because he considered the population of the city "subdued and disarmed" and with the cantonment "at close range . . . a small exhibition of troops is enough."⁴ This note produced no results since in December

¹M.R. Gubbins, An Account of the Mutinies in Oudh and the Siege of Lucknow Residency (London: R. Bentley, 1858), pp. 102-103; also see map facing p. 101.

²R. Napier, p. 22.

³Foreign/General B proceedings, July 1869, nos. 33-39, NAI.

⁴Foreign/General B proceedings, May 1871, no. 191, NAI.

1877, even after Oudh had become a part of the North West Provinces, the Muslim community sent up yet another petition, addressed to Queen Victoria on the occasion of her receiving the title of Empress of India at the darbar held in Delhi. In precatory tones the "Citizens of Lucknow and loyal subjects" pleaded that "the Great Imambara and mosque in the Machhi Bhawan in Lucknow be resorted to the Muhammedans."¹

The regular, new cantonment, "one of the 114 purpose-built [sic] cantonments"² in the Indian Empire, was finally located in the east of the city in the spacious Dilkusha garden and a half-dozen contiguous villages, that provided an open, well-drained area for "one of the largest military cantonments in India."³ The selection of a new site was indubitably influenced by the notions of health and sanitation in Indian bureaucratic circles, and often overrode strategic and economic considerations. The final decision may well have been made as it was in The Chronicles of Budgepore,⁴ where it represented the end product of several meetings, discussions and a reconnaissance trip made by the civil surgeon, the commissioner, and the military engineer, the three key bureaucrats in any provincial town. "[The cantonment site] was a plateau of high ground, well drained, and well raised . . . a bare place with only one tree upon it,"⁵ not unlike the Lucknow site except that the vegetation was plentiful

¹Petition no. 409, p. 10, Foreign/Political A proceedings, December 1877, nos. 286-496, NAI.

²King, p. 98.

³Sir Joseph Frayer, Recollections of my Life (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1900) p. 364.

⁴Iltudus Prichard, The Chronicles of Budgepore, or Sketches of Life in Upper India (London: Richard Edward King, Ltd., n.d. [ca 1880]) is one of the finest satires on the British bureaucracy in India.

⁵Ibid., p. 153.

in the latter. The Budgepore military engineer, appropriately named Major Wrangler (and reminiscent of Brigadier Napier) had "a hearty contempt, as you may suppose, for his coadjutors" because he had "contempt for men who did not belong to the Engineers." But, ponders the author, "what would become of the world if everybody was an engineer? Why, it would be scooped inside out, and there would be no place to live in."¹

The Lucknow site required plenty of scooping out since it was "studded with villas surrounded by gardens forming the country residences of the native nobility."² More than three thousand acres of valuable land with an annual revenue demand of nearly twelve thousand rupees was taken over without any prior negotiations with the lawful owners. The explanation for this arbitrary acquisition of private property was that in the "urgent necessity" for building the planned barracks, "the usual preliminary formulas were not observed."³ The total compensation paid for this entire area together with its country palaces, wells, timber, groves, and standing crops was only Rs. 57,537 and left the owners discontented.⁴

Cantonments mushroomed in Oudh after the rebellion. The vast sum of 1.9 million rupees, or 75 per cent of the entire budget of the PWD for the province "was expended on military works, owing to the continued imperative requirement of the European troops at the several new cantonments

¹Ibid., p. 148. This indeed was increasingly the case in Lucknow, where habitations were razed to make room for esplanades.

²Letter, from Assistant Secretary to the Chief Commissioner to Secretary to GOI, 27 February 1860, Foreign Correspondence, 16 March 1860, nos. 147-148, NAI.

³Ibid. The land thus acquired was valuable enough to accommodate two talugdari estates. The minimum demand on such states had been fixed at five thousand rupees annually.

⁴Ibid.

for barracks accommodation.¹ These escalating military costs were passed on to the public in the form of new taxes designed especially for urban areas.² It was the responsibility of the officers of government "to make it intelligible to the people" how the "mutiny"

has rendered it imperatively necessary that Her Majesty's government should call upon her faithful people in India, European and Asiatic alike, to contribute towards the costs of the large Military organizations which have been rendered necessary, and which cannot be suddenly dissolved. . . .³

The spatial arrangements in the cantonment were the antithesis of those in the old city. In the nine and a half square miles of space, along wide paved roads, were located the barracks and bungalows of the sentinels of the Raj. Typically, native troops "were housed in self-constructed, temporary huts made from bamboo and matting" and located at a discreet distance from the European troops who were "accommodated in brick built or wooden barracks" in the cantonments.⁴ The European officers lived in rather more opulent and spacious homes. Each officer was housed in his own "bungalow," centrally situated in a large plot or "compound" of half an acre or more. Senior officers' compounds in some cantonments were five or ten acres in size.⁵

The cantonment included other facilities that satisfied European cultural and social needs. There was a Catholic and an Anglican church

¹Annual Report for the Administration of Oudh, 1859-69, p. 27.

²See Chapter IV, below.

³Circular No. 5727, from Secretary to GOI, Foreign Department (Secret) to Chief Commissioner, 19 September 1859, file no. 700, Board of Revenue, Oudh General (hereafter: BROG), UPSA.

⁴King, p. 100. King's generalized descriptions apply precisely to the Lucknow example.

⁵*Ibid.*

with their private cemeteries, a race-course, a clubhouse with dancing, drinking, dining and indoor games rooms, and several racket courts, public rooms for European officers and canteen, soldiers gardens, ball court and library for European soldiers.¹ The aim was to create a small European cosmos at the edge of the city, not only to compensate the officers for the hardship of serving their country in an alien land but also to provide European soldiers with adequate recreational facilities so that they would be less tempted to taste the pleasures the city had to offer. The regimental bazaars² obviated trips to the city markets, and the canteen supplied them with goods imported "duty-free" from "home," to keep nostalgia at bay and patriotism from flagging. Ample provision was also made to keep the soldiers physically fit and their martial skills in good repair. There were parade, camping and exercising grounds, shooting ranges, a magazine, arms store, workshops, gunsheds, and horse lines,³ not to mention equestrian statuary and other prominently located memorials to the heroes of the "mutiny."

To complement the extensive engineering works a far larger force than the regular garrison was stationed in Lucknow, the headquarters of the province.⁴ In April 1858 there were four cavalry regiments, four

¹Ibid., p. 102.

²There were four regimental bazaars in the Lucknow cantonment. The largest was the main Sadar bazaar. The others were the Fifth Lancers bazaar, the 13th Bengal Cavalry bazaar and Light Infantry bazaar.

³King, p. 102.

⁴"The garrison consists usually of a regiment of British cavalry, a battery of horse artillery, two battalions of British infantry, a regiment of native cavalry and a battalion of native infantry." See H.R. Nevill, ed., Lucknow District Gazetteer, vol. 37 of District Gazetteers of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, (Allahabad: U.P. Government Press, 1904), p. 110.

infantry regiments, two brigades each of engineers and rifles and two crack regiments from the Punjab.¹ This preparedness may have come a bit late but its thoroughness paid off. "There will never be," remarked a veteran,

the siege of another Residency at Lucknow. The lessons of the Mutiny are not forgotten. If a new outbreak took place, there would be no need for sudden improvised defences. The four great barracks that now stand at Lucknow are really disguised forts. . . . No one can look on the fortress barracks of Lucknow without seeing how much of foresight and vigilance on the part of the British they represent. And the blackened ruins of the Residency show what memories lie behind that foresight and vigilance, and explain them.²

The railway also helped augment the force and added to the above list two companies of Oudh and Rohilkhand Railway volunteers.³ In 1875, the total population of the cantonment, including approximately 4,000 Europeans, was 23,154, which was estimated by the civic authorities to be roughly 1/13 of the total population of Lucknow city in the same year.⁴

The cantonment was a separate administrative unit managed by a cantonment committee, with the commanding officer of the province at its head, a magistrate, a sanitary officer, and executive engineer, the district suprintendant of police, and a few other officers who were appointed for fixed periods of time to serve as members of this committee.⁵ The creation of a separate legal jurisdiction under the cantonment magistrate

¹J.R.J. Jocelyn, A History of the Royal and Indian Artillery of the Mutiny of 1857 (London: John Murray, 1915), 371.

²Fitchett, p. 440.

³Lucknow District Gazeteer (1904), p. 110

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

implied an "extra-territoriality" for European residents of the cantonment on their excursions to the city. They could only be tried in their own martial law court for civil or criminal offences. The abuse of this privilege by soldiers on their visits to the city in search of women or native liquor was frequently brought to the notice of the civic authorities in the local Urdu newspapers.

Incidents between European soldiers and citizens, in which the city police were powerless to intercede or apprehend the offenders if they were the former, were common.

Such was the disturbance caused by them [drunken European soldiers], that all the communication with the Mohulla was stopped, and the inhabitants shut up the doors of their houses . . . [details of forced entry] . . . it was with difficulty that they were driven out, the Police through fear, remaining silent spectators of this scene of violence and spoliation all the while.

The editor regrets that, though complaints of mischief done by allowing European soldiers to go into the city in a state of intoxication are so often brought to the notice of the authorities, no steps are taken by them for putting an effective stop to the grievance.¹

The situation was anomalous, since the cantonment, though a distinct and important component of colonial urbanization and technically a part of the city, receiving a municipal subsidy, was considered outside the municipal limits and without any reciprocal obligations to it.² As the city's guardians against its own native population, it was natural that the European in this privileged quarter of the city should become culturally

¹Roznamcha (Lucknow), 11 February 1873, VNR.

²The cantonment was represented on the municipal committee, but it tried to shirk its fair share of taxes. The relationship of the civil and military authorities will be explained in Chapter IV.

CC-0. Agamigam Digital Presevation Foundation, Chandigarh

and socially hostile to the civilian population. Even within the cantonment the two races came into contact only in a sahib -- sepoy context; the one commanded and the other could never hope to command. The very fate of the empire depended on this uncalled bluff of racial superiority.

The Civil Station

The rapidly expanding civil organization created, adjacent to the cantonment and insulated from the old city by vast new open spaces, another colonial pocket called the civil lines. It was specifically a residential area for the use of the European non-military community comprising civil servants, traders, shopkeepers, and school teachers.¹ They each occupied a "colonial bungalow-compound complex," the basic residential unit of the colonial government, as did the officers in the cantonment.² This area together with the cantonment and railway station could be said to constitute "New Lucknow" and bore the same spatial and social relationship to "Old Lucknow" as New Delhi does to Old Delhi or Secunderabad does to Hyderabad. A contemporary remarked that the civil station in Lucknow has

a complete country appearance and though its architecture is not pleasing to the oriental eye, its numerous streets with parks and gardens interspersed everywhere, and an almost dustless atmosphere, have made Lucknow famous as the garden city of India.³

The generous acreage attached to each roomy bungalow was the result not only of the notions of sanitation and health that had widespread currency

¹See King, pp. 123-155 for a fine analysis of European residential space in the colonial urban environment.

²Ibid., p. 123.

³Mukerjee, p. 3.

in the mid-nineteenth century, but also of the pitiless logic of a colonial economy. The valuable real estate was simply at the disposal of the Europeans. King points out that the "usual market constraints on the economic use of land were inoperative in the political economy of colonialism; land was there almost for the taking."¹ The demolitions and the clearing operations, the prohibition of burial grounds within the city, and the seizure of all nawabi property in the city created space enough for the new Lucknow of barracks and bungalows to rise from the ruins of the old. According to an eminent English journalist who had been in Lucknow during the siege and returned to it in 1876:

Hundreds of acres, once occupied by houses, have been turned into market gardens. Swarded parks, vistas, rides, and drives, far prettier than those of the Bois-de-Bologne spread out where once were streets, bazaars and palaces.²

The correspondent of the Pioneer, rather more facetiously commented on the rapidly changing cityscape that characterised the decade:

. . . the demolition of brick fields around the residence are to be let out to native chegges, or market-gardeners . . . in a word Lucknow in a few years will be one vast park with an occasional street at wide intervals, and all the space not required by roads will be occupied with cabbages.³

Other features borrowed from the metropolitan townscape began to accrete in the new sections of the city. A clock tower, statuary, a shopping arcade with expensive European merchandise, a theatre and a services

¹King, p. 134.

²W.H. Russell, The Prince of Wales' Tour: A Diary in India; with some account of the Visits of His Royal Highness to the Courts of Greece, Egypt, Spain and Portugal. (London: Sampson, Low, Martson, Searle and Rivington, 1877), p. 392.

³Pioneer, 10 May 1865.

club (located in the nawabi palace, the Chattar Manzil) grew in and around Hazratgunj, the main market for the civil lines. European shopkeepers owned the main stores: a marketing experience in this area was qualitatively different from the gunjes of the old city. There was neither bargaining nor bartering, and certainly no footpath hawkers and vendors. Another colonial settlement had been spawned to match the universal description of such places in the empire:

. . . the colonial urban settlement[s], typically formed by the civil station and cantonment . . . are characterised by low density, horizontal, single-story developments and broad tree-lined roads which give access to a system of large compounds, each containing a roughly centrally-sited bungalow. The general character of the settlement is, for a western observer, one of a well-planted spaciousness with a high proportion of trees and shrubbery both within and outside the residential compounds.¹

Concomitant with and complementary to the physical rearrangement was a series of radical legislative acts that disinfect the political situation even further. Chief among these was the Arms and Amunition Act (Act XXVIII of 1857) that ordered the populace to be disarmed.² Except for "officers, soldiers or sailors -- Volunteers -- police or revenue officers -- or other persons specially exempted by Government, . . ." no citizen of British India could possess a weapon. The penalty was severe: it could amount to a maximum of Rs 5,000 as fine and/or up to two years in jail. Those exempted were, in effect, either European or loyal Indians. Passed at first as an emergency measure, it became a permanent statute which

¹King, p. 125.

²William Theobald, The Acts of the Legislative Council of India, From 1856 to 1859 (Calcutta: Thacker, Spink and Co., 1961) vol. 3, pp. 427-429.

was periodically reviewed, amended, and expanded.¹

This measure indubitably chastened the entire province, particularly the trigger-happy courtiers of the Oudh court. "Everyone," observed Frayer, "in Lucknow in those [pre-annexation] days went about armed."² Disputes had often been settled by weapons, as in the instance of long standing rivalry between two wrestlers, where the one discharged a blunderbuss at the other to end the matter.³

The work of disarming the province was vigorously executed by the military police. By the August of 1859 a very impressive number of weapons had been collected and 1,569 forts had been destroyed.⁴ This was tantamount to leaving only licenced arms with loyal men for protection against the disarmed populace. It certainly made another armed revolt a rather difficult proposition.

Another piece of legislation of this nature was Act X of 1858, an act against "Rebellion" itself, that remained in force for two years. Its application was extended to all villages, towns and cities in all areas that had "since the 1st day of May, 1857, been guilty of rebellion, or of waging war against the state or of murder . . .," a city mohalla or an entire village or an entire town would be collectively responsible for its rebellious inhab-

¹The Arms Act became a general measure by the passage of Act XXXI of 1860 and was consolidated and amended in the form of Act XI of 1878. It remains operative in independent India today.

²Frayer, p. 109.

³Ibid.

⁴Iltudus Prichard, The Administration of India From 1859 to 1869, 2 vols. (London: Macmillan and Co., 1869), vol. 1, p. 35. The official figures cited by Prichard on the weapons surrendered after the promulgation of the Act were 684 cannon, 186,177 firearms, 565,321 swords, 50,311 spears, and 636,683 weapons of "miscellaneous character."

itants:

. . . if it shall be proved to the satisfaction of a Magistrate that any European or American has been murdered or subjected to any violent personal outrage in any such Village, [City or Town], and it shall not be proved to a Magistrate that the Inhabitants of such village [or city or town] used all the means in their power to prevent the commission of the offence; it shall be lawful for the Magistrate to impose a fine upon the Inhabitants . . . or upon any specified class of the Inhabitants of such village [or city or town]. . . .¹

This act marked the beginning of almost a century of Pax Britannica in Oudh.

The pattern of colonial urbanization after the revolt was largely predicated on strategic needs. Its main architects were men of military training and vision, the scathed survivors of the siege of Lucknow. They executed a plan to make the capital city, and therefore Oudh, invulnerable to future emeutes. Large areas of the city were cleared and new sections built with military priorities in mind. Communications were an essential part of the defence establishment. The "personality" of the city was split into colonial and indigenous halves.

Finally, we must ask the crucial question. How well did the city plan fulfill its prime objective, that of safety? Was the city in fact safe? The old city had been breached but a large portion of it still remained sacculate and impenetrable. The civil station, on the other hand, with wide roads and single family bungalows was easily accessible. The low compound boundary walls were no challenge to a riotous mob, and within each compound the colonial master and mistress were woefully outnumbered by the dozen or more native servants. Yet, what imparted a sense of security to the European community was the fact that the cantonment and the police lines flanked the civil station and the three formed a large, well-linked unit. Not only could

¹Act No. X of 1858 of the Legislative Council of India, section 1.

troops quickly come to the defence of civilian families, but these families could hastily withdraw into the cantonment or be evacuated from the city by rail. The initial strategic blunder of having built the pre-annexation cantonment three to four miles away from the residency on the other side of the river had cost the British dearly, and the new arrangements demonstrated that the lesson had not been lost. The British perceived their security enhanced because they were racially segregated and at some distance from the jumble and din of the old city.

Just as the fact that in Britain, in this period, it was the harsh demands of industry that influenced the morphology of older cities, so the need for political control was the chief determinant of civic design in the old cities of the empire. The "priority of industrial discipline in shaping all human relations" made "other aspects of urban life seem secondary" with "a total indifference to social costs."¹ "We can and should criticize," urges Asa Briggs, "the appalling living conditions in Victorian cities, the absence of amenities, the brutal degradation of natural environment and the inability to plan and often even to conceive of the city as a whole."² Yet, the new cities in industrial Britain and the new parts of the old cities in the Indian empire were regarded at the time as symbols of "improvement." Urban planning in the middle decades of the nineteenth century, directed by the single-minded zeal of Britain's industry and empire destroyed the old ecology of the city. "Lucknow," as Russell summed it up, "has been fairly improved off the face of the earth. . . ."³

¹Asa Briggs, Victorian Cities (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 18.

²Ibid., p. 17.

³Russell, The Prince of Wales' Tour, p. 392.

CHAPTER III

THE CITY MUST BE CLEAN

. . . the routine of defaecation goes to the root of citizenship. Defaecation is (or should be) a daily function -- to those suffering from "the almost universal complaint" it is apt to be a daily sacrament! If it can also be a daily discipline the foundation of good citizenship has been laid. Let me ordain where the nation shall defaecate and I care not who make their laws.

-- F.L. Brayne, ICS¹

The strategic requirements of the colonial system were relatively simple to meet, given the tenacity and will of the military men who took on the responsibility. It had been a question of examining a city map and imposing upon it roads and esplanades, bungalows and barracks, and knocking down all that interfered with the execution of the plan. Once the physical undertaking was completed -- as it was in the first five years of intense activity by the public works department -- the results were made a permanent solution to the problem of another battle in the city.

The drive to make the city clean also had its origin in the experience of war. The high mortality rate of European troops during the "mutiny" retold the horror story of the Crimean war: more men died of

¹Frank Lugard Brayne Collection, Mss Eur. F 152, File 39, IOL. I thank Geraldine Forbes for bringing this passage to my attention.

disease than in combat.¹ These revelations made the cleanliness of the city as important an end to strive for as its strategic security.

However, the problem of eliminating disease from the urban environment was far more complicated and thorny, admitting no simple solution. The diseases that imperilled European lives were numerous and recurrent: everything ranging from small, everyday treacheries on the gastro-intestinal tract, to sweeping epidemics of cholera, typhoid, smallpox, and the plague pervaded the north Indian plains. The level of knowledge about the nature and cure of communicable diseases was still primitive, and medical men worked with a jumble of conflicting theories. Typhoid fever, for example, was believed to be "due to a poison of animal origin, as malarial fever is due to a poison of vegetable origin."² Dr. Bonavia, the civil surgeon at Lucknow, believed that the probable causes of the "fevers" that took more than three thousand lives -- not all European, of course -- in 1868 alone were "insufficiency of food, . . . excess or defect of heat, . . . alterations of temperature, . . . bad air, fatigue, . . . [and] insufficiency of ventilation in people's houses. . . ."³ Planck and Bonavia were both medical doctors

¹William H. McNeill, Plagues and People (Garden City, New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1976), p. 251: "In the Crimean war ten times as many British soldiers died of dysentery as from all the Russian weapons put together." For the "mutiny" experience, see J.B. Harrison, "Allahabad: A Sanitary History" (unpublished paper presented at the Seminar on the City in South Asia at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London University, 1976). Harrison relies on the report, dated 1863, of the Royal Commission on the Health of the Anglo-Indian Army.

²These were the view of Dr. C. Planck, sanitary commissioner of the North Western Provinces from 1868 to 1885, expressed in his first annual sanitary report of the province in 1868. Cited in Harrison, p. 4.

³Dr. E. Bonavia, Sanitary Report of the City of Lucknow, For the Year 1868-69, bound with Sanitary Report of Oudh, 1868-69 (Lucknow: Government Printing Press, 1869), p. 8, IOL. The report is signed by Dr. E. Bonavia and written in the first person.

and were presumably as competent authorities on the subject as was possible to find in 1868.

The communicable and indiscriminate nature of disease, and its source in damp and unclean soil, air and water was generally believed in. Theories about germs or insect-borne disease were stoutly resisted because the "miasmatic theory had a firm and satisfactory empirical basis -- or seemed to."¹ The theory was that ". . . miasma, emerging perhaps from dead corpses or other rotting matter in the earth . . . encountered appropriately weakened constitutions . . . [and] disease resulted."² Such theories had their natural corollary in the theory, espoused universally by civil surgeons posted in every native city, that rigorous and regular sanitation would check the spread of disease. The findings of the Royal Commission on the Health of the Anglo-Indian Army in 1863 were that it was "indeed impossible to separate the question of health, as it relates to troops, from the sanitary condition of the native population, especially as regards the occurrence of epidemics. . . ."³

The response to this etiological probe into the ill-health of British soldiers, which included an inspection of sanitary conditions in native cities and the personal habits of the natives, was the formation, in every town with a considerable number of Europeans, of a local "agency" (a municipal committee) that would "secure a minimum standard of health and comfort for themselves at least."⁴ This chapter will examine the nature of the official

¹McNeill, p. 235.

²Ibid.

³As cited in Harrison, p. 4.

⁴Harrison, p. 5.

response and the beginning of municipal government in the city.

City government, with its preponderant concern of making Lucknow clean and habitable while also devising ways and means of generating local revenue for the purpose, and the growth of municipal institutions and establishments will form the core of this chapter. It will begin by looking at the role of the civic police force and how it discharged its dual functions of keeping law and order and enforcing sanitary laws. The danger to empire posed by troops afflicted by venereal disease stimulated a variety of remedies applied by the municipal authorities, including the regulation of prostitution. The discussion of those measures will close the chapter.

Provincial Government

To make local measures and events more easily comprehensible, it is necessary to explain briefly the provincial government as it was set up after the failure of the post-annexation government.¹ As the turmoil in the capital was brought under control, the administrative machinery was drastically overhauled. Lord Canning's famous proclamation, issued shortly after the rebellion was officially at an end, in March 1858, set the tone of the new administration.² The inspiration to tighten the reins of government seemed to have come from the Punjab:

Dazzled by the success which had attended the Punjab Government to trample out the insurrection the moment

¹This subject has been extensively discussed in T.R. Metcalf, The Aftermath of Revolt; India 1857-1870 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964). There is no definitive work on the administration of Oudh after 1856, but a general overview may be obtained from T.P. Chand, The Administration of Avadh (1858-1877) (Varanasi: Vishvavidyalaya Prakashan, 1971).

²See the epigraph of Chapter II, p. 24, above.

it appeared in their province, so strong a contrast to what happened in other parts of India . . . It seemed to the Anglo-Indian community that the sooner the whole of India was subjected to the process of Punjabization the better.¹

Not only had the Lahore administration crushed the rebellion in its earliest stages, but had also supplied regiments of loyal Punjabi soldiers to assist in the recapture of Delhi and Lucknow. This prompted the transfer of Sir Robert Montgomery, erstwhile judicial commissioner of Lahore, to the chief commissionership of the turbulent, non-regulation province of Oudh.²

The capital of the province was an unspeakable shambles. Large scale military demolitions were in progress, search parties were looking for caches of arms and fugitive rebels, while hordes of unemployed and desperate men roamed the city for food or treasure as did bands of soldiers, who plundered and terrorized those inhabitants who had not fled into the countryside for safety.

Enquiries I have been making convince me that [in] the city of Lucknow . . . there is no authority . . . and one and everyone issues orders. The police amount to a thousand men, the canaille and off-scouring of people.

¹Iltudus Prichard, The Administration of India from 1859 to 1869, 2 vols. (London: Macmillan and Co., 1869), vol. 1, p. 63. Also see Philip Mason, The Men Who Ruled India, vol. 1: The Founders (1953; New York: Schocken Books, 1964), p. 300.

²For a brief account of Montgomery's repression of the Punjabi rebels see Philip Mason, The Founders, pp. 370-377. He was undubitably the man of iron, and a spiritual ancestor of the notorious General Dyer who ordered the Amritsar massacre of 1919. He spent ten decisive months consolidating the administration in Oudh. The term "non-regulation" is defined in Hobson-Jobson as: "the style of certain Provinces of British India (administered for the most part under the more direct authority of the Central Government in its Foreign Department), in which the ordinary Laws (or Regulations, as they were formally called) are not in force or are in force only so far as they are specially declared by the Government of India to be applicable. The original theory of administration in such Provinces was the union of authority in all departments under one district chief, and a kind of paternal despotism in the hands of the chief. . . . Military men are still eligible to hold office in the civil administration." William Crooke, ed., Hobson-Jobson; A Glossary of Colloquial Anglo-Indian Words and Phrases; . . . by Henry Yule and A.C. Burnell (1903; reprint ed., Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1968), p. 629.

response and the beginning of municipal government in the city.

City government, with its preponderant concern of making Lucknow clean and habitable while also devising ways and means of generating local revenue for the purpose, and the growth of municipal institutions and establishments will form the core of this chapter. It will begin by looking at the role of the civic police force and how it discharged its dual functions of keeping law and order and enforcing sanitary laws. The danger to empire posed by troops afflicted by venereal disease stimulated a variety of remedies applied by the municipal authorities, including the regulation of prostitution. The discussion of those measures will close the chapter.

Provincial Government

To make local measures and events more easily comprehensible, it is necessary to explain briefly the provincial government as it was set up after the failure of the post-annexation government.¹ As the turmoil in the capital was brought under control, the administrative machinery was drastically overhauled. Lord Canning's famous proclamation, issued shortly after the rebellion was officially at an end, in March 1858, set the tone of the new administration.² The inspiration to tighten the reins of government seemed to have come from the Punjab:

Dazzled by the success which had attended the Punjab Government to trample out the insurrection the moment

¹This subject has been extensively discussed in T.R. Metcalf, The Aftermath of Revolt; India 1857-1870 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964). There is no definitive work on the administration of Oudh after 1856, but a general overview may be obtained from T.P. Chand, The Administration of Avadh (1858-1877) (Varanasi: Vishvavidyalaya Prakashan, 1971).

²See the epigraph of Chapter II, p. 24, above.

it appeared in their province, so strong a contrast to what happened in other parts of India . . . It seemed to the Anglo-Indian community that the sooner the whole of India was subjected to the process of Punjabization the better.¹

Not only had the Lahore administration crushed the rebellion in its earliest stages, but had also supplied regiments of loyal Punjabi soldiers to assist in the recapture of Delhi and Lucknow. This prompted the transfer of Sir Robert Montgomery, erstwhile judicial commissioner of Lahore, to the chief commissionership of the turbulent, non-regulation province of Oudh.²

The capital of the province was an unspeakable shambles. Large scale military demolitions were in progress, search parties were looking for caches of arms and fugitive rebels, while hordes of unemployed and desperate men roamed the city for food or treasure as did bands of soldiers, who plundered and terrorized those inhabitants who had not fled into the countryside for safety.

Enquiries I have been making convince me that [in] the city of Lucknow . . . there is no authority . . . and one and everyone issues orders. The police amount to a thousand men, the canaille and off-scouring of people.

¹Iltudus Prichard, The Administration of India from 1859 to 1869, 2 vols. (London: Macmillan and Co., 1869), vol. 1, p. 63. Also see Philip Mason, The Men Who Ruled India, vol. 1: The Founders (1953; New York: Schocken Books, 1964), p. 300.

²For a brief account of Montgomery's repression of the Punjabi rebels see Philip Mason, The Founders, pp. 370-377. He was undubitably the man of iron, and a spiritual ancestor of the notorious General Dyer who ordered the Amritsar massacre of 1919. He spent ten decisive months consolidating the administration in Oudh. The term "non-regulation" is defined in Hobson-Jobson as: "the style of certain Provinces of British India (administered for the most part under the more direct authority of the Central Government in its Foreign Department), in which the ordinary Laws (or Regulations, as they were formally called) are not in force or are in force only so far as they are specially declared by the Government of India to be applicable. The original theory of administration in such Provinces was the union of authority in all departments under one district chief, and a kind of paternal despotism in the hands of the chief. . . . Military men are still eligible to hold office in the civil administration." William Crooke, ed., Hobson-Jobson; A Glossary of Colloquial Anglo-Indian Words and Phrases; . . . by Henry Yule and A.C. Burnell (1903; reprint ed., Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1968), p. 629.

Any man who chooses places a badge on his arm and plunders on his own account.¹

Out of this bureaucratic exasperation over the state of affairs in Lucknow, a strong, centralized civil government took shape to tackle the immediate chaos and replace it with a stable and effective rule over the townspeople. In the next two crowded decades the institutional framework of modern colonial city government was evolved.

The Police

The chief burden of civic cleanliness was borne by two interlocking departments, the police and the municipality, both under the executive authority of the city commissioner. These overlapped in function and authority. The police, at this stage did not constitute a separate department, and two-thirds of the cost of its establishment was met by local funds. Apart from being responsible for law and order the police aided the municipality in its multifarious tasks of collecting local taxes, supervising the conservancy and sanitary arrangements, helping in the execution of public works (such as demolitions and road building) and generally "improving" the city.

The reorganization of the police force headed the list of administrative priorities, since it was not only required to curb the rampant lawlessness but also to discipline numerous policemen who, under cover of their official uniform, were themselves threats to life and property. It was an ambitious task to transform an unruly "canaille" into a reliable body of men who would uphold and enforce the law. One of the objects of this chapter will

¹Chief Commissioner's Memo on the "Civil Organization of the City of Lucknow." no. 186, Foreign/Political, 23 July 1858, UPSA.

be to see how far the British succeeded in achieving this goal, and another to assess the role of this body of men in their day-to-day interaction with the citizenry.

A brief description of the reorganization of the police would be of interest here.¹ The city police force was separately constituted from the district force, and a superintendent was appointed to oversee its operations. The city was divided into western and eastern police circles, each managed by an inspector, an arrangement which tended to reinforce the separation of the old city from the new. The two circles were in turn subdivided into three thanas (police precincts) which also served as the six municipal wards of the city. The eastern circle consisted of Ganeshgunj, Wazirgunj, and Hasangunj thanas, and the western circle of Daulatgunj, Chowk, and Sadatgunj. Every mohalla in the city came under the purview of a thana and selected "a representative who formed the medium of communication with the police."² The traditional hereditary post of chowkidar, or night watchman, prevalent during the nawabi, virtually disappeared.

The chief commissioner recommended that no resident of Lucknow or of the area within a radius of two miles be employed as a policeman "unless the security be ample and the character fair."³ The use of a distinctive uniform and a badge, "peculiar and striking," was also urged in the same memo. The cantonment had its own thana which was supported by cantonment funds.

¹The following summary is constructed from the scattered facts available in the Lucknow District Gazetteer of 1904, the annual Report on the Administration of Oudh, 1859-60, p. 14; 1961-62, pp. 10-12; and the annual Report on the Police Administration of Oudh, 1865 and 1868 through 1876.

²Report on the Administration of Oudh, 1858-60, p. 15.

³Memorandum from the Chief Commissioner of Oudh, "Civil Organization of the City of Lucknow," no. 186, Foreign/Political, 23 July 1858, UPSA.

The full establishment of the civic police in 1862-63 numbered 855 men, and their total expenses for that year were Rs. 93,084, of which only a third was chargeable to imperial funds (unlike other cities in British India, where the whole expenditure was borne by the government of India).¹ The salaries of the police were broken down as shown in Table 1. Only the last three grades were open to Indians.

The colonial urban police, curiously enough, were a far smaller force than the approximately 5,000 men that served as policemen under the nawabi.

TABLE 1

LUCKNOW POLICE SALARIES AND MISCELLANEOUS EXPENDITURE, 1862-63

Grade	Rupees per annum	Rupees per month, per person
1 Superintendent	6,000	500
2 Inspectors	5,400	225
4 Deputy Inspectors	4,200	88
18 Chief Constables	5,616	26
80 Head Constables	9,854	10
750 Constables	54,432	6
Miscellaneous expenditure: medical contingencies, clothing, arms, accoutre- ments	7,572	0.73
Total	93,084	

Source: Report on the Administration of Oudh, 1862-63, p. 10.

¹Report on the Administration of Oudh, 1862-63, p. 10.

The per capita ratio of policemen to citizens actually declined from 1:75 during the reign of the last King, Wajid Ali Shah (1847-1856), to 1:333 after the department was revamped under the Police Act of 1861.¹ The massive retrenchment did not achieve a proportionate reduction in the cost of the establishment. With four thousand men fewer on the police payroll it might be logical to assume that the new establishment was, at least, more economical in its use of the taxpayer's money. This proves not to be the case when we compare nawabi salaries to colonial ones.² The muhatamin (superintendent) of the nawabi police earned an average of Rs. 44, the naib mahatamin (deputy superintendent) only Rs. 28.33, and an ordinary constable an average of Rs. 3.6 per month. The corresponding British salaries, especially for the European officers at the executive level, were ten times as great (cf. Table 1, above), making "feudal extravagance" appear almost frugal in comparison. If we assume that the profile of Lucknow police was similar to that of the provincial police, then the total cost of the extensive city police establishment did not exceed two

¹These ratios have been calculated on the basis of the following data: the population of the city at the time of annexation is given in the Oudh Census 1872 as approximately 370,000 and the nawabi city police numbered 4,929 men. Oude: Papers Relating To (London: Harrison and Sons, 1856), p. 88. For the British period: the population of the city in 1872 was reckoned at 284,779 "excluding Europeans, Eurasians and the native military and criminal population," and the police numbered 855. Report on the Census of Oudh, 1872, vol. 1, Appendix E, p. 32; Report on the Administration of Oudh, 1862-63, p. 10.

²The data for the nawabi salaries is taken from Michael H. Fisher, "The Imperial Court and the Province; A Social and Administrative History of Pre-British Awadh (1775-1856)" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Chicago, 1978), pp. 177-179, and from Wajid Ali Shah, Jawabat-i Shukuk Mundarijah Blu Buk. I am indebted to Michael Fisher for the generous supply of data from this Urdu source.

lakhs of rupees during the nawabi.¹ During the colonial period under consideration, the annual cost of the police establishment was just under a lakh, a saving of roughly only fifty per cent, even though it had fewer than seventeen per cent of the nawabi policemen on the payroll. The colonial appropriations were absorbed by the few salaries for senior Europeans, forcing scores of discharged native policemen to turn to crime for a living. The European cash salaries were officially supplemented by such perquisites as housing and touring allowances, which, if computed into the cost of the establishment, would bring the figure even closer to the nawabi total.

The most significant result of this drastic reduction and withering away of the chowkidari system was double-edged: on the one hand, a trim force of better-trained and equipped men stationed at a half a dozen posts managed to eliminate political crimes, such as riots or popular agitations, most feared by the authorities in a politically volatile city; on the other hand, the continually swelling ranks of the unemployed (as more departments were streamlined and posts abolished in a city economically devastated by the departure of the Oudh court) resulted in a surge of petty economic crimes. The increase was annually attributed, in more or less the same official phrases, to "the high price at which grain sold in the city during the year, and the amount of misery thereby entailed . . .," and the police seemed

¹This figure was computed by the following equation:

$$\frac{\text{cost of Lucknow police}}{\text{cost of Oudh police}} = \frac{\text{no. of Lucknow police (4,929^a)}}{\text{no. of Oudh police (34,586^c)}}$$

(Rs. 1,374,306^b)

Sources: ^aOude: Papers Relating To (London: Harrison and Sons, 1856), p. 88.
^{b,c}Fisher, pp. 177-179.

ineffectual in preventing the crimes that affected the average citizen.¹

This outcome appeared not to ruffle the authorities, as the annual reports on the police administration of the province seem to indicate. A typical comment on the state of crime in Lucknow read:

Lucknow city has the highest number of cognizable crimes reported in Oudh. The city has more crime than the whole of Faizabad district. . . . Altogether the city during the year has been well conducted, there has been but a single case of 'riot' and but a few 'aggravated assaults', which speaks well for a large city not accustomed in the past years to much law and restraint.²

The annual police reports claim, without exception, an improvement in the functioning of the police over the previous year's performance and then proceed to supply the evidence in the shape of statistical information which does more to expose the disingenuous use of statistics than to back the authenticity of the claim. I have compiled two sets of tables from the figures on crime in Lucknow city for five consecutive years (from 1867 to 1871) to illustrate the discrepancy (Tables 2 and 3).

Looking at Table 2, it appears that the police were fairly lackadaisical in 1867: in an average day they made only 4.5 arrests, sent up 3.7 people for trial, managed to get a couple of felons convicted and recovered 53% of the goods stolen. From 1868 onwards there was a very dramatic numerical increase in each category, suggesting an unusual amount of vigour and commitment on the part of the patrolling constable. In 1868 the appre-

¹Report on the Police Administration of Oudh, 1865-66, p. 1. Similar statements can be found in other official appraisals of the crime in the city, for example, Report of Civil and Criminal Justice in Oudh, 1869-1870, p. 1., and 1872-73, p. 1. In fact, the very first page of almost every report in the latter series offers this information.

²Letter no. 103, from Officiating Inspector-General of Police in Oudh to Secretary of Chief Commissioner, Lucknow, 10 April 1862, Police: City Annual Report, p. 1, MCRR.

TABLE 2

POLICE ACTION IN LUCKNOW, 1867-1871

	1867	1868	1869	1870	1871
Cases					
Investigated by police	1,673	2,602	2,437	2,458	2,593
Resulting in conviction	761	1,612	1,194	1,313	1,464
Persons					
Tried	1,353	4,102	4,110	2,951	3,510
Convicted	1,193	3,834	3,743	2,660	3,108
Acquitted	160	268	376	291	402
Property (in rupees)					
Stolen	47,064	31,391	35,868	43,797	55,856
Recovered	25,086	8,562	13,175	14,998	12,412

Source: Report on the Police Administration of Oudh for the years 1867-1871 inclusive, (Lucknow: Church Mission Press), IOL.

hensions were up by 58% (an average of 7.1 persons per day), the convictions more than doubled, but the property recovered dropped to 27% of that reported stolen. In the following years this general pattern remains roughly the same.

Table 3 shows that the inflation of the number of investigated cases was a direct result of the enforcement of sanitary bye-laws of the municipality after the eye-opening visit of the sanitary commission into the heart of the old city in 1868, and not from a greater vigilance against local criminals. A very substantial proportion of constabulary energy was expended on keeping

TABLE 3

CRIME IN LUCKNOW CITY

	1867	1868	1869	1870	1871
Murders and attempts	3	3	4	6	3
Culpable homicide	1	1	1	-	-
Dacoity	-	-	-	-	-
Robbery	4	1	7	7	8
Rioting and unlawful assembly	1	3	-	2	13
Theft by house breaking or trespass	501	475	615	506	556
Theft simple	563	674	945	802	672
Theft of cattle	9	9	16	15	8
^{en} Offences against coins and stamps	-	2	3	2	3
Total	1,082	1,168	1,590	1,341	1,262
Total number of cognizable cases from Table 2	1,673	2,602	2,437	2,458	2,593
Table 2 totals minus Table 3 totals	591	1,438	847	1,117	1,331

Source: Reports on the Police Administration of Oudh for the years 1867-1871 inclusive, (Lucknow: Church Mission Press) IOL.

the city clean, since the entire number of cases unrelated to crime were cases related to offences against sanitary laws. Persons were arrested for urinating along the roadside or retarding some other aspect of the renewed drive for a clean and therefore, "safe" city. The point is well expressed in a letter from the inspector-general of the police:

The working of the Lucknow City Police during 1868 shows great improvement over former years. The percentages of apprehensions and convictions are very high and the percentage of stolen property recovered is good. . . . Theft has been well kept down . . . and the increase in the number of reports of crime is nearly altogether accounted for by the number of nuisance cases taken up during the year showing a greater activity on the part of the police. . . .¹

Theft had not been "well kept down"; if anything, it had surged. But while crime was rampant in the city, almost all of it was petty, unpolitical, perpetrated by natives against natives and, in sum, only a small inconvenience to the ruling elite.

The reaction of the public against the police and the rising crime rate was less insouciant. Apart from the ignominy of being convicted for "committing nuisance" -- in 1876 some 2,722 cognizable cases of "nuisance" alone were added to the thana ledgers, and one person in every hundred was actually convicted of committing a "nuisance"² -- there was a great deal of resentment expressed on the subject of their city becoming less safe for the citizens. The local Urdu newspapers burgeoned with reports of specific crimes and editorials on economic distress, increasing crime, and the indifference of the police. More often than not the police were thought to be implicated in the crime. In a lengthy editorial on the state of "Local Government" in the Oudh Akhbar the police appear to be the least efficient part of city government:

If I am asked to give an account of the heroism of the city police, I could fill a whole room. But, unfortunately, the

¹Letter No. 30-1356, From Maj. R.M.H. Aitken, V.C., Inspector-General of the Oudh Police to the Secretary of the Chief Commissioner of Oudh, 23 March 1868, Police Basta, MCRR. The emphasis is mine.

²Calculated from the Police Administration Report, 1875-76.

accomplices of thieves and unsavoury characters whom they help in committing crimes and all sorts of excesses in bazaars. The notion of life and property being secure is an idle dream, and of this the authorities are well aware. Quite apart from this the government's idea that the police would render valuable service in time of need proved mistaken. Whenever the cry of "thief" is heard, the police disappear from their posts and from the mohulla, feign innocence of the event and then cry out "Catch him," "Catch the thief."¹

Another editorial disapproved of the centralized reorganization of the police leading to the abolition of the mohalla chowkis (posts for chowkidars) since the "thieves and other bad characters will have it still more their own way" because the new thanas were so few and far between.² The Cawnpore Gazette noted "the want of good arrangements at Lucknow. Police show little inclination to investigate the frequent thefts or prevent public disturbances and outrage, however serious they may be."³

The apparent contradiction between the official and public assessments of the performance of the police lies in the differing definitions of the rulers and the ruled of what constituted a "safe" city. Officialdom was pleased that there were no more than an average of 3.2 "riots" and 3.6 people murdered annually in the decade between 1867 and 1876; a formerly riotous populace now existed peacefully. It was probably wiser to accept an average of 927 thefts committed every year in the city during the same decade, as the inevitable result of the higher prices for grain (which were also the inevitable result of imperial economic policies) and permit the lesser crimes to serve almost as a safety valve against the pressures of

¹Oudh Akhbar, 13 November 1868. My translation.

²Asah-ul-Akhbar, (Lucknow), 17 September 1874, VNR.

³Cawnpore Gazette, 2 July 1866, VNR.

inflation and unemployment in the city. Both the thieves and their victims were from among the subject population and lived in the old city, while life in the civil lines and the cantonment was relatively unperturbed.

There were also an inexplicably high number of deaths in the city described as "accidental" in the annual returns for crime, and these apparently were not investigated judging from the lack of comment in the annual police reports. On an average, 303 people perished "accidentally" every year between 1867-76 in the city, and two-thirds of these mishaps were described as "falling into wells."¹ There appears to be no evidence of any forensic enquiry into these alleged accidents and it is not improbable that many of these deaths were suicides or murders. With no similar data on the nawabi period it is difficult to say whether the colonial period saw an actual rise in the "accidental" death rate. These lapses notwithstanding, the official satisfaction with the police for having achieved the prime goal of transforming the population of Lucknow into a politically harmless mass, was justified:

Lucknow city police is not a mere body of men kept for watch and ward, but it is a highly organized body of police which deals with crime. . . . It has brought this great city, formerly a hot-bed of violent crimes of all sorts into a condition as peaceable and secure as that of any city in India. There is not an institution in the city the value of which stands so high in the native estimation as the police. . . .²

The officials clearly ignored the published opinions of the average citizens. But the loyal protestations of the native members of the municipal

¹ Average compiled from the yearly figures for accidental deaths in the Police Administration Reports, 1867-76. The average annual figure for the province is 3,361.

² Letter no. 3476, from the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner [I.F. MacAndrew] to the Secretary to GOI, Home Department, 11 August 1869. Un-numbered basta, MCRR.

committee often were taken for an accurate representation of the feelings of the people on the workings of the new government.

The Municipal Committee: History and Membership

In an official appraisal of the municipal committee undertaken in 1941, its formative years up to 1884 are dismissed as "obscure,"¹ even though an overwhelming amount of source material on the period was lodged in bastas, the enormous cloth bundles in the record room of the building that housed the institution since the 1920s. Since there is no scholarly work on the municipal committee, as it was then called, it is worthwhile not just to fill this chronological gap but also to uncover the biases which influenced local policies and recreate the atmosphere in which the mentality of later politicians was shaped.²

The first year of municipal government is shrouded in obscurity because no records survived the general pillage in 1857-58. A small managing body, consisting of the deputy commissioner as president, the city magistrate as secretary, the treasury officer and a native extra-assistant commissioner, appears to have been constituted in 1858, but of its functioning and responsibilities there is no record. We do know, however, that it consisted chiefly of officials in contrast to its counterparts in the Punjab where committees were allegedly "composed of citizens chosen by trade panchayats or selected

¹Report of the Lucknow Municipal Board Inquiry Committee (Allahabad: Superintendent, Printing and Stationery, U.P., India, 1942), p. 7.

²For a current account of the municipal corporation see Roderick Church, "The Politics of Administration in Urban India: Citizens, Municipal Councillors and Routine Administrators in Lucknow" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1973). T.P. Chand's Administration omits municipal administration in Oudh altogether.

for their public spirit," and where "district officials seem to have remained entirely in the background."¹ This body appears to have managed nuzul, or the civic property of the ex-King that was escheat to the new rulers.² Shortly afterwards this body expanded its membership from among the officials and enjoyed a brief existence as the Local Agency Committee. It now acquired municipal functions, which at this rudimentary stage, were the collection of civic taxes and nuzul rents, supervised public works, the police and conservancy. In 1862 this agency was dissolved at the request of the chief commissioner and a new body called the municipal committee was constituted on the first of the year 1862. It continued to collect taxes and took charge of the conservancy of roads, and improvements in the city, the appointment of all necessary officers and servants, the making and amendment of rules of procedure, the definition and prohibition of nuisances and the imposition of penalties for the violations of such rules.³

The judicial commissioner of Oudh was appointed president, the commissioner of Lucknow district the vice-president, the deputy commissioner the secretary. There were to be nine other members including the inspector-

¹ Hugh Tinker, Foundations of Local Self-Government in India, Pakistan and Burma (Bombay: Lalvani Publishing House, 1967), p. 35.

² Letter no. 393, from W. Capper, Officiating Commissioner Lucknow to Deputy Commissioner, Lucknow, 27 April 1867, unnumbered basta, MCCR. The same source informs us that nuzul property was later reclassified to include the following: "1) State property -- houses etc. constructed by the Kings of Oudh; 2) Old Nuzool Property -- appropriated by the Kings of Oudh or that lapsed to them as escheat; 3) New Nuzool -- escheats taken in payment of penal tax imposed on inhabitants of Lucknow."

³ PMC (Proceedings of the Municipal Committee meetings), 6 January 1862; the instructions of the Chief Commissioner were communicated in a letter from the Secretary to Chief Commissioner, no. 2876, 19 December 1861, and its enclosures detailed the composition of the new municipal committee.

general of police, the superintendent of city police, the civil surgeon and city magistrate as official members, and four unofficial members, two each from the Hindu and Muslim communities. The Muslim representatives were two nawabs, Mohsun ud Dowlah and Mumtaz ud Dowlah, both prominent shiites, and the Hindus were two prominent mahajans (bankers), Shah Benarsi Das and Shah Makhan Lal. The inclusion of Indians as members in a governing body, though it did not signify a revolution, marked the entry of a tentative native toe in the door. From the official perspective the move would bring in acquiescent men with a stake in the Raj to endorse the levy of local taxes rather than create a forum where local opinion would be aired. This assessment of the role of native members was borne out in practice in the early years, since their participation remained perfunctory.¹

The impetus for the next stage in the evolution of this institution came from the government of India, in its attempt to relieve itself of the burden of subsidising the town police and passing it on to the townspeople themselves. By a special act for the city of Lucknow, Act XVIII of 1864, which served as its legal charter, an expanded municipal committee of 25 members "for levying duties on certain articles brought within the limits of the city for consumption" and generally for the regulation of all matters related to "conservancy and improvement" was called into existence. This act provided for the annual election of nineteen non-official members "by and from among the inhabitants of the city."² This would have been an unprecedented

¹After a careful check of the attendance at committee meetings I discovered that Benarsi Das attended 5 of 37 meetings and the other three came but once each. (Abstracted from the PMC volume for 1862, MCRR)

²Section III of Act XVIII of 1864; the act was also "An Act to provide for the appointment of a Municipal Committee for the city of Lucknow," and received the assent of the governor-general on 24 March 1864.

leap forward had the opportunity been treated with less cynicism by the townspeople. The arrangements for an election were made in 1875, and an election held "but as only seven votes were recorded, the Members of the Committee were nominated."¹ There is no evidence, either in the municipal records or in the newspapers, of any other election between 1864 and 1877, and what evidence there is supports the conclusion of Hugh Tinker who states that "in fact the elective principle was held in abeyance. . . . In general [municipal] boards were formed by the District Magistrate from among his *mulagatis* (acquaintances) and other 'respectable' citizens."²

The number of meetings between the years 1864 and 1877 varied from 8 to 22 in any single year, getting fewer as civic matters became routine.³ The non-official members, which included a few European residents of Lucknow, improved their attendance at meetings but their role in the decision making process was negligible. The picture that emerges from the proceedings of these thirteen years is one of a compliant group of a dozen and a half "respectable" men who represented their own rather than the interests of the residents of their wards. Though the city population had a far greater number of Hindus than Muslims (there being 59 per cent Hindus) the native members were drawn equally from both communities. Neither the potential for the slowly democratising ethos of the Raj, nor the "threat" from the Hindu majority were, as yet, perceived.

Communalism was nascent but would awaken in the arena where joint participation in an increasingly "representative" format would make numbers

¹Report on the Administration of Oudh, 1875-76, p. 35.

²Tinker, p. 37.

³The information for this paragraph is abstracted from the Ms registers of the Proceedings of the Municipal Committee, 1864-1877, MCRR.

crucial, if not menacing, for then the erstwhile rulers of Oudh (and much of India) would be reckoned as nothing more than a "minority" community for political purposes.

In these two decades, however, the only interests represented in the municipal committee were the narrow, economic self-interests of the monied and propertied class -- a religiously mixed group of bankers, wasiqadars (political pensioners), nawabs (noblemen), traders and loyal parvenus. The British were quick to identify the prominent men in the city and drew them into cooperating with the government since these men had a personal stake in the stability and continuity of the Raj. So there was even less justification for the official perception of the local population being polarised along religious lines or requiring "representatives" from the two religious groups. Had "communal" interests, in fact, been correctly identified the society would have been perceived as a combination of several sectarian (Shiites and Sunnis among Muslims) and caste (brahmins, khattris, kayasthas and banyas among Hindus) groups rather than one vertically divided on religious lines. It is well known that during the nawabi Muslim Shiites dominated the executive and Hindu khattris and kayasthas the financial branches of government.¹ Shiites and kayasthas had mutual interests, and were allied as political and culturally compatible groups (the kayasthas had adopted the Persianized life-style of the Shiite elite), while Shiites and Sunnis remained dogmatically and politically opposed to each other. The appointment of a Sunni to the office of the prime minister by Muhammad Ali Shah (1837-1842) was done only at the urging of the all-powerful British resident, and was suffered as a shameful "blot" on the Shia imperial escutcheon.² Violent communal clashes

¹Fisher, p. 223.

²Ibid., p. 163.

occurred more frequently between the two rival sects of Islam than between Hindus and Muslims in the city.

The British ignored these complex affinities across religious and cultural lines. They chose to see the society as simple aggregations of Hindus and Muslims for political purposes, and representation on official bodies was similarly accorded. This straightforward communal representation, would in time generate communal constituencies, when local representatives would understand the implications of a religious and vertical classification of the polity and exploit the advantages inherent in it. It is reasonable to suggest that the germ of the bitter and ugly communal strife of the future lay in this early obscuring of class interests in favour of religious ones. This is what made the latter day imputation that the British sought to "divide and rule" a fair analysis of their manipulation of historical forces unleashed by the revolt of 1857. The more detailed and painstaking the British effort to define, quantify and regroup the elements that made up indigenous society with census, settlement and commission reports, the more categorically this artificial and simple dichotomy was reinforced.

In the course of these two decades, the nominated members of the two communities established themselves as a coterie that worked in collaboration with the British in the municipal arena and reaped personal rewards for their loyalty in return. Table 4 identifies the longest-serving members; there were several others of shorter tenure and spotty attendance who represented the same economic group and probably found their self-interests, especially in matters of taxation and compensation, protected by their more active colleagues. That these men represented neither the interests of the citizens at large, nor the interests of their co-religionists in particular is patently obvious. They tended to act and vote together rather than as religious units

LONG-SERVING MEMBERS OF THE MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, 1864-1977

	Occupation (where known)	Ward	Number of years served ^a	Period of service
Daroga Mir Wajid Ali	Property and land owner; later taluqdar	Wazirgunj	13	1864-1877
Girdharee Lall	Jeweller, Banker	Chowk	10	1864-1877
Lala Shadi Lall	Banker	Dowlatgunj	9	1865-1875
Baboo Somair Chand	Banker	Chowk	9	1867-1876
Aga Ali Khan Bahadur	Property owner, wasiqadar	Chowk	9	1865-1877
Lala Surup Chand	Banker	Sadutgunj	8	1865-1873
Sirdar Mirza		Dowlutgunj	7	1868-1877
Lala Lalta Parshad		Dowlutgunj	7	1868-1876
Chait Ram Choudhury		Husseingunj	7	1868-1876
Daroga Hadi Husain Khan		Ganeshgunj	7	1865-1877
Chuttree Chowdhury		Husseingunj	6	1864-1874
Aga Ushraff Ali Khan	Wasiqadar	Wazirgunj	5	1865-1871
Lala Gujjadher Pershad		Husseingunj	5	1869-1874
Syud Akbar Ali		Husseingunj	4	1865-1870
Yusuf Mirza	Wasiqadar	Sadutgunj	4	1866-1871
Nawab Furukh Mirza		Sadutgunj	4	1873-1877
Syud Wazir Ali	Wasiqadar	Wazirgunj	4	1873-1877
Munshi Newal Kishore	Printer	Ganeshgunj	3	1875-1877

Source: Proceedings of the Municipal Committee, 1864-1877, MCRR.

^anot necessarily continuous.

with conflicting interests. There was as yet no consciousness of community which is the first stage, according to Paul Brass, that leads to political action in the quest for a separate nation state in a multi-ethnic polity.¹

There were other constraints that made it difficult for these men to be effective representatives of any but their own narrow interests. The formality and protocol observed at meetings was as alien to the indigenous members as it was awesome. The presence of senior bureaucrats and the use of English as the medium of communication, which few of them understood, much less spoke, doubtless added to the reluctance or the inability of the Indians to participate in the process of government. The Taj-ul-Akbar of Lucknow of 8 December 1874 published a letter of a correspondent complaining about municipal committees in Oudh. "The Committee," the letter writer remarks

is composed of members who, although they are considered wealthy and respectable, are mere puppets, and sit in council like deaf and dumb people, staring at the chairs and tables; "yes" and "no" being the extent of their argument for or against any measure of importance. . . . Now tell me is this what is called a Committee? Is this what we have to lean on for reform? When the members are asked, we generally receive this reply -- "Who asks me? They [the English members] generally among themselves talk 'git pit' [a derogatory term for English], and if they question me, I can but acquiesce in what they say. Many things mentioned I do not even comprehend, but to do our duty we obey as members."²

The forum was further restricted since several areas of municipal management were excluded from non-official review. The administration of the police, for example, with an allocation of approximately a third of the total civic revenue, was such an area, as were larger public works projects which were

¹Paul R. Brass, Language, Religion and Politics in North India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 44-45.

²Taj-ul-Akbar, 8 December 1874, VNR.

approved by the municipal engineer for both feasibility and outlay.¹ It was only within the sub-committees designated for specific purposes as the sub-committee for bazaar weights and measures, or regulating other market practices, that indigenous members apprised the European of the customary practices of Lucknow bazaars (see below p. 88) but, on the whole, their role was passive and acquiescent in matters which seemed not to impinge on their day-to-day business.

This acquiescence was not, however, freely given at all times. The officials appeared to "purchase" it by innumerable small and large favours or concessions to the members. These usually came in the shape of contracts for building supplies, sanctions for plots of land for commercial or residential development, licences for liquor or tobacco retail for an enterprising relative, or a clerical post for a member's protege in the expanding administrative establishment. These "payoffs" seem minuscule when compared to fortunes lavished on favourites by the nawabs of Oudh, but committee membership was one of the few opportunities of gaining access to the senior civil servants who controlled the patronage in the province. It became more and more clear that the vacuum created by the deposition of the King and the dispersal of his court was filled by the municipal committee, to serve as the font (albeit with a budget a fraction of the King's) of all jobs and business contracts in the city and the mufussil; to have access in Lucknow was especially prized since a word from the chief commissioner or his secretary in Lucknow could fill a vacancy or secure a contract in any distant corner of Oudh. It paved the way for a growing number of Indian "collaborators" to enhance their status and influence in the city, in the decades to come. Francis Robinson maintains

¹Memo of W. Lane, Secretary of the Municipal Committee, 24 December 1864, PMC, 1864, PMC, MCRR.

that, "it has too often been assumed that non-official members of the municipal boards had little real power" and historians of local self government, including Hugh Tinker, have endorsed this view without presenting any real evidence in its support.¹ This is once again "assumed" here but not without a mass of evidence to prove that it is based on hard facts.

Even in its infancy, and long before its non-official members were actually elected, this institution was used as a spring board by several of its members to increase their private wealth and influence. The men who made, perhaps, the best use of their connections, were Mir Wajid Ali, who served on the committee for thirteen years till his death in 1876, aggrandizing his social position from a nawabi daroga to a man of property and influence; Munshi Newal Kishore, who won contracts to print government publications and text books, to make of his print shop the largest and most voluminous press in all Asia; and nawabs Mohsun ud Dowlah and Mumtaz ud Dowlah who became the trustees of the largest charitable trust in the city.²

Daroga Mir Wajid Ali, a Shiite, had served the last King of Oudh, in the capacity of a mahal darogah, and his job was to supply the daily wants of the multitude of King's wives (reputed to have been in the region of three hundred and twenty) who resided in the Kaiserbagh palace complex.³ For his loyalty to the British during the rebellion he received a handsome reward of a lakh of rupees (details in the next chapter) and was appointed to the munic-

¹Francis Robinson, Separatism Among Indian Muslims (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 52.

²We shall make the acquaintance of these men at some length in Chapter 5.

³This information is taken from a petition by Daroga Mir Wajid Ali addressed to Sir George Couper, Chief Commissioner of Oudh, n.d., Urdu Ms., file no. 1931 Board of Revenue, Lucknow District (hereafter: BRLD) UPSA. Also see pp. 224-228, below.

ipal committee in 1864. He gained experience in dealing with European officialdom in his long and persistent struggle to acquire property, and to press claims for compensation and litigate on behalf of the many begums (wives of the ex-King) who had been dispossessed after the rebellion. He also was associated with charitable causes in the city and was often called upon to collect and disburse "relief" to the poor of the city.¹ In other words, he became well known in the city as a man who could get things done. He managed, for example, to get an order of the chief commissioner, which prohibited the manufacture of khari salt in Lucknow district, waived, and obtained a licence to do so after four years of petitioning a succession of senior bureaucrats in the city. He finally managed to inveigle Col. Barrow to grant him a licence to manufacture salt in 1869.² A mixture of Wajid Ali's influence and tactics of attrition had succeeded in overturning the orders of the chief commissioner in his own case, but he could do nothing about getting the oppressive ban on salt manufacture lifted.

The daroga was an indefatigable member of the committee and had the highest attendance record amongst all his non-official colleagues.³ His conscientiousness undoubtedly helped him, at least on one occasion, when a written complaint against him filed by a certain Mrs. Johannes was dealt with in a meeting held on 20 April 1865. He was accused of having violated a bye-law of the committee by building a gunj in the vicinity of two flour-

¹Oudh Akhbar, 9 October 1861.

²For the entire case see file no. 2585, from 3 August 1865 and to 18 February 1869, BRLD, UPSA.

³This fact was ascertained by counting the number of meetings attended by the Indian members during the thirteen year period. Attendance was taken at every meeting and a record of it kept in the registers where the proceedings were recorded. PMC, MCRR.

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh

ishing gunjes without the permission of the committee to do so.¹ After due consideration of the daroga's undeniable breach of the law (which he may well have helped to frame since he was present on the day the above resolution was tabled) the committee,

Resolved that, the darogah is in fault in having built the gunje without first obtaining the usual permission; but under all circumstances the Committee will not interfere in the matter.²

Wajid Ali certainly managed to soften the blows aimed against him.

The daroga's attempts to shape government policy on the subject of gunjes were unabashed. As the owner of four major markets in the city, to wit Chandgunj, Futtehgunj, Sadatgunj and Rakabgunj (all of which he had received as compensation for the loss of two villages which were acquired by the government for the new cantonment), and a tireless builder of new ones, his interests were closely tied to any rules the committee might devise to regulate the market place. In July 1868, he served on a sub-committee of five, which included Mirza Ubbas Beg, Surup Chand and Chaitram, who had similar vested interests, "to draft rules regarding the grant and Registry of Licences to Dullals [brokers], Weighmen, &c."³ These rules were drafted and confirmed by a resolution of the committee on 14 July 1868. They went into effect in the next fiscal year and brought forth a howl of protest from dullals and arhatiyas (brokers) of Rakabgunj (owned by the daroga) embodied in a strongly worded petition to the commissioner.⁴ The latter

¹The bye-law categorically stated "that there being an undoubted customary law [that] no new bazaar can be opened without express authority, the consent of the Committee must be obtained previous to the establishment of a bazaar. . . ." Resolution no. 182, 22 July 1863, PMC. MCRR.

²Resolution no. 245, 20 April 1865, PMC, MCRR.

³Resolution no. 76, 25 June 1868, PMC, MCRR. They are mentioned in the resolution as gunj owners.

⁴Petition, Ms. in Urdu, docket no. 822, from the Commissioner, Lucknow

immediately ordered the deputy commissioner, who departed for G. W. Bonner, the superintendent of octroi, to enquire into the changes in trade practices alleged by the brokers. The strongest allegation in the petition against the new rules was that they "have placed . . . extra power . . . in the hands of the owners of the gunjes . . ." and this was confirmed to be true after Bonner's investigation. "Proprietors of Gunjes," he wrote in his report, "could not

formerly claim as a right any fees from either traders or arutheas, neither had they any control over the latter. On the contrary they were obliged to conciliate these men, but by the new rules things have been reversed, and what is most galling to the arutheas is the Proprietors having the option of sending up names of those whom they desire should obtain licences [for brokerage] which, in some instances had led to the servant obtaining a licence to the exclusion of the master. Proprietors have therefore great powers in their hands, whereas formerly they had none.¹

On the 8th of October, even before Bonner's report had reached the deputy commissioner, the daroga sent up another petition in a pre-emptive bid to invalidate Bonner's findings. Having managed to obtain the precise information in the arthatiya's complaint and in Bonner's corroborative report on Rakabgunj, Wajid Ali petitioned that

The Superintendent [Bonner] having sent for those "Aurutias" who are against me, kept some conversation with them for days and enquired into the matter without giving me any information about the subject, he made an expost [sic] enquiry and formed his report simply on the statement of those who have complaint against me. . . . Now the said "aurutias" say that they will desert and ruin my Gunjes and settle a new one and they say that Mr. Banner [sic] has given a promise for doing so.²

Division, to the Deputy Commissioner, Lucknow, 13 September 1869 (Original petition enclosed) basta 69, "Municipal," MCRR.

¹Ms. report by G.W. Bonner, Superintendent of Octroi to Deputy Commissioner, Lucknow, 6 October 1869, basta 69, "Municipal," MCRR.

²Petition, from Daroga Mir Wajid Ali to the Deputy Commissioner, 8 October 1869, basta no. 69, "Municipal," MCRR.

He also stated that the payment of fees was customary before 1856 and had "ceased [to be paid] merely from the date when Mr. Banner [sic] obtained charge of the Choongie . . ." and strongly urged the government to bear these facts in mind when Bonner's report appeared before them. Unfortunately there is no record of the final outcome of the allegations against the daroga nor his counter allegation of collusion between the arhatiyas and Bonner, but we can surmise that the daroga retained for proprietors of gunjes their lately assumed right to charge fees from brokers and tradesmen as well, for such was the case when William Hoey, excise commissioner of Lucknow, undertook his detailed survey of trade practices in the city in 1879-80.¹

The daroga demonstrated how influence could best be used and seemingly impossible favours extracted as the price for unswerving loyalty to the regime. The British were anxious to replace the ex-King's men with their own, and of this mutual need a brief era of intense cooperation and collusion between the government and the native elite was born. Men like the daroga were content to wrest financial advantages and increased social status from their association with the ruling elite. They, however, did not and could not aspire to real political power since it was in the hands of a caste that was most rigidly ascriptive: the European elite.

The Municipal Committee: Activities

Having provided a brief sketch of the evolution and structure of the

¹William Hoey, A Monograph on Trade and Manufactures in Northern India (Lucknow: American Methodist Mission Press, 1880) p. 60.

municipal committee we can appraise the actual discharge of its civic responsibilities. A glimpse of the various functions of the committee over this twenty-year period can be had by examining the "expenditures" side of the municipal budgets over three well-spaced years. This will also reveal at a glance the relative weight assigned to a particular function at a given time. (See Table 5.)

In the first few years after the recapture of Lucknow an inordinate amount of money was spent on the reconstruction of a major part of the city, and this sum alone exceeded the average annual budget of later years by almost a third. The municipal records do not have any detailed annual budgets of the years 1861-70, when it was the practice to sanction bills on a monthly basis. A complete record of these is lacking, so it is difficult to form an annual picture of the receipts and disbursements.¹ It was not until the committee submitted annual reports of its activities and finances from 1872 onward that we get an accurate account of the scope of its endeavours in the city. The contrast between the crude figures of 1859-1860 and those in the seventies suggests that once the great and urgent Napier plan had been executed, the cost of on-going public works (road building, repairs to bridges, etc.) never exceeded 12 to 15 per cent of the annual budget. In 1859-60, "local improvements" included a modest outlay for "drain- ing and metalling" principal thoroughfares of the native portions of the city . . . and generally improving the town."² A large and prosperous market, the Chini Bazaar, was demolished in order to improve the view from the civil station and its dismantling threw open "the magnificent tomb of

¹PMC, 1861-70, passim, MCRR.

²Report on the Administration of Oudh, 1859-60, p. 44.

TABLE 5

MUNICIPAL EXPENDITURES

	1859-60	1872-73	1876-77
Head office establishment	-	2,201	2,759
Collection of octroi	-	17,922	15,436
Police	176,663	96,595	89,765
Lighting	-	-	446
Registration of births and deaths	-	-	229
Construction & maintenance of roads ^a	317,913 ^b	30,261	31,850
Watering roads	-	1,518	2,862
Drainage works	-	11,375	33,423
Water supply	-	-	-
Buildings	-	9,975	9,187
Other public works, gardens and similar improvements	-	7,778	9,009
Sanitary and charitable establishments	-	3,643	2,749
Conservancy and cleaning ^c	73,461	42,838	26,647
Education, science and arts	-	1,200	1,192
Contribution to local or provincial funds	-	6,913	7,725
Interest on debt	-	2,469	500
Repayment of debt	-	4,000	20,000
Collection of other taxes and income	-	-	175
Total	568,037	242,081	258,107

Source: The expenditure of 1859-60 is taken from the Administration Report for the Province of Oudh, 1859-60, p. 41. The figures for 72-73 and

76-77 are taken from the municipal report on Oudh of those years. This report was submitted only from 1872 onward.

^aThis was called "Local Improvements" in 1859-60 and subsumed later categories such as "buildings," "other public works" etc.

^bIncludes the cost of the Napier plan, demolitions and major repair work on nuzul buildings.

^cThe figures under this head include Rs. 7,200 contribution to cantonment conservancy.

Saudut Ali Khan, and the elegant square of Kaiserbagh, through which two broad roads have been made."¹

Another expense incurred under the same head was a lump sum of ten thousand rupees "set apart . . . [by] the municipal committee [to relieve] the suffering and distress amongst the lowest class of people caused [by] . . . the high price of grain . . . in consequence to the unprecedented export to the North West."² This sum distributed "in the shape of the lowest rate of wages for a day's labour," staved off starvation for the "poorest classes of people of the city for several months."³ Though the sum expended was insignificant, the members seemed to acknowledge a limited responsibility of the municipality for the "welfare" of its citizens, especially since the scarcity and high prices were man-made rather than the result of natural causes. This practice was not a new departure for the citizens of Lucknow, who had traditionally depended on the charity of the nawabs of Oudh in times of natural shortages caused by drought or flood. There were poor houses in the city endowed by the nawabs, the best known being Nasir ud Din's

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 37.

³Ibid.

Poor House. The nawabs also undertook the building of large palaces or imambaras in order to provide employment to the hard pressed in times of famine. The Asafi Imambara, completed in 1791, was the best known of such projects in Lucknow. Hundreds of poor artisans, whose jobs had withered away with the nawabi, found themselves temporarily employed in clearing of the debris and preparing kunkur (pieces of brick broken with a hammer) for road building, for the lowest possible day wage. A reduction in the export of grain from Oudh might have been the more efficacious thing to do.

In the early sixties the various departments of the provincial government, including executive offices, judicial and land revenue courts, public works, and post and telegraph establishments, which had been disrupted during the rebellion, had to be housed. It was decided that the spacious nuzul buildings, once the palaces that constituted the nawabi court, would best accommodate the full civic and provincial establishment. These buildings were repaired and renovated "at heavy cost from the Local Funds, and the imperial finances [were] put to no charge on this account."¹ In other words the city taxpayers bore the cost and the municipality the responsibility of refurbishing the vacant, shot-ridden palaces as office space for the provincial government. This extraordinary burden on civic resources was seen as the fair price the citizens had to pay to convert what had been "for three years the seat of rapine and disorder" into the seat of a stable and just government.²

¹Letter no. 3276, from Junior Secretary to Chief Commissioner of Oudh to the Secretary, GOI. Foreign Department, 7 December 1864, Foreign Department/ Revenue A, NAI.

²Report of Charles Currie, Officiating Secretary to the Chief Commissioner to Cecil Beadon, Secretary to GOI, 5 April 1860, Foreign Consultations, NAI.

Sanitation

The committee's most important responsibility, its raison d'etre, in fact, was sanitation. This was an era when the connection between dirt and disease had been made, but the discovery of bacteria, or the role of house flies, mosquitoes and other vermin as carriers of disease was yet to be made. The tireless war against ubiquitous vegetable, animal and human waste in a city both vast and dense, and given the inadequate weapons and theories to fight it with, appeared to be a hopeless one. If an epidemic of cholera abated, an outbreak of malaria or typhoid could be expected next. Then there was the imponderable question of the indigenous citizens themselves. Could natives and Europeans co-exist and enjoy good health when the very "habits of the natives are such that, unless they are closely watched, they cover the whole neighbouring surface with filth. . . ."¹

In Lucknow large amounts of money and effort had been expended to keep the native and European quarters of the city as far apart as possible, but clearly this was not enough. Therefore a mixture of genuine concern for the lack of adequate drainage and rubbish disposal, some good common sense about clean drinking water and more public toilets, some prejudice about "native habits" and a spirit of bold experimentation characterised the efforts made to clean up the city.

There was also the prevailing belief that cities of the Indian plains were not conducive to prolonged European colonization:

The statistical tables of the Royal Sanitary Commission prove that sickness and mortality increase every year with length of residence in India, at a much greater rate than is explainable by age alone. The natives of temperate zones degenerate in the tropics, as the Esquimaux or negroes do when removed to temperate climates . . . even inferior animals, as cows, dogs

¹Report of the Royal Commission on the Health of the Anglo-India Army, as cited in Harrison, p. 6.

and sheep, deteriorate in the tropics. . . .¹

This problem was dealt with in part by transferring, every year between May and September, the entire official establishment and its attendant paraphernalia to the "hill station,"² Nainital, where the cool Himalayan breezes, the magnificent lake, and English-style cottages renewed the health and vigour of the ruling race. The other remedy, resorted to bi-annually, was the grant of "home leave," a two-month or longer spell home "in England" to compensate for the hardship endured in the colony. The sea voyage to and from England made this considerably longer. Officials were also constantly transferred within India, to make a balanced use of its wide range of climatic and topographical possibilities.

All this notwithstanding, the ineluctable fact of an unhealthy city had to be confronted. The nawabi drainage system, which had once worked efficiently, was a subterranean complex of pukka (paved) and kachcha (unpaved) drains that fed four main arteries, which in turn combined to form a single large sewer that emptied itself into the Gomti River. But with years of neglect, particularly during the rebellion, floods and bad levels had choked these drains so that they became "receptacles of filth of all kinds."³ In addition there were "small systems of drainage into what are called 'garaias' or tanks" created by the removal of earth for building

¹Prichard, Administration, vol. 2, p. 283.

²For a discussion of the "hill station" in the colonial urban system see Anthony D. King, Colonial Urban Development (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), pp. 156-170. Nainital served as Oudh's summer capital, just as Simla did for the Indian empire.

³Letter no. 3467, from Secretary to Chief Commissioner, to Secretary to GOI, Home Department, 11 August 1869, docket in unnumbered basta, MCRR. The nawabi system of drains are also described in the Sanitary Report of the City of Lucknow For the Year 1868-69, p. 9, IOL.

purposes.¹ The net effect of the supplementary drainage system was to add several cess-pools to an ill-drained environment, and increased its potential for disease. Furthermore, there were numerous "filth depots" dotting the cityscape, referred to in the report of the health officer, Dr. Bonavia, as "a disgrace to civilization,"² where ordure and rubbish collected from the city lanes was piled in great heaps. This created large malodorous areas in the city and ideal breeding grounds for disease. The ruins of buildings that were destroyed either during the rebellion or demolished later on, compounded the already insuperable sanitary problem in the city. The municipal committee taking cognizance of this resolved that

In a sanitary point of view the Committee regards it as a most essential duty the government owes the people to remove these ruins, which are calculated to create a pestilence, which [also] harbour thieves and robbers and cripple the operations of the Police. . . .³

and therefore the ruins should be levelled expeditiously. In the next decade the committee laboured to cope with the endemic environmental hazards that affected "the salubrity of the city" by expending large sums on levelling ruins, cleaning and repairing old drains, building public latrines and planning for a civic water works.⁴ The "demolition lands" which had become "an unhealthy jungle" were handed over by the provincial government to the local agency to take the best possible steps to clear them

¹Sanitary Report of the City of Lucknow For the Year 1868-69. p. 12. This report was based on a detailed scrutiny of the existing sanitary conditions in the city by E. Bonavia, M.D., health officer, Lucknow, and an official member of the municipal committee.

²Ibid.

³Resolution no. 334, 29 May 1861, PMC, MCRR.

⁴Report on the Administration of Oudh, 1863-64, p. 69, and 1868-69, p. 150.

and provide for their conservancy.¹ These lands were given in leasehold for a nominal rate (for five years at Rs. 4 and for twenty-five years at Rs. 6 per annum) to those townspeople who complied with the terms of the lease to convert the rubble heaps all through the city into "pleasant walks for the people" with "neat hedges" and "a shrubbery to border each plot."² In the non-ornamental areas of the plot the leaseholders could obtain special permission to grow vegetables "conducive to health." These plots were to be inspected periodically to see that the conditions of the lease were being honoured, failing which the lessee would "at once be ejected without compensation."³ Some portions of the cleared area were not leased but reserved for small parks and gardens, thought by the committee to be

as good a measure and as legitimate a way of spending its funds as could be adopted, for the more the people are attracted from the close streets of the city the better, and as it is impossible to make the city itself altogether healthy, the next best thing is to provide a healthy place near at hand for air and exercise.⁴

The notion that open spaces were needed to serve as "lungs of the city" was widely accepted and many areas, which otherwise would have been sold or leased for money were retained as gardens. Even the petition of Daroga Wajid Ali for the grant of Aishbagh (the ex-King's pleasure garden), as compensation for certain of his villages acquired by the government for the new cantonment, was rejected on the grounds of it being a "lung of the city."

¹Letter no. 4349, from Financial Commissioner Oudh to Commissioner, Lucknow, 11 July 1868, file no 966, BRLD, UPSA.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

which the Local Agency would be very unwilling to part with. . . ."¹

It was also believe that roads, "affording as they do, a free passage for a current of air through the heart of the city, are not less important in a sanitary than in a military point of view."² The allocation of money to pave some selected city streets in the native quarter was debited in the budget for conservancy rather than for the maintenance of roads.³

The other areas where filth tended to accumulate easily were the several scores of gunjes in the city. The committee decided to make stringent bye-laws to constrain the owners of gunjes and serais (inns) to arrange and pay for the proper conservancy and maintenance of public latrines and sweepers on their property. Violaters were liable to be fined heavily, and judging from the numerous petitions for the reduction of fines by defaulting owners, it appears that inspections were regularly carried out.⁴

The conservancy arrangements, not surprisingly, tended to be more rigourously executed in the cantonment and the eastern circle of the city than in the western circle, where the bulk of the population resided. The unequal treatment of the two portions of the city was built into the system itself.⁵ The eastern sector (civil lines) was under the direct charge of the

¹Letter no. 5194, from the District Commissioner, Lucknow to the Commissioner, Lucknow, 7 October 1868, file no. 864, BRLD, UPSA.

²Report on the Administration of Oudh, 1863-64, p. 69.

³Ibid.

⁴Ms. Report on "Conservancy in Gunjes," 4 October 1865, p. 2, unnumbered basta, MCRR. Also see Resolution no. 86, 5 January, 1871, PMC wherein "owners of gunjes [were] to report to the approval of the health officer [about] the arrangements made by them for the maintenance of urinals" and general cleanliness of the markets.

⁵The conservancy "system" is explained at great length in a committee report on conservancy (30 July 1862, PMC, MCRR). The following account is based on it. The report is unsigned, but in all probability it was written by the deputy commissioner who was also the vice-president of the committee.

committee while the western section was farmed out to a contractor. After a surprise inspection the committee found that there was "scarcely . . . a sweeper from one end of the [old] city to the other and some portions of it were excessively filthy."¹ The contractor, a European named Ross, claimed that the sweepers were absent because they had been summoned to report to their respective police thanas. It was also discovered that Mr. Ross had made provisions for clearing only the main streets, since he believed that the "narrow lanes and by-lanes should be the responsibility of the inhabitants," which meant that "two-thirds of the city had not been cleaned at all." The committee was appalled by this neglect but failed to take any punitive measures against Ross and did not abolish the contract system until 1868. They managed to tighten the terms of the contract and from then on the cleaning of "only blind alleys or lanes which [had] no thoroughfare" would be the responsibility of the inhabitants. This was still a large part of the native quarter, since its cul-de-sacs were many. The "daily filth and rubbish" collected was to be deposited in "cess-pools in localities, to be constructed by the committee" and it would have to be removed nightly to the outskirts of the city in carts or by donkey.²

This discriminatory treatment of the old city did not go unobserved by the natives, and complaints against it appeared in the local Urdu newspapers which were increasingly becoming a vehicle for local reaction to the new government. The Oudh Akhbar, for instance, reported that the

Hazratgunje [the fashionable civil lines' market] and "Thandi Sarak" [Mall] are kept clean and neat, but in the more remote situations there is said to be neglect

¹Ibid. All the quotes in this description have been taken from the above Report.

²Ibid.



apparent, and the stench and filth are not only disagreeable but unwholesome. . . . In Lucknow the money provided for the general good is devoted to the improvement of one or two favoured places.¹

At the same time the police were assigned a prominent role in enforcing sanitation bye-laws and overseeing the conservancy arrangements.² The head constable of every police thana in the city was "answerable for cleanliness of the streets and roads," would keep a diary (roznamcha) where he would sum up the reports on the conservancy made by subordinate constables, and would be expected to visit every road and lane in his beat at least "once in every twenty-four hours."³ Any "obstructions, nuisances or breach of conservancy rules" reported to the head constable had to be forwarded, on the appropriate form, to the city magistrate.⁴ The committee, in a rare flight of poesy, urged that the city magistrate be "ubiquitous, Argus Eyed, and Antelope Eared and a Jupiter in Thunder" and all "Municipal Commissioners should be

¹Oudh Akhabar, 5 December 1865, VNR. Harrison, p. 10 reports similar evidence of the disparity in the sanitary service in the European and Indian parts of Allahabad.

²Report on Conservancy, 30 July 1862, PMC, MCRR.

³*Ibid.*

⁴*Ibid.* A blank form appended to the report reads as follows:

Conservancy Inspector's Report this ____ day of ____ 186__

Division ____ Name of Street ____ Cause of Breach ____

Forwarded to Darogah with orders to intimate contractor that if breach not rectified in ____ hours, he will be fined Rs. ____ of ____, the penalty bound and that you will report the result after inspection.

Signature of the contractor with date and time of recovery notice ____

Report of the Darogah on the result with date and signature ____

eyes, nose and ears to aid the Magistrate."¹

By the end of 1864, with the problem no less bothersome, a sub-committee on drainage planned to solicit opinions from the sanitary commissioners in other provinces of the Indian empire "with a view to gaining the best possible system of drainage for the City"; the municipal engineer was despatched to Calcutta to consult maps and plans for drains in other cities.² These grandiose schemes were never executed because the pecuniary outlays did not match the ambitions of the sub-committee. The imperial treasury in its eternal and insatiable quest for extra rupees, annually raided the Lucknow municipal funds for all the "proceeds, generally for property sold or confiscated in the city, and of rents from confiscated houses . . . and more particularly, of the proprietary profits of all land demarcated as belonging to Villages within City-limits."³ The financial commissioner submitted several pleas to retain these funds for civic purposes to the government of India between 1867-69, including a representation to the viceroy who visited the city in November, 1867, when the latter's "special attention . . . was attracted [by] the ruinous appearance of the interior of the city."⁴ The sanction to retain these funds was delayed by the inevitable routine referrals and the transfers of officers; Barrow himself moved up from the position of commissioner of the division to financial commissioner and finally chief commissioner of the province in 1871, which at one stage in the course of the

¹Ibid.

²PMC, Resolution no. 184, PMC, MCRR.

³Letter no. 3792, Financial Commissioner (Col. Barrow) to Chief Commissioner, 10 May 1869, file no. 757, BRLD, UPSA.

⁴Ibid. The Financial Commissioner listed all his previous petitions in this letter.

convoluted procedure, necessitated his reviewing appeals that he had written himself. The sanction was finally given in 1878 and the usufruct of the nuzul properties was made over to the committee.¹

While decisions of this nature were mired in the bureaucratic process, the spur for decisive action were the periodic reviews of the problem of sanitation authorised by the imperial government. In anticipation of the visit of the Imperial Sanitary Commission in December 1866, the city was hastily scrubbed and barely passed muster; it was reported with justifiable pride that

The Commission [having] indulged optics and nasal organs [and] after the fatigues and endurances of such perambulation [through the city, found it] though still very dirty in pigs and pig sties, in sinks and sewers, in dung heaps and latrines, in personal and domestic cleanliness, [to] rank superior to all the other great cities of this our Indian Empire.²

Even while Col. Barrow seemed to be patiently corresponding with himself to enlarge the municipal outlay, Dr. Bonavia, the civil surgeon and health officer of Lucknow, inspected the old city, ended the conservancy contract system, and wrought, virtually unaided, "a complete revolution . . . in the Lucknow latrine system."³ Latrines, whether public or private, were central to the problem of keeping the city clean. The existing public latrines, according to Dr. Bonavia's painstaking research and graphic description, were scandalously dirty enclosures, where those who dared to use them at all, had to "pick their way through the ordure, and squat in any bit of clean ground." The miasma of faeces, urine and water remained "saturating

¹Municipal Report of Oudh, 1878-79, p. 5.

²Pioneer, 17 December 1866.

³Sanitary Report of the City of Lucknow For the Year 1868-69, p. 13.

the ground" till the enclosure was entirely filled. Then a sweeper, armed "with a cow's rib, used as a scraper, and a piece of broken pot, fancied he cleaned the place."¹ The new latrines invented by Bonavia combined all that was, in his opinion, requisite: "complete privacy, cleanliness, sweetness, dryness and thorough ventilation, and some of them [even] picturesque." The new latrine was a walled enclosure with a thatch roof, equipped with a simple seat made of two large bricks, between which were kept a small basket and a glazed pan, half filled with earth, for ordure and urine respectively, and a separate screened area, where water for washing up was available in a large jar embedded in the ground. Each latrine was manned by a male and female sweeper, usually man and wife, who lived in a hut adjacent to a shed for storing dry earth, a few yards away from the enclosure. They cleaned the latrine after every use, deposited the contents of the containers in a large filth basket, and replaced fresh dry earth in the latrine receptacles. The filth baskets were serviced nightly by conservancy carts or donkeys. Dr. Bonavia conducted his own opinion poll among native users and received responses such as, "ab bahut safa [now very clean]" or "hamara makan se behter [better than my house]." Yet another man thought that the doctor was "building a place for [a] 'cutcherry' [courthouse]."²

The old latrines were transformed "from stinking filthy holes [which] filled the air with nastiness and impurity . . . into garden-like places" and some townspeople were "building their houses close to the latrine." The revolution was city-wide, affecting fifty-seven old public latrine sites with multiple enclosures and one hundred and thirty-four private latrines,

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

CC-0. Agamigam Digital Presevation Foundation, Chandigarh
owned by private sweepers and partially subsidised by the municipality.

The owners of the latter charged a small fee for the use of their facilities since they were not employees of the municipality and were liable to be fined if they did not maintain them as expected.¹

The committee recovered its initial investment for remodelling the latrines from an increase in the sale of filth under the direct management system. The revenue from this source more than doubled itself and exceeded Rs. 6,000 annually. The contractor used to pay a lump sum of Rs. 3,000 for all the night soil in the city, and "removed only such quantities that suited him, and left the remainder in great heaps all over the city to corrupt the air and demoralize the people."² Dr. Bonavia, having played Hercules in the Augean stables, tried to persuade his sceptical European colleagues that the citizens of Lucknow had responded with enthusiasm to the new facilities. Official "suppositions" about the "natives" have proved to be "without foundation." The townspeople were "only too glad to have the change" in the style of latrines and "they in no way dislike to be screened, when performing their private operations as is generally supposed."³ The new latrines undoubtedly reduced the temptation for the male population of the city to "commit nuisance" and the patrolling constables limited the opportunities. The vigil was not without its frustrations since committers of "nuisances," who had left the scene of their "crime," were impossible to identify. The policeman's imponderable dilemma haunted the dedicated health officer and defied his ingenuity: "By what sign is he to recognize the

¹Ibid., pp. 13-14.

²Ibid., p. 15.

³Ibid, p. 14. Emphasis in the original.

the committer of the nuisance, so that he may apprehend and prosecute him?"¹ Once apprehended, the offender was zealously prosecuted. Newspapers published periodic protests against the severity of fines for civic nuisance which could be as high as Rs. 200 ² and was an extreme hardship on the poor who appeared to be the chief offenders.³ To Dr. Bonavia's everlasting regret, he was neither able to enforce the modernization of latrines in people's homes nor inspect their wells, though conservancy carts serviced private homes and the soil collected was either sold or deposited in gigantic trenches dug in special locations in the city and covered with earth, to await sale as manure at a later time.⁴

Efficient as these arrangements sounded in the report, they appeared not to work as well as they might in the old city. The citizens manifested a growing civic consciousness and the complaints about "certain serious abuses connected with sanitation in the city of Lucknow" became more numerous.⁵ The conservancy carts and donkeys moved slowly through the city spreading "the most offensive smell"; the sweepers deposited the full baskets from the latrines and drains on the side of the narrow streets making concourse impossible; and the uncovered drains on the side of the street aggravated the stench in the city.⁶ Another editorial went further in its investigation and blamed the "native gentlemen" as much as the superintendent of conservancy

¹Ibid., p. 11.

²The penalty according to Act X of 1872 (section 278) for "making atmosphere noxious to health" was Rs. 500 and (sections 240 and 241) for "committing nuisance" was Rs. 200 fine or six months imprisonment or both.

³See Karnamah, 31 July 1871 and 27 May 1872, VNR.

⁴Sanitary Report of the City of Lucknow For the Year 1868-69, p. 15.

⁵Roznamcha, 21 March 1873, VNR.

⁶Ibid.

for the lapses in night soil removal, "as many of them are members of the

Municipal Committee, and yet do not care to take notice of the nuisance. . . . Until honest, conscientious, and able natives are appointed members of Municipal Committees, the comfort and convenience of the public will not be secured."¹

Another source of ill-health that Dr. Bonavia tackled was the quality of the water supply. There were 217 public and 301 private wells in the city on which the citizens depended for their drinking and household needs. Dr. Bonavia ordered a limited assault against polluted wells, putting every police post in the city in charge of the maintenance of a public well nearest if used solely for drinking purposes. The brick work, the drainage and the immediate vicinity of the well were to be kept in good repair.² An abortive attempt was made by the police to install hand pumps in selected locations in the city to increase the potable water supply,³ but there is no evidence to suggest that they were in use or even installed in the city.

These quotidian preoccupations notwithstanding, Dr. Bonavia mounted a major onslaught on the traditional Muslim custom of burying their dead in small plots scattered throughout the city.⁴ These were, to his mind, the major health hazard and finding that his elaborate proposal to create burial and cremation grounds outside city limits⁵ received no immediate response, he determined to make it his next project (i.e. after the "latrine

¹Karnamah, 24 March 1873, VNR. Also see Roznamcha, 24 September 1874 and 20 November 1874, VNR.

²Sanitary Report of the City of Lucknow For the Year 1868-69, p. 17.

³Oudh Akhbar, Lucknow, 21 May 1862.

⁴Sanitary Report of the City of Lucknow For the Year 1868-69, p. 16.

⁵Letter no. 336, from Dr. Bonavia, Civil Surgeon, to Deputy Commissioner, 21 November 1868, Municipal Basta, MCRR.

revolution") and to, characteristically, "drive at it day after day till I get done."¹ His pertinacity finally paid off and the committee decided that the existing burial grounds in the Dowlatjunj, Ganeshgunj, Chowk and Saadatgunj wards and in the cantonment be closed. Instead, six nuzul and three private plots were sanctioned on the periphery of the city as sites for new cemeteries.²

This step was far more serious than any that had been taken so far, since it interfered directly with religious practice and the sensitive issue of the sanctity of the dead. It generated a storm of petitions against the order, and many well-to-do Muslims filed for exemptions for their private cemeteries.³ The Shiites and Sunnis, in separate formal representations, demanded "distinct and separate burial grounds," which sentiment was hastily accommodated in the new extra-mural cemeteries.⁴ Where it was not practicable to provide separate sites to the two communities, a road or a ditch was to serve as the demarcation of the Shia and Sunni portions of the cemetery. Further concessions were made to the demands of the influential Muslim families, and a dozen private cemeteries were permitted to continue. Nawab Mohsun ud Dowlah's family burial ground, in the heart of Thakurgunj mohalla was among those exempted.⁵ The concession was finally extended to those who could comply with Dr. Bonavia's specifications. Thus,

all family Masoleums situated inside masonry built houses, or such as are enclosed by high wall . . . may continue to be used for the burial of bona fide

¹Sanitary Report of the City of Lucknow For the Year 1868-69, p. 16.

²Resolution no. 34, 5 January 1871, PMC, MCRR.

³The petitions are discussed in the Resolution no. 117, 15 February 1872, PMC, MCRR.

⁴Resolution no. 51, 21 September 1871 PMC, MCRR.

⁵Resolution no. 117, 15 February 1872, PMC, MCRR.

members of the family to which they belong. A pucca masonry receptacle with masonry cover for coffin at depth of six feet from surface be provided.¹

There were an estimated 399 cemeteries in the city of which 222 were closed by the beginning of 1873 and the tukiadars (keepers of burial grounds) were apportioned land in the new sites.² The drive to close burial grounds was intensified by proclamations to the effect on the fifteenth of the first three months in 1873 that forbade future burials in the old grounds.³

The concession did not appease the outraged sentiments of the Muslim community, since Dr. Bonavia's rules only emphasized the notion that sacred burial grounds could be relocated with the same ease as latrines had been remodelled. Dr. Bonavia, in an excess of professionalism and deference to the miasmatic theory, seemed to disregard the religious and emotional significance of the last rite of human passage, and imposed on Muslim burial practices his notions on the scientific disposal of corpses. The general outrage inevitably found its way into the local newspapers. The Roznamcha, one of the more outspoken Urdu dailies of the time, bitterly criticized the order "on account of its interfering with the time honoured usage. . . . [It] is felt extremely oppressive by Mussalmans, and has caused great disaffection among them. . . ." ⁴ The Roznamcha expressed its astonishment at the fact that the "Government of India and members of the Municipal Committee should have tolerated such a prolific source of discontent." The editorial went on to say that the European complaint against Muslim "ignorance" of the proper way of burying their dead was used as a feeble excuse to relocate their cemeteries

¹Resolution no. 69, 6 January 1873, PMC, MCRR.

²Resolution no. 68, 6 January 1873, PMC, MCRR.

³Ibid.

⁴Roznamcha, 28 June 1873, VNR.

in some filthy spot, like that of Aishbagh."¹ The Aishbagh, once the pleasure garden of the nawabs of Oudh, had indeed become a malodorous area since the central distillery for European liquor and the gigantic trenching pits created by Dr. Bonavia were both relegated to this neighbourhood. To locate a burial ground in the vicinity was to add insult to injury. This disrespect for the native dead stood in painful contrast to the new and beautiful graveyard prepared for the Europeans in the civil lines.²

The issue became a cause celebre. Other newspapers followed suit in denouncing the measure as insensitive, insulting and intolerable.³ The order was also condemned for its blatant discrimination against the poor, since only the rich families could afford paved graves and fancy coffins and become "license holders" for private plots where they would be buried.⁴

"With the exception," wrote the editor of the Karnamah of 19 May 1873,

of the sepulchral grounds belonging to the nobility all other cemeteries and graveyards in the city have been ordered to be levelled to the ground, and the site sold. . . . It is much to be regretted that all new orders which are passed by the authorities bring difficulties on the poor.⁵

In June, a Muslim member of the municipal committee, named Yusuf Mirza, was assaulted by an irate man near the Akbari Darwaza for his passive acquiescence to the hated order which forced the "lower and middling classes of Mussalmans" to be interred at Aishbagh, where the relatives of the deceased had to "stay amid the stench" of the filth and refuse of the distillery ware-

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³See Roznamcha of the 9th and 23rd May, 1873 and Karnamah, 19 May 1873, VNR.

⁴Roznamcha, 9 May 1873, VNR.

⁵Ibid.

houses till the "funeral ceremonies" were completed. The editor was "at a loss to see" how the burial of the dead bodies of the poor corrupted the air any more than those of the rich, and urged that the order be rescinded.¹

The order lent itself to easy abuse. The keepers of the private cemeteries in the city accepted bribes to bury ineligible bodies. This was an additional expense to those who could least afford it but wanted a customary and dignified burial instead of taking their dead to Aishbagh or the distant extra-mural cemeteries.²

The spate of secret and illegal burials led to an increase in the night patrol of the police. They found that Mirza, the owner of a mosque in the Aminabad area, had buried his five year old son in the courtyard of the Mosque. The police arrived and forced him to disinter the body and rebury it in a regular graveyard outside the city.³ The editor of the newspaper that reported the incident added in wonder: "How rules against one's creed and law can be enforced by these people [the British]." Disinterment of bodies is strictly forbidden in Islam and he hoped that the sin had been committed in ignorance of this fact by the hakim (rulers).⁴

A similar prescription for the polluting problems associated with tanneries and low-caste chamars (leather workers) was urged by Dr. Bonavia. The three major tanneries in the city were located close to the workshops of the shoemakers and saddlers in Ahiagunj and Moulvigunj in the old city. It

¹Roznamcha, 17 June 1873, VNR.

²Roznamcha, 2 June 1873, VNR.

³Oudh Akhbar, 24 September 1867, VNR.

⁴Ibid.

was suggested that the tanneries and their attendant chamars be moved out to Moti Jheel, a lake on the outskirts of the town, where the slaughter house and its kasais (butchers) had already been removed, even though this would forseably injure trade and jeopardize the livelihood of the workers' families.¹ The distillery, with its personnel of low caste workers, had been similarly deported, and these three "unclean" trades, inseparable from unpleasant odours and waste materials, came under the general purge of the civic environment. Dr. Bonavia envisaged a new, clean and well-conserved colony for these untouchable workers "with proper spaces for streets, and drains, &c in accordance with sanitary principles." The land vacated by the tanners could be "dressed up" and it was "not improbable that the well-to-do residents in the vicinity of the present tanneries would gladly contribute something toward compensating the chamars and getting rid of the stench and nuisance. . . ." ² Dr. Bonavia's plans for the improved sanitation of the city were not fully consummated by 1877 but they set the inexorable trend for the future, and his infectious zeal did for the sanitary planning of the city what Napier's had achieved for the strategic.

Control of Building

An allied area in which the municipal committee played an increasingly significant role was to influence the architecture and aesthetics of future buildings of Lucknow. This it achieved by simply arrogating the power to sanction or reject building plans for all construction work in the city, be it a new building or an extension of or repairs to an old one. Napier had decreed such control long before the birth of the municipal body. "It is

¹Sanitary Report of the City of Lucknow For the Year 1868-69, p. 18.

²Ibid., p. 19.

very necessary," he wrote in his epoch-making memorandum

for the improvement of the city that strict supervision be maintained over the buildings permitted to be constructed in the new streets, and along the front of the esplanade; all houses should be built on sanctioned plans, and no encroachments on the allotted frontage should be permitted. The future appearance of the city will depend on the vigilance of the civil authorities on this point.¹

The municipal committee was faithful to the last letter of this law (and is to this day).

A comparative description of the colonial and upper class, indigenous dwelling forms will help in understanding the subtle social change in the living styles of the native elite and the role official pressure played in accelerating this trend. The bungalow, a very elaborate and pukka adaptation of the modest mud huts of Bengal,² made luxurious with furnishings and decor borrowed from the style of housing fashionable in the metropolitan society, was the basic residential unit for the colonial elite. This made a suitable "home away from home" to ameliorate the hardship and reward the sacrifice made by the governing elite in serving Queen and country in an inhospitable colony. "The typical bungalow," as defined by King

consists of a low one-story, spacious building, internally divided into separate living, dining and bedrooms, the latter with attached rooms for bathing. A verandah, forming an integral part of the structure, or alternatively, attached to the outside wall, surrounds part or all of the building. The bungalow is invariably situated in a

¹R. Napier, p. 20.

²Anthony King, "The Bungalow in India: Its Regional and Pre-industrial Origin," Architectural Association Quarterly, 5, 3 (September 1973), pp. 8-22. Also see Janett Pott, Old Bungalows in Bangalore, South India (London: Published by the Author, 1977) for the evolution of the bungalow in India as the standard form of colonial housing.

large walled or otherwise demarcated 'compound' with generally one main exit to the road on which it is situated . . . the kitchen, as well as the servants' quarters, stabling and room for carriage (or car) are separate from and placed at the rear of the bungalow.¹

A representative sample of a plan for a bungalow is shown in Figure 4.

In contrast, the typical manzil, or upper class indigenous house was (and still is) structurally inverted. The open courtyard inside the house, for example, served the same purpose as the compound of the bungalow. Most manzils were built in attached rows and had no compounds. Instead the central courtyard usually had a tree, some shrubs, a cow or goats, (and a shrine, if the residents were Hindu), and the area was where household chores such as cooking and washing were carried on, and was used by the servants, women, and children.

The rooms were built around the quadrangle and shaded by a verandah that provided protection from the elements.² The four corner rooms were always small and each one had a special function. One served as the main entrance or deorhi that led into the courtyard from the street, another as a storeroom for fuel and an emergency kitchen in bad weather, a third as a latrine and the fourth as the landing to the stairway that led to the roof. The other rooms were not defined by their function, as were the drawing and dining rooms of the colonial bungalow, but were used for various purposes at various times of the day. Instead, they were grouped into the mardana (male) and zenana (female) sections of the dwelling. The rooms were windowless, or only had a single small opening to keep the heat and dust out. This

¹King, Colonial Urban Development, pp. 124-125.

²For a detailed discussion of the climatic advantage of the courtyard dwelling see Daniel Dunham, "The Courtyard House as a Temperature Regulator," The New Scientist (8 September 1969), pp. 663-666.





Fig. 4. Plan of an Indian Bungalow

Source: Janet Pott, Old Bungalows in Bangalore, South India (London: Published by the author, 1977), p. 58.

feature, more than anything else, gave them the reputation among the European bureaucracy of being dark and dank, airless and therefore unhealthy. The mardana was the room where the household males congregated and entertained their male friends. The zenana section was used as the private family space by the women and children during the day and as bedrooms for the nuclear units within the extended family at night. The flat roof was the most versatile space of all, where the ubiquitous columbaries of the pigeon-fancying elite of Lucknow were located, and where clothes-lines were strung, the pickles matured, spices dried and neighbours on adjacent connected roofs visited. The lower rooms were used on summer days and winter nights and the roof top was used on winter days and summer nights for all kinds of domestic activity, and was often converted into an open air dormitory.

The Napierian injunction inaugurated an era of official architecture in Lucknow. Official taste, which necessarily favoured "uniform," neat and regular shaped structures would put an end to the apparently sporadic self-expressive and ornate structures produced by native artisans. In Hazratgunj, the fashionable new town centre, where a hundred and twenty-three shops, abandoned during the rebellion, were renovated as nuzul property, it was ordered "these at once be put in a state of repair with neat fronts of a uniform pattern."¹ The commissioner enclosed a sketch of the facade which would "look neat and suitable," and this was to become a blue-print for the appearance of the shops.² In 1871 a committee circular requested that all "shopkeepers of Hazratgunj . . . remove their present unsightly choppers

¹Letter no. 107, from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Lucknow Division to Deputy Commissioner, 25 August 1858, file no. 2485, BRLD, UPSA.

²Ibid.

[thatch roofs] and reconstruct booths according to the plan of the two recently constructed there by the Municipal Assistant Engineer."¹ Similarly in Aminabad bazaar a row of fruit stalls were erected "on a uniform and neat plan" to replace a large shed which had housed them because it was "a great eyesore and disfigurement." The owners were paid only half the cost of reconstruction.²

A new gunj could be established only after the site and plan of the market had been duly approved by the committee and had complied with its structural and sanitary standards rigidly. Encroachments, or any additions to existing buildings, which had not been expressly sanctioned, were liable to summary dismantling, and often resulted in such awkward situations as in the instance of "The mosque at Farangi Mahal Bridge, the steps up to which have been pulled down, to the great inconvenience of those who assemble there for prayer every Friday."³ Similar treatment was meted out to the unauthorized extension platforms and verandahs in front of shops. The shopkeepers remonstrated against the order to pull these down, claiming that these had been erected for the convenience of the customers in wind and rain, but to no avail.⁴ The policy to keep roads wide and uncluttered

¹Resolution no. 133, 17 August 1871, PMC, MCRR.

²Sub-committee Report on the State of Aminabad Bazaar, 3 September 1862, PMC, MCRR. It is apposite to mention that more than a century later, the municipal administrator of the city in 1975-76, armed with virtually dictatorial powers in the absence of an elected municipal body, and moved by the spirit of his official forbears, ordered that the buildings of the principal markets in the city be painted in uniform colours. The proprietors and tenants of shops were simply billed for the cost plus 15 per cent for administrative charges; all hoardings and billboards were also to be reduced to a uniform size using only standardised lettering and colours. A faith in barrack-style simplicity and unimaginative uniformity is manifest in Lucknow to this day.

³Karnamah, 18 July 1874, VNR.

⁴Asar ul-Amsar (Lucknow), 20 August 1874, VNR.

overruled the real needs and conveniences of the marketplace.

The sanitary and construction rules laid down by the committee,¹ especially in their application to the building of private residences, tended to favour men of means who were willing to construct dwellings closer to the norm of the bungalow, introduced in the civil lines, rather than the typical, courtyard style native makan (house) which was considered ill-designed and poorly ventilated. A case in point, was that that of Sehutoodowlah, a city rais, or man of property, who applied for a plot of land in the Moti Mahal area of the civil lines. The committee "considered that it would be a pity to encourage the erection of Native Houses in this part of the station and would prefer him choosing some other site."² At the next meeting of the committee however, the matter was reconsidered, conceivably at the behest of a native member who may have been approached or otherwise induced to reopen the issue by Sehutoodowlah, because the "applicant was a man of great respectability and quite capable in the pecuniary view" of building a house "equal to the description required by the Committee." Sehutoodowlah was then asked to submit a plan "with the general disposition of the premises as he would wish to have them eventually laid out," and if these were satisfactory his application would be approved.³ This appears to have been the beginning of a slow and steady revolution in the style of elite housing in the city, making "native houses" less desirable, if not entirely impermissible. Newal Kishore, the owner of a printing press in Lucknow, submitted plans for both styles for a house he wished to construct in Hazratgunj. The native-style house plan was rejected out of hand and

¹Resolution no. 70, 18 March 1863. PMC, MCRR.

²Resolution no. 286, 16 November 1863, PMC, MCRR.

³Resolution no. 291, 23 December 1863, PMC, MCRR.

the bungalow plans were approved.¹ Unfortunately the plans were not retained for the record, for they would have clearly illustrated the two forms of elite domestic architecture at the time. What is important is not what style dominated or prevailed, but that the extended use of the mechanism for political control invariably resulted in a direct and unambiguous form of social control.

Since the form of the dwelling was designed to suit a way of life, the notion that the design for residential space for the indigenous society should be regulated by the abstract principles of colonial taste, proved, in the long run, to be another lever for social change in Indian society. Customs like strict sexual segregation and purdah were more difficult to observe in the bungalows, where spatial arrangements made these inconvenient. Those among the elite who were influenced by the new culture, and who aspired to be "progressive" and accepted the new style of residential space were also more receptive to adapting their way of life to match it.²

The Control of Intemperance and Other "Social Diseases"

The European garrison, around whose health and efficient functioning the urban environment had been largely redesigned, were susceptible to even more insidious "social diseases," which the authorities, both civil and military, tried in vain to control. Drunkenness and venereal disease were the scourge of the British soldiery and the ineluctable result of the nature and quality of military life itself. The soldier was invariably a man from

¹Resolution no. 48, 3 July 1869, PMC, MCRR.

²In an informal survey of Muslim families living in the old city and the civil lines I discovered that purdah and sexual segregation is observed less strictly or not at all in the bungalows. The correlation is probably dependent on variables such as income and education, but the reinforcing effect of the new residential form can hardly be denied.

the dregs of metropolitan society, doomed to live in single cells in the barracks in the cantonments, forced by his very role in the colonial state and empire to remain alien and aloof. Submitting to a strict military regimen, he found, in the unsparing use of alcohol and native prostitutes, relief from the frustrations and loneliness of cantonment life. The soldier's life and philosophy is most sympathetically portrayed by Kipling in prose and verse, and a stanza from his famous ballad "Tommy" epitomises the soldier's attitude toward the high-minded Victorian officers with whom he had to deal:

We aren't no thin red 'eroes,
 nor we aren't no blackguards too
 But single men in barricks,
 most remarkable like you;
 And if sometimes our conduct
 isn't all your fancy paints,
 Why single men in barricks
 don't grow into plaster saints;
 While it's Tommy this and Tommy that,
 and 'Tommy, fall behind'
 But it's 'Please to walk in front, sir,'
 when there's trouble in the wind,
 There's trouble in the wind, my boys,
 there's trouble in the wind
 O it's 'Please to walk in front, sir,'
 when there's trouble in the wind.¹

A more prosaic summation of the problem was made by Dr. A. Shelton, the officiating deputy inspector-general of police in Lucknow;

Within a period of some two months four men of the Regiment of this station [Lucknow] were so affected by native liquor that one man died in the guard room, another died in hospital with all the symptoms of alcoholic poisoning, and two men were rendered perfectly insensible requiring active treatment to restore them.

Men leave barracks without any preconceived bad object. They meet women prowling about. These women tempt the men with native liquor, under the excitement of which they are led to still further vice; thus the man runs the risk of punishment for drunkenness, renders his constitution most

¹Rudyard Kipling, Collected Verse of Rudyard Kipling (New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1918), p. 264.

Since the prime objective of officials was to maintain a healthy and disciplined fighting force, the approach to the problem of vice and drunkenness was a pragmatic one. Some compromise of moral principles was necessary, as was the loss of excise revenue from drugs and spirits, to achieve this objective. The problem of excessive drinking was compounded by the dubious quality of the cheap native liquor the soldier was forced to drink, for he was ill-paid and did not receive rations of European liquor like the officers. To check the rampant drunkenness among the soldiers, it was proposed that the sale of native liquor "simply be prohibited in the city of Lucknow and for six miles around" because native liquor shops found it easy to circumvent the earlier stipulation that forbade them to sell to European soldiers. It was thought that "if soldiers and liquor are in close proximity they will always somehow or the other get the liquor. Natives are always found to minister to them surreptitiously."² The proposal envisaged a loss of Rs. 60,000 in annual revenue from the sale of native liquor as a small sacrifice to make because "the health of our European Regiments is more important than any income which can be received from the Abkaree [manufacture of native liquor] of the town . . . [and] it is desirable to put a stop to it for the sake of the troops. . . ."³ Though the proposal was promptly accepted by the governor general, there was no significant

¹Letter no. 296/3, from Dr. A. Shelton, officiating Deputy Inspector General to Capt. Hunter, D.A. Quarter Master General, 5 October 1862, file no. 10, BROG, UPSA.

²Letter no. 7, from G. Campbell, Judicial Commissioner of Oudh to F. Forsyth, Secretary to Chief Commissioner of Oudh, 29 April 1858, file no. 185, BRLD, UPSA.

³Ibid.

improvement in the drinking habits of the soldiers.¹ On the contrary it spurred consumption of more harmful drugs like opium, charas (hashish), and ganjha (marijuana), illicit manufacture and sale of native liquor, and large scale smuggling from outside the proscribed area.² The economic loss was not the government's alone; the native abkars (distillers of native spirits) were either driven out of business or forced to relocate outside the six mile limit.³ The poorer section of "the native population" suffered because not only did they have to travel a great distance and pay more to obtain their drink, but they were also forced to consume stronger narcotics since "the less deleterious spirits [were] removed from their reach."⁴ Ironically the Europeans were "probably the only community who would not be affected by the closing of the shops . . . for the boys who supply them with liquor would not object to going to the nearest shops in existence within an area of eight or ten miles. . . ." ⁵ The problem appeared to worsen with these assorted controls.

The government also decided to regulate the manufacture of local liquor. The abkari system, as the governmentally controlled operation for the distillation of spirits was called, was first tried in Lucknow and met

¹Letter no. 1506, from G.F. Edmonstone, Secretary to GOI with the Governor General, to R. Montgomery, Chief Commissioner, 31 May 1858, file no. 185, BRLD, UPSA.

²Letter no. 231 of 1864, from E.N.C. Braddon, Superintendent of Excise & Stamps, Lucknow, to Major J.N. Reid, Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, 5 March 1864, file no. 10, part VI, p. 2, BROG, UPSA.

³This was reduced to a two mile radius from the cantonment, by order contained in letter no. 1432, from the Commissioner, 12 December 1863, file no. 375, "Abstract of Correspondence regarding Liquor Shops in Eastern Division of Lucknow City," BROG, UPSA.

⁴Letter no. 231 of 1864, 5 March 1864, file no. 10, part VI, p. 2, BROG, UPSA.

⁵Ibid.

great success. It served as the model for other towns in Oudh and the North West Provinces. It consisted of a tightly patrolled "enclosure with which all spirits required for consumption . . . must be manufactured . . ." and where all abkars in the city would have to erect their stills. The object was "to obtain the largest possible revenue on the smallest consumption of liquor" while making it possible to control the quality and proof of the spirits. This would also render all stills outside the abkari compound illegal, making it simple to force their closure, and check smuggling by bootleggers.¹ That this new system elicited more than a mild protest from the trade is suggested in another official circular on the subject of handling local opposition:

The change of the system will, I have no doubt, be very unpopular first, both with the Abkars and with the people generally, and both are likely to discourage its introduction to the best of their ability; here [Lucknow] they made all manner of objections, and even attempted at one time to excite religious prejudices against the measure. The remedy for all this is to convince the Abkars, especially the leading men among them that you are quite in earnest, and determined at all risks to carry out your plans; that any opposition on their part is worse than useless, and that by far, the best plan for them is to accept the change cheerfully, and make the most they can of it. Where influential Abkars are numerous, by pitting one against the other, Officers may manage without much difficulty to induce some of them to cooperate heartily. . . .²

Other rules and regulations for the sale of native spirits proliferated.³ The native shops had to be licenced and their premises were to

¹Circular, no. 6/1390, 23 April 1861, from Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Oudh to all Commissioners in Oudh, file no. 10, part IV, BROG, UPSA.

²Circular no. 165 of 1862, Demi Official to all Revenue Authorities in the North West Provinces, file no. 10, part IV, BROG, UPSA.

³"The new rules for the guidance of Abkari inspectors," enclosure in Letter no. 273, from City Magistrate, to Major of Brigade, Lucknow, 27 January 1864, file no. 10, part V, BROG, UPSA.

remain under "effective supervision" to restrict all sales to persons who had not obtained a pass issued by the superintendent of Abkari. Notices in English prohibiting the entry of European soldiers were prominently posted on the doors of shops. Liquor dealers "whose object might reasonably be presumed to be to supply European soldiers" would be prosecuted and if these cases "resulted in convictions [they] would have a salutary effect" on the others.¹ To discourage "camp followers of all descriptions, including cook boys, grass cutters and punkha coolies," from producing liquor for soldiers, they were never to be issued passes "and all liquor purchased by them must, therefore, be drunk on the premises" of the shop itself. Anyone who tried to outwit the inspectors but was caught was liable to be fined up to a hundred rupees and severely flogged.² There were some second thoughts about the practicability of some of the strictures, particularly the one that insisted that natives consume the liquor they purchased on the premises of the shop. The measure was too harsh since "a native grog shop is not a comfortable tap room where men can lounge over their bottles and it has not ordinarily room or accommodation" for the customers to wait and drink all they had bought.³

However difficult it may have been in theory to obtain liquor, the regulations failed to achieve the desired sobriety in European regiments.⁴

¹Ibid.

²Ibid. Women were exempt from flogging, a fact rued by the chief commissioner, since prostitutes were considered the most effective smugglers of liquor to soldiers. See Letter no. 1045, from the Chief Commissioner to the Adjutant General, H.M.'s Forces in India, 14 April 1865, file 10, part V, BROG.

³Letter no. 231 of 1864, from E.N.C. Braddon, Superintendent of Excise and Stamps, Lucknow, to Major J.N. Reid, Secretary to Commissioner, 5 March 1864, file no. 10, part VI, BROG, UPSA.

⁴File no. 10, part VI, BROG, UPSA, passim, has many letters of the type already cited which suggest that the problem of drunkenness continued unabated among the European soldiery.

Even the "sacrifice" of revenue seemed in vain. The impact of these regulations was felt more by natives, whether of the lower classes, who were fined and flogged, or of the upper classes whose servants normally did their shopping for them and therefore found it difficult to buy liquor without personally undergoing the nuisance of obtaining a pass. There were frequent petitions from retailers of country liquor against the two-mile dry zone encompassing the cantonment and the Machhi Bhawan (where troops were still billeted), which in effect, banned sale in two-thirds of the entire city, and against the cumbersome pass system. Passes were only issued to those of "good character," and since this was difficult to establish in the prevailing atmosphere of mistrust, business for the abkars was ruined further. One such petition explained the repercussions of these measures on the retail trade of country spirits:

People of lower caste used to take liquor . . . when there was any punchayat [neighbourhood meeting] &c. and the nobility of Lucknow used to send for bottles daily and they never came [personally] to the shop. By the order of the Deputy Commissioner the sale is much decreased. . . . It is inconvenient for a respectable man to go before the Tehseeldar to prove his good character and then get a pass. The respectable men of the city have stopped taking liquor.¹

The upper classes were too diffident to fetch their "grog" personally, so they turned to imbibing the finer, more expensive spirits imported from Europe which were available without fuss or bother in the fashionable shops in Hazratgunj. The advertisements in the Pioneer of many importers of European liquors, such as Messrs Peake, Allen and Company, and Murray and Company, between 1862 and 1877, suggest a growing demand among the native

¹Translation of the "Petition of Ahmed Allee, Tilluck and other Guddeedars [retailers of country spirits] of Lucknow," July, 1866, file no 10, part VII, BROG, UPSA.

clientele not only for Scotch whisky, rum and gin, but also for exotic champagnes, sherries and vintage French wines. Drinking habits and tastes were slowly transformed among the native elite in Lucknow, whereas in the mufussil, owing to "the great improvement in the manufacture, distribution transports [sic] and profits on spirits [by the new distilleries in every Tehsil] . . . the habit of drinking among the people increased at no slow rate."¹

An even more nagging and persistent problem was that of venereal disease and its inevitable link with local prostitutes. The real remedy, it was tacitly understood, lay not in treating the symptoms of venereal infection, but in reducing the temptation for the average European soldier to visit local brothels, by permitting the young men to marry and take their wives with them to their colonial posts:

Both morally and medically, there can be little doubt of the desirability of a large number of married men among the rank and file . . . Sir John Lawrence himself stated: "I believe a great deal of unhealthiness [among soldiers] arises from their being unmarried. . . . There can be no question that marriage opposes a barrier to immorality of a certain nature and consequently to disease."²

But prevention was more prohibitive in its costs than the cure, and officialdom was resigned to view the matter as "simply a matter of finance. . . . The condition of the public revenue will long, probably ever, forbid the spectacle of a standing army of married men, either in England or India."³ This left no choice but to tackle the problem with a series of interesting, though less efficacious remedies.

¹P.C. Mukerjee, The Pictorial Lucknow (unpublished galley proofs, dated 1883), p. 66, U.P. Sanghralaya, Lucknow.

²Prichard, Administration, vol 2, p. 328.

³Ibid., p. 329.

In Lucknow, as in cantonments elsewhere in India, both soldiers and prostitutes were treated and quarantined in special hospitals called Lock hospitals.² The problem of venereal disease in the Lucknow cantonment was acute in the early 1860s, when one out of every four European soldiers contracted either gonorrhoea, syphilis or some "other" related infection, in addition to all the other infirmities that incapacitated them in India. By 1868-69, when the Cantonment Act had been in force for nearly five years, the number of European patients declined from 25 per cent to a little less than 18 per cent of the approximately 2,000 European soldiers in the station. Though the improvement was considerable, this issue never ceased to be a disquieting one for the military and civil officials alike.

We have only scraps of evidence to suggest how this issue was handled (and none at all for the related question of homosexuality among the soldiers). It was dealt with chiefly as a medical problem and expressed only quantitatively or in the expanding medical jargon of the time to neutralize its emotional and social connotations. At one level it was the anxiety for the health of

¹Kenneth Ballhatchet, "Race, Sex and Class Under the Raj, 1887-1905" (paper read at the European Conference on Modern South Asian Studies, Leiden, 1976), p. 1.

²The origin of the term "Lock" hospital is attributed to the Oxford English Dictionary to "Lock-lazar house in Southwark, which is mentioned as having received a bequest in 1452, was afterwards employed as a hospital for venereal diseases, and its name came to be used as a general designation for institutions of that kind. The origin of the name is uncertain; it has been conjectured that the 'Lock-lazar house' was so called as being specially isolated or quarantined."

the sentinels of an empire, the retention of which was crucial to Britain's position in the world, and at another, it was the proof of the shameful liaison between the men of the ruling race (be they the "scum" of that race) and the "fallen" women of the subject race. The soldier's world, so exquisitely evoked in several Kipling stories,¹ cannot be fully explored here. Only its limited and furtive interface with the native world will be discussed.

The liaison between Indian prostitutes and Europeans was the illegitimate extension of the non-official interaction between the two races fostered by the colonial situation. The only connection the ruled had with the rulers was a household servants, living in the servants' quarters in the compounds of the colonial bungalows, or in separate shacks near the European barracks, supplying services in exchange for money and goods. The servant-master relationship was a paradox; it was intimate and remote at the same time. The "bearer" (valet) helped to clothe, feed and supply the personal needs of his master but there was very little communication between them beyond the giving and obeying of commands. The prostitutes supplied even more intimate needs, with, perhaps, an even sparser exchange of words, in contrast to their rather more elaborate function in local society. In order to understand how the courtesans of Lucknow were affected by the imposition of new rules to check the spread of venereal disease it is necessary first to understand the profession as it was practiced in the nawabi capital.

The world of the courtesans of Lucknow was as complex and hierarchical

¹Rudyard Kipling, Soldiers Three (New York: Doubleday and McClure, 1899).

as the society of which it was part.¹ Under the generous patronage of the nawabs of Oudh and the town notables during the eighty-odd years that Lucknow served as the nawabi capital, the apartments in the Chowk bazaar, where these women lived and entertained in decadent opulence, were centres for musical and cultural soirees.

A courtesan was usually part of a household establishment under the chaudhrayan (chief). She owned and maintained extra apartments, having become wealthy and famous for her musical and dancing abilities. Typically a wealthy patron, often the King himself, would set her up in agreeable quarters and support her household in the style in which he wished to be entertained, and she would attract and recruit budding young singers, dancers, and musicians to compete with other reputable establishments. Ameer Jan (later Ameer Mahal), a dancing girl, made her debut in Wajid Ali Shah's "parikhana" (literally "fairy house," established by the King as a school of music and dance), was later married to him and received a monthly allowance of Rs. 2,000. She was comfortably ensconced in a palatial house, and resumed her career as a courtesan after the King divorced her and five other such women on the 16th of March 1856.²

Every reputable house maintained a team of skilled male musicians who were often connected to famous musical lineages or gharanas, and enhanced the prestige of the establishment. Doormen, touts and other male auxiliaries, often sons or nephews of the chief courtesan, screened clients

¹This description of the traditional nawabi courtesan's establishment is drawn chiefly from several unstructured interviews with 13 prostitutes held between 9 September and 20 November 1976, in Lucknow. The wish of the informants to keep their identities and addresses secret is scrupulously respected. An interview with Mirza Jafar Husain of Golagunj, a writer, conducted on 12 September 1976 helped round out the picture. Corroborative evidence from other sources will be footnoted.

²Sheikh Tassaduq Husain, Begamat-i Avadh (Lucknow: Kitab Ghar, n.d.) p. 24.

at the door and acted as sentries of the house. The other members of the house were females, often related to or close associates of the choudharyan (daughters, nieces, cousins) who formed a core group of tawa'ifs (the order of courtesans). They were intensively trained from an early age (7 or 8 years old), to dance, sing, converse, amuse and excel in the exaggerated politenesses for which Lucknow had acquired a special reputation during the nawabi. The more distinctive the dress, jewels, manners, and food served in the house the greater its respectability among the local patrons. Abdul Halim Sharar, a journalist and novelist who tried to recapture the mytho-poetic self-perceptions of the nobility during the nawabi, writes that

in Lucknow, association with courtesans started during the reign of Shuja ud Daula. It became fashionable for noblemen to associate with some bazaar beauty, either for pleasure or for social distinction. A cultivated man like Hakim Mahdi, who later became Vazir [prime minister], owed his initial success to a courtesan named Piyaro, who advanced her own money to enable him to make an offering to the ruler on his first appointment as Governor of a Province of Avadh. These absurdities went so far that it is said that until a person had association with courtesans he was not a polished man. . . . At the present time [c. 1913] there are still some courtesans with whom it is not considered reprehensible to associate, and whose houses one can enter openly and unabashed. Although these practices may have had a deteriorating effect on the morals, at the same time manners and social finesse improved.¹

To acquire this social fastidiousness (the memory of which haunts present day Lakhnavis to a disturbing extent) the young sons of the gentry were sent to the salons of the best known tawa'ifs for lessons in etiquette and the proper

¹Abdul Halim Sharar, Lucknow: The Last Phase of an Oriental Culture, translated and edited by E.S. Harcourt and Fakhir Husain (London: Paul Elek, 1975), p. 192. For a detailed account of the life of a Lucknow tawa'if see Muhammad Hadi Ruswa, The Courtesan of Lucknow, translated by Khushwant Singh and M.A. Husaini (Calcutta: Orient Longmans, 1961); and The Beauties of Lucknow; Twenty-four Portraits of the Most Celebrated and Popular Living Historic Singers, Dancers and Actresses of the Oudh Court and of Lucknow (Calcutta: Central Press Company, 1874).

appreciation of Urdu poetry.

Lower than the tawa'ifs in rank and accomplishment, but often part of the same establishment, were two other categories of women known as thakahi and randi. They lived in the same bazaar area and were regular prostitutes as the term was best understood by the officials, catering to "the labouring classes" and the "common citizens." They provided, in Jafar Husain's words "Only the pleasures of the flesh being incapable of cultural interludes."¹ Finally, there were khangis, women who observed strict purdah and were married, but who for financial reasons were forced into clandestine relations with men who were discreet and wanted secrecy for their own sakes as well. Jafar Husain maintains that the epoch of the tawa'ifs came to close when wealthy patrons were hard to come by after the annexation and the few establishments that survived into the next century could not maintain the old standards of entertainment; the final blow to the profession came from the present government, which abolished zamindari rights in 1957 and declared existing salons illegal.

If the nawabi had perceived these women as a cultural asset the British Raj saw them as a necessary evil, if not a threat, and sought to make of them an inexpensive answer to the loneliness of single Europeans by up-lifting their standards of personal hygiene. The government taxed their income (see below p.159), and regulated their contact with Europeans, which had interesting effects on patrons and clients alike. With Wajid Ali Shah in exile after 1856, the profession lost its chief patron and several lesser ones, and gained numerous practitioners from among the abandoned wives of the ex-King and the nobles who went into exile. These women resumed their careers (for several of the royal harem had been singing and dancing women) to support

¹Interview with Jafar Husain, Lucknow, November 1976.

themselves. The profession became more competitive even as times were harder.

The new patrons were creatures of the new rulers -- whether they were taluqdars (see pp. 216-217, below) on ever-more frequent trips to the capital, or European soldiers roving in the city after dark. The soldiers understood little or none of the urbane Urdu speech used in the salons.¹ The soldiers had neither the liberty, the time, nor the money to partake of the pleasures of the "nautch," and made, as we can deduce from the venereal disease statistics, and Gulbadan's testimony, short business-like trips to the chaklakhanas (brothels) of the randis.

The government sought to control the profession locally long before the matter received more general attention in the Cantonment Act of 1864. In a letter to the editor of the Oudh Akhbar, a reader who styled himself as "Rana" (he wrote frequently to the newspaper on important local issues) summarised the early steps the administration took against prostitution. "The darogh of a nishatkhana [literally, night house/night club]" wrote Rana,

had to deposit a cash security and a written bond to ensure the proper running and cleanliness of the place. It was also ordered that minors attached to the nishatkhana would be permitted to marry when they came of age. It is regrettable that these rules are honoured only in the breach because the government did not have adequate means to enforce the rules.²

¹This point was made very strongly by the oldest (and now retired) courtesan I interviewed. She (whom I shall call Gulbadan), claimed she was seventy-five years of age in 1976. "The soldiers," she claimed, "had no tamiz (manners) or tahzib (culture). We could not speak their language nor they ours. For them we were no different to randis and seldom wanted to stay for the nautch. They were quickly satisfied by those women who had taken up residence in the cantonment, or would come secretly to the chowk for sexual gratification. Only very few showed any inclination to stay for the nautch."

²Oudh Akhbar, 8 October 1862. My translation.

Another reader who called himself "Berissa" ("without guile") claimed that only the Punjab had sound laws against prostitution. In Lucknow, he felt that the system was so deeply entrenched that it could not be "smashed," only regulated. A randi, he informs us, charges at the nightly rate of five rupees, and often more; tawa'ifs insist on a hundred rupees a night and also receive lavish gifts of jewellery and property. (A male labourer was paid only two to four annas [one rupee=16 annas] for a day's toil and a female labourer only half that.) He goes on to say:

That is why all prostitutes must be registered and classified according to the facilities they offer. Each woman should be given a wooden 'ticket' [word in the original] with her name, age, address and fixed rate chiselled on it by the authorities, and this ticket should be affixed on her front door . . . each prostitute should carry a certificate in Persian, Urdu and English stating whether or not she is free from venereal disease . . . the certificate should be periodically attested by government seal after every medical inspection . . . also the photographer, Mushkurud Dowlah, should take photographs to be attached to the certificates.¹

The subject became a burning issue in the newspapers, and some of the letters printed had a very vindictive flavour, which almost comes as a surprise in a city where, it should be reiterated, the courtesans were influential with the court and dynasty, and a status symbol for the elite. Another letter suggested that

prostitutes who refuse registration on the pretext that they intend to lead reformed lives, really elude the law by moving to another town. Such women should be branded on the chin, cheek or forehead of their beautiful faces. . . . If this is considered excessive, then their wrists should be branded. If a prostitute marries on a temporary basis [nikah] then the brand mark should be underlined [with a straight line] so that she may no longer be mistaken for a low [neech] woman. It is essential that the women are branded to save the izzat [respectability] of innocent men.²

¹Oudh Akhbar, 9 April 1862. My translation.

²Ibid. My translation.

While the controversy was playing itself out in the forum provided by the Oudh Akhbar the government took some first bold steps in dealing with the problem. The Indian Contagious Diseases Act of 1865 formalised the control the government had hoped to exercise on this profession. The new law prescribed regular inspection of registered prostitutes by the medical men at Lock Hospital, but these were difficult to enforce. The chief commissioner wrote to the commissioner of Lucknow to expose it to native opinion in the municipal committee, and obtain their ideas on the expediency of enforcing the act in "Native towns."¹ The Indian members, while they approved the act, disagreed on whether all classes of prostitutes, including tawa'ifs, should be subjected to the clinical examination at the Lock Hospital. Eventually, Usuf Mirza, a Shiite committee member, prevailed on the official members to exempt from inspection "dancing girls of the higher class, a list of whom not exceeding fifty in number" would be furnished by him. The native members also succeeded in persuading the committee that Indian hakeems (doctors) of the Yunani Hospital, instead of the European doctors at the Lock Hospital in the cantonment, should conduct these examinations.²

The Cantonment Act of 1864 had already provided for the relocation of some prostitutes in the regimental bazaars. Of the 956 registered prostitutes of all categories in the city, a hundred women were selected and established in the cantonment. The ratio of European soldiers to native prostitutes was approximately twenty to one.³ All the prostitutes were also

¹Resolution no. 79, 16 July 1868, PMC, MCRR.

²Ibid.

³Report on the Administration of Oudh, 1868-69, p. 135.

inspected twice a week by native nurses (da'is) and "as many as live in certain localities, or are suspected of consorting with Europeans are, besides this, compelled to attend twice a month at the City Lock Hospital for further examination by the Civil Surgeon and his subordinates."¹ This practice evidently continued till the end of the empire in 1947; Gulbadan and the other retired tawa'ifs whose heyday was in 1920-1940 spoke about the humiliating routine of inspection.

Policemen and government "spies" (jasus) would secrete themselves into an evening's entertainment to report on the attendance of British soldiers or the sanitary condition of the house. These tawa'ifs told of incidents where women were abused, insulted and beaten "by these coarse, low caste policemen who took their revenge on the women they coveted and lusted after, but had neither the money nor the courage to visit." Gulbadan also maintained that there was a dramatic increase in the incidence of venereal disease among women in the profession after (her emphasis) the European soldiers began visiting them. "It was seldom heard of in the time of my phupi [paternal aunt] and nani [maternal grandmother]." She went on to say that "all these rules and regulations offended our dignity and sense of pride. We had to cater more and more for taluqdars from the dehat [village] and goras [white men]. I began to accept invitations outside the city. I was invited by the Nizam of Hyderabad with the famous Akhtari Bai, and was also the chief entertainer at the parties in the palace of the nawab of Rampur. Our reputation and prestige as Lucknow women stood us in good stead wherever we went."¹ Most of Gulbadan's testimony is corroborated by other sources. The Oudh Akhbar noted that "under British rule the traffic [prostitution] is somewhat lessened; but the plan adopted by bawds now is to go into Independent

¹Interview with Gulbadan cited before.

states, where they can act as they please, and young girls who are starving become their easy prey."¹ The courtesan in Ruswa's novel claims that

Many made their living on the name of Lucknow as I did when I was in Kanpur. . . . I know of imposters, seventy generations of whose forefathers had been brought up in rude rusticity, describe themselves as "Lucknawi" on the strength of having spent a few days studying in Lucknow or having been here on some business. I do not understand the particular pride in belonging to Lucknow; still less the point of lying about it.²

Lucknow seems to have retained its aura of romance: its courtesans found work elsewhere because of their well-known city background.

The authorities recognised the futility of their attempts to eradicate the problem; if inspections and forced quarantine in the Lock Hospital showed a decline in the number of men infected by disease one year the number would surge in the next. So government rule-making in this area was modest. In the eighties a series of explicit circulars and memos on the subject instructed the commanding officers of the various cantonments to ensure an adequate supply "of sufficiently attractive women," decently housed in the regimental bazaars, with the proper means of ablution readily available. The native nurses who inspected these women were also to make sure that these women consorted only with Europeans. The same circulars advised that soldiers should be told to restrict their visits to only the selected women in the cantonments and to take to heart the tips given to them on personal hygiene and disease prevention.³

¹Oudh Akhbar, 9 February 1869, VNR.

²Mohammed Hadi Ruswa, The Courtesan of Lucknow, p. 147.

³Ballhatchet, "Race, Sex, and Class," p. 4.

Such were the means and modes devised by the medical and civil and military branches of the bureaucracy to cope with the health hazards in the city. While they achieved some measure of success, they also transformed the cultural ecology of the city and extended the control of the government into many private areas of the average citizen's life. To make the city conducive to colonial occupation, the authorities, through the formation of municipal institutions, exercised a great measure of social control. Even the citizens' customary ways of defecating, sleeping with prostitutes, drinking, burying their dead or building houses were not left untouched.

CHAPTER IV

THE CITY MUST PAY

A cloud of misfortune hangs over the fate of Lucknow. . . . The scarcity of grain [and] the receipt of the news concerning the establishment of a municipal tax . . . has sent the hearts of the residents up into their mouths. . . . While the Chief of Jeypore has been so honored for his generosity in pardoning the tax on grain, for which he was considered worthy of increased rank and dignity, and the Viceroy of Hind and the Secretary of State wrote letters in his praise, and gave him two additional guns to his salute, the Government of India, notwithstanding all their wisdom and experience, have kept up the choongee tax, and moreover propose to institute a municipal tax.

-- Karnamah Hind, 14 June 1869¹

The ample revenues of Oudh, it need hardly be reiterated, had forced the grasping hand in 1856. After the revolt there was a frantic bid to generate local funds to implement the "improvements" the city needed to make it possible for less than five thousand European soldiers and civilians to live without constant danger to their lives. The government in Calcutta was clearly not going to use the land revenue for civic improvements; the city would have to pay for the benefits planned for it. In this the new rulers differed most significantly from the nawabs of Oudh; the new rulers had the attitude of conquerors instead of that of patrons and patriarchs.

¹ Karnamah Hind (Lucknow), 14 June 1869, VNR.

The citizens had experienced no direct taxation under the nawabs. On the contrary, the city had had a parasitic relationship with the state coffers, which were replenished annually by the revenue from the countryside. The nawabs had spent money lavishly in the city. They had consumed conspicuously, supported the extensive and numerous households and royal entourages, spawned and maintained the scores of luxury industries that sustained the ostentatious cultural style peculiar to Lucknow. They had also contributed generously to the building and upkeep of religious and palatial buildings, the public observance of courtly religious ceremonies, endowed charities and invested erratically in "public works."¹ A staggering million and a half pounds sterling had been paid to the British as a subsidy for their "protective" garrison.

Indefensible as this nawabi penchant for extravagance may seem, it kept the money in circulation in the city and in the province, even more so after Ghaziuddin Hyder broke his tributary relationship with the Mughal empire in 1819. Only very rarely did the nawabs voluntarily spend money outside Oudh. The funding of the Asafi canal in Karbala in Iraq (in 1816)² and the periodic disbursement of charity were the only major instances of the export of local capital, apart from the appropriations by the East India

¹For an elaboration of this, see Abdul Halim Sharar, Lucknow: The Last Phase of an Oriental Culture, translated and edited by E.S. Harcourt and Fakhir Husain (London: Paul Elek, 1975); Michael H. Fisher, "The Imperial Court and the Province; A Social and Administrative History of Pre-British Awadh (1775-1856)" (unpublished PhD dissertation, The University of Chicago, 1978); G.D. Bhatnagar, Awadh Under Wajid Ali Shah (Varanasi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1968); and W.H. Sleeman, A Journey Through the Kingdom of Oude, 2 vols. (London: Richard Bentley, 1858).

²Nawab Wazir to Resident, 11 September 1816, Bengal Political Consultations, 20 February 1818, IOL.

Company. The annexation brought "hardship and impoverishment" to the city of Lucknow, since the surplus was drained away: "After paying all its expenses the province of Oudh puts into the Imperial Treasury no less a sum than one million sterling per annum though it receives no profit on the opium it produces, nor for the duty on the salt it consumes."¹ The million pounds "which now reaches the treasury of the Government of India was then [prior to 1856] spent in the city." Numerous "hangers-on" of the court, who had lived in ease if not luxury, "now find it hard to get bread to eat." Even worse:

Whole trades, no doubt ministers of luxury and extravagance, but none the less industries by which people lived, have disappeared, and the city, with a few rich men left in it, is a gigantic nest of paupers and is totally incapable of bearing any further taxation.²

These facts had been "more than once acknowledged" by the government of India, which had "at the time acknowledged its inability to apply an adequate remedy."³

After annexation Oudh was automatically subsumed under the larger trade and taxation structures of imperial India. It is not within the ambit of this study to discuss these structures or even their adaptation at the provincial level except to supply the necessary backdrop for the main subject.⁴ This chapter will focus on local taxation, or taxes which the

¹Letter no. 3476, from [I.F. MacAndrew] Secretary to Chief Commissioner, to Secretary to GOI, Home Department, 11 August 1869, unnumbered basta, MCRR.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴For a general review of imperial taxation in Oudh see T.P. Chand, The Administration of Avadh (1858-1877) (Varanasi: Vishvavidyalya Prakashan, 1971), pp. 113-184.

municipal committee was empowered to levy to finance urban projects and meet its expenses. It will also look at the municipal committee's role as a tax collector for the imperial government, a role it dutifully played at the cost of the taxpayers of Lucknow. (See Table 6 for a listing of these taxes.) The day-to-day economic and political repercussions of the procedures adopted to assess and collect taxes in the city will be examined to explain the mechanics of local government and the popular reaction to it.

The imperial taxes in Oudh, which affected rural and urban residents, were numerous. At the second summary land settlement the land revenue for Oudh was fixed at a "little over a crore [10 million rupees]," but the new government was not satisfied with this and "grasped all other possible means of income."¹ These were: levies on salt (the manufacture of which was banned in Oudh), a tax on opium (its widespread cultivation as a cash crop in the province was encouraged), a stamp duty ("that is, taxation on dealing justice to the people"), the tax on private incomes, and the tax on trades and professions.² With these new receipts the yield from taxation amounted to well over 1.75 crores of rupees (1.75 million pounds sterling), "so that at one bound three-fourths of a crore was added to what the native Government levied. . . ."³ The imperial government ordered the municipal committee to assess and collect the trades and professions tax and the imperial income tax, a very difficult proposition (as we shall see), without offering the committee the use of any of the money it collected.

¹ P.C. Mukerjee, The Pictorial Lucknow (unpublished galley proofs, dated 1883), p. 66, U.P. Sanghralaya, Lucknow.

² Mukerjee, p. 66. The imperial income tax should not be confused with the municipal income tax which was imposed on city residents in 1869.

³ Ibid.

TABLE 6
TAXES COLLECTED BY THE LUCKNOW MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE

	Date initiated	Beneficiary	Remarks
Octroi	1856	city	1.5% ad valorem on goods entering the city; farmed out to <u>chungi daroga</u> until November 1868, then brought under the direct management of the municipal committee.
Penal tax	1858	city ^a	To penalize the disloyal elite of Lucknow.
Trades and Professions Tax (sometimes called the Licensing Tax)	1860	imperial government	3% of profit or income.
Imperial income tax	1861	imperial government	Graduated tax on income.
House tax (rates)	1869	city	5% ad valorem on property in city; 5% on rental in Civil Lines; 4% on rental in cantonment.
Municipal income tax	1869	city	Graduated scale.
Conveyance tax	1869	city	According to size of vehicle and animal; cantonment and civil lines exempt.

Source: compiled from file no. 1919, BROG, UPSPA.

^a Some funds were impounded by the imperial government.

Inevitably, such a steep rise in the tax liability of the province manifested itself in rising prices and exacerbated the economic distress, already acute in the city.¹ The new government's policy of exporting grain from Oudh to other parts of British India had the effect of keeping the prices artificially high.² Even in years of plenty the Oudhi lived on the edge of starvation. Barley, a popular staple, sold in Lucknow in the last decade and a half of the nawabi (1841-1856) at the average price of 36 seers (one seer = 0.83 kg) to a rupee, while wheat averaged twenty-four seers.³ In the fifteen years following annexation (1856-1870) the rupee would buy only an average of twenty-nine seers of barley or nineteen seers of wheat, a 20% increase in grain prices. The prices in the nawabi had been kept in check because hardly any grain left the province in ordinary times and exportation of grain was legally prohibited whenever the price of wheat rose as high as twenty seers for the rupee.⁴ The real rise in prices after the British

¹This statement emerges with great force from a variety of sources.

Chief among these are:

- 1) Private papers of Malika Gaiti (widow of King Amjad Ali Shah [1842-1847]), owned by Prince Sartaj Mirza, Nakhas Bazar, Lucknow. These include several copies of the family's petitions to the chief commissioner for an increase in wasiqa payments because of rising prices, three volumes of household account books kept by Malika Gaiti till her death in 1866, and the correspondence of her son, Dara Sitwat, with a succession of Oudh chief commissioners. All the information in these papers is directly or indirectly related to the straitened circumstances of the family and the surge of inflation in Lucknow.
- 2) Gazetteer of the Province of Oudh, 3 vols. (Allahabad: North-West Provinces and Oudh Government Press, 1877), vol. 2, pp. 301-396.
- 3) The annual Report on the Administration of the Province of Oudh, 1860-1876.
- 4) Selections from the Vernacular Newspaper Reports (VNR) 1860-1877. There are numerous news items pertaining to heavy taxation and the plight of the citizens of Lucknow.

²Gazetteer of the Province of Oudh, 1877, vol. 2, p. 327.

³Ibid.

⁴H.C. Irwin, The Garden of India or Chapters on Oudh History and Affairs, 2 vols. (1880; reprint edition, Lucknow: Pustak Kendra, 1973), vol. 1, p. 107.

takeover was much higher than the figures indicate because the reduced cost of grain transportation (since the advent of the railway), the decrease in the population of the city and a consequent drop in demand, and the scarcity of money which should normally have cheapened food, kept the prices from soaring even higher. In other words, grain was getting dearer in spite of the forces of the market place working in favour of lower prices. Urban wages, on the other hand, instead of rising to neutralize the effect of inflation showed an equally unnatural decrease. This was attributed to "the departure of the Oudh Court and to the diminished wealth and population in the city."¹ With this broadly sketched economic backdrop the specifics of civic taxation and the popular response to it are easier to understand.

The Penal Tax

In 1858, when the administration was in throes of reconstituting itself, it was deemed necessary to exact, over and above all the new and regular imposts, a one time penal tax from the nobility and prominent citizens that would, apart from its punitive value, pay for the cost of repairing the devastated city.² This led to a summary investigation of the ex-King's courtiers, his begums, his heirs and assigns, and the prominent tradesmen and bankers in the city, for purposes of assessment. The penalties imposed varied with the gravity of the offence. This measure resulted in a very

¹Gazetteer of the Province of Oudh, 1877, vol. 2, p. 330.

²Letter no. 66, from George Campbell, Judicial Commissioner, to T.D. Forsyth, Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, 27 July 1858, file no. 2241, BRLD, UPSA.

substantial collection of cash, jewels and confiscated property. Over-zealous local officials found this an irresistible opportunity to augment municipal funds, and often exceeded the limits of their own authority in expropriating property and putting it up for public auction, when a fined party was unable to produce cash or other valuables.¹

When the government of India learnt of these profitable auctions, it arbitrarily stepped in and appropriated nearly 74,000 rupees of the money collected, to express its disapproval of local officials who had acted "without sufficient authority."² This admonition, however, did not make any material difference to those whose property had been sold. The men affected by these auctions were not the wealthy men of the city. Forty-two of the fifty houses auctioned on 6 January 1865, for example, were valued at less than a hundred rupees, and their owners were mostly the domestic servants, cooks, carriage drivers, and guards of the ex-King.³

Some of the "disloyal" were charged not only a large fine but found their monthly wasiqas or pensions permanently reduced. Several families who had to surrender their homes were forced to move to smaller townships, such as Kakori and Malihabad in Lucknow district, where they owned orchards or agricultural land.⁴ By December 1861, the collection from this tax was

¹ First sale of confiscated houses, Foreign/Revenue A Proceedings, August 1864, nos. 31-33; Results of second sale of confiscated houses at Public Auction, Foreign/Revenue A Proceedings, November 1864, nos. 15-16; Houses sold on 6 January 1865, Foreign/Revenue A Proceedings, February 1865, nos. 58-60; NAI. Together these three auctions netted nearly Rs.50,000.

² Letter no. 96, from [I.F. MacAndrew], Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, to Secretary to GOI, Home Department, 11 August 1869, unnumbered basta, MCRR.

³ Foreign/Revenue A Proceedings, February 1865, nos. 58-60, NAI.

⁴ Interview with the family of Mail Malihabadi, in Malihabad, 29 July 1976.

more than 6.5 lakhs and the amount expended on repairs and reconstruction in the same period was 5.4 lakhs.¹ The political and social impact of this tax will be discussed in chapter five.

Octroi

All local committees in towns and cities in India depended, for the bulk of their income, on octroi, a duty levied on goods entering the city. In Lucknow there were eight categories of goods (broken down into ninety items) which were subject to octroi: foodstuffs, animals for slaughter, fuel, building materials, drugs and spices, tobacco, cloth, and metals.² Octroi remained the principal source of income for the Lucknow municipality till 1868, when the schedules were revised and the income from octroi had to be supplemented by property taxes and a municipal income tax. The octroi had little to recommend it. Everywhere in India "the system pressed hard on the poorer classes," was arbitrary in operation, expensive to collect, and gave ample opportunity for corruption to its collectors, yet "this system was preferred, at least by the middle classes, as being familiar through ancient usage."³

¹Memorandum, "Provisions of the Lucknow Penal Tax and Maintenance of the City Police from Municipal Funds," Foreign/Revenue A Proceedings, December 1861, nos. 25-26, NAI. The breakdown of the expenses was as follows:

Repairs to houses (occupied by government)	Rs. 173,225
Repairs of roads and bridges	150,000
General improvements (details unspecified)	213,815
Total (as of December 1861)	Rs. 537,070

²Statement of duty levied on Articles brought into the City of Lucknow from 1 April 1868 to March 1869, "Municipal" basta, no. 69, MCRR.

³Hugh Tinker, Foundations of Local Self-Government in India, Pakistan and Burma (Bombay: Lalvani Publishing House, 1967), p. 75.

In Lucknow the octroi operations were fraught with the same problems. The octroi had existed in a native version, called chungi (literally, handful of grain), the only urban levy to which the people residing in the towns of Oudh were accustomed.¹ The two taxes differed significantly in principle and structure, even though the old term "chungi" was used interchangeably with the exotic "octroi." Both the taxes were designed to be collected in walled cities at the city gates. Lucknow was unwallled and presented a problem. The nawabi had solved the problem by appointing a chungi daroga, or superintendent, who was responsible for collecting the duties at the various gunjes in the city.² This method of collection was permitted to continue for a dozen years after the annexation. In 1868 the entire system was overhauled. Octroi collection was brought under the direct management of the municipal committee, and eighteen posts, or collection points, were designated and manned to form a tight ring around the city.³

It is interesting to compare the effects of the nawabi chungi and the British octroi on the trade of the city. This was lucidly explained in a petition by some disgruntled shopkeepers in Lucknow who traded exclusively in European goods.⁴ The chungi, their petition contended, was a tax upon

¹ Memo no. 4296, 23 September 1872, file no. 1919, part IV, BROG, UPSA. See also, G.D. Bhatnagar, Awadh under Wajid Ali Shah, pp. 200-203, for a discussion on chungi.

² Abstract of the proceedings of the Chief Commissioner of Oudh in the Judicial department, items 2-11; December, 1956, UPSA.

³ Letter no. 3476, from [I.F. MacAndrew] Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, to the Secretary to GOI, Home Department, 11 August 1869, unnumbered basta, MCRR.

⁴ "Petition of Lucknow Shopkeepers trading exclusively in European Goods Upon which Sea Customs Duty Has Been Paid," addressed to Charles Wingfield, Chief Commissioner of Oudh, 13 June 1864, Foreign/Revenue A Proceedings,

actual sales and was viewed as a fair charge for the protection and conservancy arrangements made by the nawabi daroga in the city gunjes. It was remitted at a time when a trader had realized the whole or a portion of his outlay and was, therefore, "no addition to the money risked in view to probable returns." Unsold goods that had to be sent out of the city were not taxed. In contrast, the octroi was a toll on goods entering the city and tantamount to an exaction "in advance for promised benefits which may partially or never be realized." In the case of fragile goods the toll was paid on the invoice "without thought to ullages, breakages, and many other accidents incidental to our present Indian roads."¹ The loss sustained on perishable goods that remained unsold was even greater. Furthermore, if goods once brought within municipal limits were sent on to another town they were liable to duty and the octroi degenerated, in effect, into a transit duty which affected trade adversely. It reduced the volume of trade and kept prices high. The chungis had had none of these disadvantages.

There was some soul-searching among the officials about the wisdom of levying a tax that was "denounced almost melodramatically as a wicked and oppressive measure" by native and European traders alike.² It was also a nightmare to manage. It was difficult and expensive to collect octroi in a city without walls and the collection was "attended with many evils" such as a large and corrupt establishment of mohurrirs or record keepers.³ The

July 1864, no. 42 NAI. The petition is signed by the representatives of Murray & Co., Brewer & Co., J. Sonderman and Co., Johannes and Co., Chotey Lall Shaw and Co., and P.T. Company, which were the major retail stores located in fashionable Hazratgunj.

¹Ibid.

²Pioneer, 27 December 1865.

³Preamble to proceedings, 12 June 1861, PMC, MCRR.

cost of collection exceeded 13 per cent of the total receipts from this source and it was estimated that a far greater sum was lost on account of the bribery and corruption.¹ The official attitude in this case was one of resigned acceptance since "no better scheme has been suggested and there is one difficulty that lies at the root of all, viz.: the largeness of the sum it is necessary to raise" to keep the city well conserved and policed.² Lucknow, it was agreed, had "suffered perhaps more than any other city in India . . . [and has been] impoverished by the succession of annexation, Mutiny, and demolition . . . and upon [whose citizens] the enhancement of the price of the most necessary articles of life caused by the existing choongie system, falls with extreme severity."³ William Hoey, who served as a licence tax officer in Lucknow in 1879-80, surveyed and remarked on the tabescent condition of the various trades in the city and came to the conclusion that its commercial health would be "vastly improved" by the outright "abolition of octroi." But he hastened to add that since it was "a necessity for the maintenance of conservancy and police," it was "a delicate point" which he preferred to pass "without further comment."⁴ The pall of octroi hung heavily over the stricken city and despite the periodic reviews which confirmed the harm it was doing to the local economy the situation did not change.⁵

¹ Report of the Administration of Oudh, 1868-69, p. 149.

² Preamble to proceedings, 12 June 1861, PMC, MCRR.

³ Ibid.

⁴ William Hoey, A Monograph on the Trade and Manufactures in Northern India (Lucknow: American Methodist Mission Press, 1880), pp. 30-31.

⁵ An official enquiry into the "evils of Octroi," whose results were embodied in a Report of the Municipal Taxation Committee, U.P., 1908-1909 (Allahabad: Government Printing Press, 1909) reaffirmed the damage octroi

The strongest criticism of the tax came from the Europeans, traders and consumers alike, who resented paying a second round of taxes in Lucknow on imported goods which had already been charged customs duty in Calcutta. The Pioneer in an editorial boldly printed the colorful invective against octroi which was pronounced "without fear of refutation... the most inquisitorial, the most oppressive, . . . the most illegal and dishonest impost levied under any civilized government in the world."¹ It also earned several other epithets such as "all-sweeping, all-seeking, all-defrauding,"² not to mention "the accursed" and "iniquitous."³ The irate owner of a piece of saddlery, for which he had paid duty in Calcutta, and octroi in Lucknow, Faizabad, and Sitapur finally gave vent to his feelings on the "wholesale system of fiscal oppression":

Talk of Imperial despotisms indeed! Match me this atrocious tax in Russia or France; and failing to do so, sicken me with your perpetual self-laudation about British wisdom and justice and knowledge of the art of governing and legislating, and doing everything better than every country in the world.⁴

The anger was not in vain. It prompted serious reconsideration on the matter of levying tax on European goods, and from November 1868 "the iniquitous octroi virtually disappeared for European merchants and other Europeans" when it was decided that any goods on which custom duty had been paid would be exempt from local octroi.⁵ The exemption was also extended

was doing to urban trade. It was not until 1928 that it was superceded by the terminal tax. See Report of the Municipal Board Inquiry Committee (Allahabad: Superintendent, Printing and Stationery, U.P. India, 1942), p. 30.

¹Pioneer, 12 June 1868.

²Ibid.

³Pioneer, 3 July 1868.

⁴Pioneer, 27 April 1868.

⁵Pioneer, 5 February 1869.

to goods that were subject to a special excise duty, such as salt, indigenous liquor and opium, and to such goods that were brought within municipal limits for exclusive and direct use of the government.¹ The rate of octroi, though limited to 1.5 per cent ad valorem, was retained on all the basic articles of consumption, such as grain, fresh produce, animals for slaughter, construction materials, Indian textiles, and metal goods. It was, in fact, urged by the municipal committee that the existing rate on these articles be raised to make good the shortfall in the receipts.² In other words, life became easier for consumers of European goods, and trade more profitable for the handful of merchants dealing in them at the cost of some eighty-five thousand rupees to the municipality.³ The local population not only found no relief from octroi, but were expected to accept cheerfully the burden of new local taxes -- such as the house and conveyance taxes -- to wipe out the deficit caused by the sanction of this "relief" measure.⁴

The octroi was also a source of conflict between the civil and military authorities. The chief commissioner and the cantonment authorities had agreed, in theory, that it was essential to levy octroi in the Lucknow cantonment because "if the duty was levied in the city and the Cantonment was free, the Sadr Bazar in the Cantonments would swell into a city and ruin the town octroi."⁵ Though by Act XVIII of 1864 (Lucknow Municipal Act) the

¹ Report on the Administration of Oudh, 1870-71, p. 123.

² Proceedings of a Special General Meeting of the Lucknow Municipal Committee held at Chatter Manzil, 5 December 1868, PMC, MCRR.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ This agreement was confirmed in a letter written by an anonymous major-general in 1859 which was summarized in letter no. 3476, from [I.F. MacAndrew] Secretary to Chief Commissioner, to Secretary to GOI, Home Department, 11 August 1869, unnumbered basta, MCRR.

cantonment was excluded from municipal limits, the same argument persuaded the authorities to continue to levy octroi there. This arrangement posed "little problem" as long as the octroi was farmed out to a native contractor who "did not insist that Europeans pay tax."¹

The trouble began when, in 1868, the committee brought octroi collection under direct management; some military officers refused to pay octroi to municipal employees, and when the demand was made in writing they promptly sued the committee and won their case because of a "technical ommission" in the new regulations.² MacAndrew had rather bluntly informed the Home Department that he considered it unfair "to tax the people of the city to water cantonment roads or to provide ornamental pleasure grounds for the use of officers who will not contribute a farthing."³ He viewed the military officers' conduct as defiance of civil authority which placed the "Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Lucknow in the most invidious position" and threatened to declare the municipal connection of the city and cantonment at an end; "to cease on the one hand to levy any taxes in the Cantonments, and on the other to make any contribution to the cantonment fund."⁴

The military officers blatantly disregarded these objections and continued to evade octroi to the tune of nearly 8,000 rupees a year.⁵

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid. Also see case summary entitled "Objection of Military Officers to Octroi," docket no. 24, unnumbered basta, MCRR.

³ Letter no. 3476, from [I.F. MacAndrew] Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, to Secretary to GOI, Home Department, 11 August 1869, unnumbered basta, MCRR.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Memo on the Fair Share of the Cantonment in the Octroi Collection, by Raj Kumar, Sarbadhikari (a municipal official), 13 October 1875, basta no. 69, MCRR.

They even requested a larger share of the municipal funds. The civilians contended that the 8,000 rupees should be added to the monthly cash subsidy of 600 rupees from municipal funds received by the cantonment and to the 15,000 rupees spent annually on the running of the Lock Hospital which existed "solely for the benefit of the Cantonment."¹ These amounts added up to nearly 30,000 rupees, which was more than double the "fair share" of the cantonment of the total octroi collection, if it was calculated on a per capita basis.² It was on this basis that the civilians voted down the military request for an increased monthly subsidy from the municipal funds.³

This financial tug-of-war between civil and military authorities reflected the growing contradiction between the notion of an unquestioned, monolithic colonial authority on the one hand, and an evolving civic institution where local voices and local dissent were beginning to temper decisions on budgetary matters on the other. The fact that military officials failed to prevail on their civilian colleagues to transfer extra funds to the cantonment, and that MacAndrew actually complained to the authorities in Calcutta of the arrogant behaviour of army officers at octroi posts, suggests that the committee was learning to be jealous of its power and did not hesitate to exercise it against its military component. An embryonic sense of local autonomy began to emerge as an outcome of these small, early tests of strength and endurance which the committee had to face.

¹Ibid. Recall that the Lock Hospital was maintained to treat venereal disease; see above, p. 127.

²Ibid. The cantonment had 7.5% of the total population of the city, and so the "fair share" of the cantonment would have been Rs. 13,678 of the total of Rs. 174,195 collected as octroi.

³Ibid.

Tax Assessment and Collection

The committee also served as the agent for the imperial government to collect the trades and professions tax as well as the income tax. The task was challenging, and the experience of the assessment and collection of direct taxes in Lucknow in those early years demonstrates the nature of the interaction between the mutually suspicious citizenry and government, and the increased encroachment of the latter upon the lives of the former. Land and its produce were already taxed to the hilt; surplus money could only be raised by taxing trade or urban incomes derived from service or industry in the city. The government of India devised the strategy of exploiting this untapped source and trusted local talent to implement it.

Wary of the inflammable mood of the citizenry, the central government had cautioned the chief commissioner of Oudh to take special measures to prevent any overt opposition to the proposal to license trades and professions.¹ The police and the army were alerted to meet any contingency and it was to be made "intelligible to the people that the vast expenditure [had been] imposed upon the state in the past two years for the purpose of preserving the whole country from anarchy and ruin."² It was expected that "Her Majesty's . . . faithful people in India, European and Asiatic alike" would contribute towards the "large Military organizations which have been rendered necessary"; the taxes would be fair and "intended to reach all. . . classes of Her Majesty's subjects." The circular ordered that the best civil and executive officers be posted at all points where trouble was

¹Circular no. 5727 from Secretary to GOI, Foreign Department (Secret), to Chief Commissioner of Oudh, 19 September 1859, file no. 700, BROG, UPSA.

²Ibid.

expected in giving "practical effect to the provisions of a new and unpalatable law." No officer whose "ability and discretion" did not inspire confidence was to be retained in any position that demanded the "exercise of such qualities in a high degree."¹

Carnegie, the deputy commissioner, who was closer to the pulse of the people, responded sanguinely to the misgivings of the twice-shy higher-ups. "I don't think there is the slightest reason to apprehend any attempt at open or violent disturbance," he wrote, because

the Province of Oude and the City of Lucknow have had such a lesson read them during the last two years, as to convince the people thoroughly, how hopeless and foolish is any attempt at armed opposition. There will be nothing of the kind but there will be a long passive resistance.²

The first practical hurdle was the business of tax assessment. This posed an enormous problem in a city teeming with multifarious trades and professions and with no readily available records or information on trade or profits to serve as a starting point. The formula adopted to compile the first tax registers in the city was a painstaking one. It required a systematic and thorough economic census of the entire city. Carnegie, with "feelings somewhat approaching dismay at the Herculean task of giving effect to the Bill," devised a workable, if arbitrary scheme.³ He classified the entire working population of the city under the following four heads: traders and professionals, private servants, government servants, and exempt persons, so that every income-generating or receiving adult found his name

¹ Ibid.

² Letter no. 1339 from P. Carnegie, Deputy Commissioner, Lucknow, to Col. S.A. Abbott, Commissioner and Superintendent, Lucknow Division, 21 October 1859, file no. 1919, part I, BROG, UPSA.

³ Ibid.

in the appropriate register after the survey was completed. The trades and professions category was exceptionally bewildering since the initial enquiry revealed that "300 trades [were] now being carried on in this City, and the list is by no means complete."¹ These were studiously boiled down to approximately a hundred and sixty trades and professions and these were again sorted and grouped under twenty-six major categories. Thus the major category "Provisioners" included six trades, namely, butchers, bakers, pig dealers, ghoosees (poulterers) and ahirs (cowherds).² This was but a small step in the process.

The next stage was to determine the incomes of individual practitioners of every trade with a reasonable degree of accuracy. In a society unaccustomed to interference in its economic affairs the "truth" could only be approximated with the cooperation of some members of that society. Without active volunteers from among the prominent townspeople, who would agree to divulge information on the economic affairs of their friends and neighbours, the task would be a hopeless one in such a vast and populous city.³

Carnegie solved this thorny problem by the winning tactic of appointing selected men as "chowdharies [headmen] of every trade . . . who will be required to examine and attest the lists and be held heavily responsible for their perfect correctness."⁴ These selected headmen were

¹ Ibid.

² "Detailed Statement Showing Distribution of Trade Tax in the City of Lucknow," [c. 1873], file no. 1919, part VII, BROG, UPSA.

³ H.H. Butts, Report on the Settlement of Land Revenue in Lucknow District (Lucknow: Oudh Government Press, 1873), Appendix I, p. i. The survey of the city revealed that it had more than 162 mohallas and 65,288 compounds or enclosures in the city.

⁴ Letter no. 1339, from P. Carnegie, Deputy Commissioner, Lucknow, to

induced by "fixed remuneration and rights" to cooperate in supplying income-related information and reporting mutations promptly. Other "informers" were also put on the payroll to help collect relevant data, and fines collected for tax evasion were ear-marked for disbursement as rewards to those who volunteered information to the tax collectors. It was also made known to the potential tax payers that there were severe penalties for evasion provided by the law, "including flogging for perjury, [which] must be held in terrorism [sic] over them and rigorously enforced." The mohulla panchayats, neighbourhood committees of five elders, were to assist the trade headmen in determining individual incomes to be taxed. The local network of tax assessors would be buttressed by government assessors and inspectors for each municipal ward, who would investigate incomes independently and spot-check panchayat decisions.

The tax was to be calculated at the flat rate of three per cent of the annual average profit over the previous five years. If there was a substantial discrepancy between the taxpayer's word and the educated guesses of the panchayat, sundry "informers," and the official assessor, the matter was to be settled by appeal and arbitration.¹ Theoretically incomes below sixty-six rupees per annum were exempted from the trades and professions tax, but this limit was not honoured as is evident from the returns available in the revenue records.² The smallest amount of tax paid in any trade or profession was one rupee, which, when calculated as three per cent of the

Col. S.A. Abbott, Commissioner and Superintendent, Lucknow Division, 21 October 1859, file no. 1919, part I, BROG, UPSA.

¹ Ibid.

² "Detailed Statement showing Distribution of the Trade tax in the City of Lucknow" [c. 1873], file no. 1919, part VII, BROG, UPSA.

income, made any person who earned more than thirty-four rupees a year liable to pay tax. After the mohalla panchayats rejected more than 15,000 names on the official list as "poor and unable to pay," the final count of taxpayers in Lucknow was 60,510 persons. Among them was distributed the burden of remitting Rs. 270,000 annually in trade tax alone.¹ The tax reached down to the poorest artisans and labourers since an income of more than 2.8 rupees a month was taxed. The long arm of the trade tax can be fully appreciated if we consider that from a population of 280,000² approximately half male, of which rather less than half or 70,000 may be presumed to be adults and of these 60,510 were taxed. The chief commissioner acknowledged that the trades tax collected in 1861 was "much too high,"

certainly not less than 5 per cent on income, and often and specially in Lucknow, very much more, and that it descended far too low even to the extent of assessing individuals in fractions of a rupee . . . [when] the highest rate of taxation cannot by law exceed 4 per cent.³

The once free nawabi capital became one of the most highly taxed cities in the British empire, a city where one out of every four inhabitants paid taxes.⁴

¹ Memo no. 352, Ms. of Supplementary Memo to City Trade Tax, signed "Comm and Supdt., Lucknow" [S.A. Abbott] 16 February 1861, file no. 1919, part II, BROG, UPSA.

² Gazetteer of the Province of Oudh, 1877, vol. 2, p. 377. The population figures for the city are explained thus:

Native population	273,126
Europeans	4,222
Eurasians	760
Pensioners and employees	3,648
In jail	3,023
Total	284,779

I have discounted the last category from the total and rounded off the figure.

³ Letter no. 517, [from Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Oudh] to the Secretary, GOI, Financial Department, 17 February 1862, file no. 1919, part III, BROG, UPSA.

⁴ Letter no. 1014 [no author given; probably the Deputy Commissioner,

The only women on the tax register in their own right were prostitutes, classified as "dancing girls," even though there were women who were economically active in supplementing family incomes by engaging in small, low-paid piecemeal work in the traditional embroidery industry. Prostitution, it appears, was the only profession for women profitable enough to be considered within the pale of taxation. Carnegie reasoned that

prostitution is not a "lawful trade," but in Oude we are not bound by Regulations, while by custom and by oriental consent this trade is held in estimation, not only as not unlawful, but as a highly respectable one, and why therefore should this, the most profitable of all trades in Lucknow, not be¹ taxed, when others which we hold in much higher esteem are.

Once the trade tax registers had been prepared, the government had in its hands the most systematic and detailed economic information on virtually every single working citizen. These registers also became a reference source for further taxation in the city. When the imperial income tax was introduced in Oudh the following year, the trades tax registers were used as a source of names for the compilation of fresh registers. As an extra precaution it was decided that the duty of selecting names ought not be entrusted "to any but an European assistant." In fact, the commissioner was advised that respectable people of European extraction should be "preferentially selected for the duty."² The procedure adopted to compile the first tax

Lucknow] to Secretary to GOI, Foreign Department, 22 March 1861, file no. 1919, part II, BROG, UPSA.

¹ Letter no. 1339, from Deputy Commissioner, Lucknow, to Col. S.A. Abbott, Commissioner and Superintendent, Lucknow Division, 21 October 1859, file no. 1919, BROG, UPSA, Lucknow. Emphasis in the original.

² Circular no. 9-2028, Income Tax Circular To All Commissioners: Act XXXIII of 1860; 18 June 1861, file no. 361, BROG, UPSA. Emphasis in the original.

registers in the city became the standard formula used for adding names of new individuals to the tax rolls. The registers were periodically updated and served as the basis for reevaluating the economic life of the city for official purposes. Jury lists, for example, were drawn from the list of the biggest taxpayers in the city.¹

Thorough and conscientious as the process of assessment of the trade tax may have been, there was, as Carnegie had correctly anticipated, widespread passive resistance to the idea of paying direct taxes. The subtler and more common form of resisting the new imposts was the concealment of actual incomes or profits by falsifying records and softening the decisions of the mohalla panchayats with bribes or favours. These means of tax evasion were inevitable and "a fact accepted by Government as well as by the unanimous opinion of the country."² It was soon understood that "calling for returns of income from natives does much harm, and obtaining them does no good," so that the government had to resort to "arbitrary taxation."³

A system that relied on the mohalla panchayats to play the leading role in assessing the tax owed by their own friends and neighbours was handicapped at the outset. Private deals were bound to be made. After the system had operated for a while, Abbott, the commissioner and superintendent, confided to the officiating chief of police that panchayats "appointed by the different Mohallas who have no interest but to make it [the tax] as light as possible to themselves and their friends and throw the burden on others"

¹ The Report on the Administration of Oudh, 1859-60, Appendix B, p. 14.

² Letter no. 517, from Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, to the Secretary, GOI, 17 February 1862, file no. 1919, part III, BROG, UPSA.

³ Ibid.

were necessarily "inferior" for the tax.¹

The process of assessment was not without its repercussions on the social and business practices of the day. In the first place, eliminating certain trades altogether and grouping the rest for the convenience of compiling trade registers tended to redefine or alter the specialized nature of many crafts and arbitrarily cluster them with others with which they were seen to be akin. Nearly fifty per cent of the small, specialized handicrafts nurtured by the fastidious consumption of the Oudh court received no official recognition. It was only considered

worthy of remark that many branches of industry are carried on in the City, and are peculiar to it, [and] which are unknown in the Districts. Among these may be enumerated makers and sellers of brocade, gold and silver tissue, of braidings of tinsel garlands, pickles, soap, carpets, tallow chandlers, stone cutters and seal engravers, makers of mirrors, spectacles and hookas, and these have been brought under one or the other of the 26 headings to which it is considered their trade has the most affinity.²

These "affinities" tended to reinforce the differentiation of occupations along caste lines and obliterate the nuances in the self-perception of the workers as specialists or craftsmen. Book binders and shoe makers, for instance, were lumped together³ and this was probably due to the fact that both worked with leather and belonged, in the Hindu scheme of things, to the sub-caste chamar which subsumes all leather workers. Their own emphasis and pride in their special skills and training was ignored.⁴

¹ Ms. Letter [personal note written by hand] from Abbott [Commissioner and Superintendent] to Col. Barrow [Officiating Chief of Police, Oudh], 23 July 1860, file no. 1919, BROG, UPSA.

² Letter no. 1014 [No author; probably written by the Deputy Commissioner of Lucknow] to the Secretary to GOI, Foreign Department, 22 March 1861, file no. 1919, BROG, UPSA.

³ "Detailed Statement Showing the Distribution of the Trades Tax in the City of Lucknow," [c. 1873] file no. 1919, part VIII, BROG, UPSA.

⁴ Sharar's Lucknow is informed with a special appreciation for the

A second result, and far more significant than the first, was the defence mechanism developed by tradesmen to deal with the scrutiny of their account books by the various tax assessors. They rebuffed this unprecedented invasion of their financial privacy by establishing a second set of books which were splendid pieces of numerical fiction maintained for the eyes of the tax authorities alone. In investigating the appeal of one Shumboonath, a treasurer in the chief commissioner's office, alleged to be a money lender on the side, against the Rs. 1,005 income tax, the panchayat refused to examine the books which the plaintiff "was very anxious to show," because they claimed that no other banker had been taxed on the basis of his books.¹ Carnegie comprehended the futility of inspecting account books after he was "credibly informed that nearly every Banker in the Country has established a new set of books, with a special view to the Income Tax."²

The most daring response to taxation in Lucknow came from the bankers and traders of Asharfabad mohalla in the heart of the old city. They refused to honour the demand for the income tax they owed and created a minor revolt which came to be known as "The Asharfabad Affair," the most notable among the few overt acts of protest against direct taxation that occurred in the city. Reconstructing this "riot," as it was also sometimes called, from a variety of sources will demonstrate, close-up, the colonial

peculiarities and crafts that had made Lucknow famous. For example, the noted pigeon-fancier, Mir Aman Ali, specialized in transplanting coloured feathers onto the wings of pigeons, which held as firmly as the original plumage. He sold each of these birds for fifteen to twenty rupees and did a thriving business during the later years of the nawabi (p. 128). There is little doubt that a unique craftsman such as he would have been blandly classified under "poulterers" in the tax registers.

¹ Letter no. 382 from P. Carnegie, Deputy Commissioner of Lucknow, to Charles Currie, Officiating Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, 28 May 1860, file no. 1919, part I, BROG, UPSA.

² Ibid.

civic machine in action, and evaluate its effectiveness in a situation it was expressly created to combat.

Asharfabad mohalla, as the name suggests (ashurf from the Arabic sarraf or banker, money changer) had as its dominant group of residents, the Hindu commercial caste of rastogis.¹ They were the traditional money lenders of the city, and their clients ranged from the spendthrift nobles of the court to the impoverished cotton weavers, who remained permanently indebted because of the prohibitive rates of interest. The rastogis, functioning within the traditional banking network, had also accumulated vast amounts of capital discounting the coin of other states when Oudh was an independent state with its own mint at Lucknow. With British rule came the closure of the mint, the introduction of currency notes and money orders, and the consequent transformation of the native banker into a pawnbroker and moneylender.² The rastogis became ever more a necessary evil in the impoverished city. Their special victim, according to the Oudh Akhbar, were the poorest sections of the society like "the julaha [weavers], kasai [butchers], and dhuniya [cotton carders]."³ The rastogis, like usurers in any society, were not popular. Their frugality was as conspicuous as the consumption in the homes of their noble debtors. It was hard to assess the taxes they owed because their account books were fraudulent and their style of living so austere as to render their wealth invisible:

They wear only a vest and dirty dhoti [loin cloth] and carry a spare dhoti over their shoulders. They eat parched gram and drink sattu [a flour and water mixture]. They try

¹ Oudh Akhbar, 20 June 1860.

² Hoey, p. 26.

³ Oudh Akhbar, 20 June 1860.

to eat their meals only in the homes of their debtors.
. . . They readily accept rich food and sweetmeats
when they come to collect their exorbitant interest.
. . . Most of them have hoarded wealth and collected
enough pieces of jewellery [from pawn-broking] to have
become jewellers as well.¹

Such were the protagonists of the "Asharfabad Affair."

The official representative was Ram Dayal, a kayastha of proven loyalty who had been duly rewarded with the position of extra-assistant commissioner in the tax establishment. Since he was responsible for the meeting of the mohalla panchayat, he had been assured of the fullest co-operation from the police and was assisted by several trusted subordinates.² On the 10th of June, 1860, Ram Dayal and his deputy Gajraj Singh arrived in the mohalla to collect the pre-assessed tax. The assesseees appear to have greeted the team by withdrawing behind locked and bolted doors.³ It is difficult to determine exactly what collective planning occurred at the mohalla level but a meeting of the taxpayers to defy the authorities jointly can be presumed. After demanding that the doors be opened, and even "pleading" with the men behind locked doors, Ram Dayal allegedly ordered the mohalla to be surrounded by two hundred armed policemen and used a mixture of intimidation, insults, and violence to collect the tax.

The recalcitrants were dealt with in the following fashion: a policeman went up to a locked entrance of a house and demanded it be opened; if the resident failed to obey the order, then the door was forced open;

¹Ibid. My translation.

²Oudh Akhbar, 18 June 1860.

³Enclosures to letter no. 93 of 1860, from Lt. Col. Barrow, Officiating Chief of Police, to Secretary to Chief Commissioner, n.d., file no. 1919, part I, BROG, UPSA. The enclosures are the original statements made by the several defaulters who were later imprisoned. They are written on small slips of paper and describe the events of 10 June 1860.

one or more policemen would enter the house and apprehend the tax evader; if he agreed to pay the tax it was collected and the man set free after gratuitous insults and threats. If however the man still refused to pay the tax, he was arrested and taken into custody, and his property, possessions, and even the female members of the household were left to the mercy of the police. The police would enter the zenana, accompanied by dhobins (low caste washerwomen) whose presence was considered defiling to an upper caste household, and valuables, including the jewellery worn by the rastogi women, was snatched and taken.¹ A typical statement of the treatment of the women reads thus:

Testimony of Brij Bhoshandass: Two dhobies were sent for and the Moharir [clerk] said he was ordered to take my women . . . to the Chutter Manzil [British Officers' Club]. He said to me, send for your women and put them in [the conveyance that would take them to the club]. People [neighbours] asked me to pay to save further disgrace.²

The treatment of a defaulting prostitute, as stated in her testimony, defined the limits to which the intimidation and force were used. Mirza Khanum, a well-to-do tawa'if, stated that she was beaten by a chaprasi [peon], that Ram Dayal "spoke obscenely" to her and ordered her to be confined "in the privy with four others [prostitutes]."³ The confined underwent further indignities in custody. Some were made to "sit on filth" (another defiling act), received minute portions of parched coarse grain to eat for which they had to pay, and were deprived of drinking water. The prostitutes were not given food or water.⁴

¹ Ibid. This general pattern emerges from the written testimony of the money-lenders against the conduct of Ram Dayal.

² Ibid. The testimony of Herpershad Rastogi is similar.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

The roles of the various actors involved in this "affair" are as interesting as they are varied. Let us consider the officials first. Carnegie, the deputy commissioner (the executive officer answerable for any untoward event in the city), was confident that the citizens would not resort to large-scale armed resistance (since they were disarmed, this is hardly surprising) and the police and municipal authorities were prepared for any other eventuality. Those who fashioned the law itself, quite deliberately did not "provide any strict procedure of enquiry as to income and its sources," nor did they provide any forms to elicit information or "consult the convenience of the tax payer . . . to avoid harrassment."¹ Carnegie had erred in devising a procedure that was open to abuse and resented by the local tradesmen and that Ram Dayal, the native assistant, could use to prove his worthiness as a loyal official by exercising his power to an unconscionable extent. He used means that in today's slang can only be described as "dirty tricks": he ordered his subordinates to use violence, he stirred up caste prejudice, and he deliberately abused and robbed the women of the household. Though these tactics were not expressly approved by the municipal committee, their perpetrator was not reproved even after an official enquiry confirmed these allegations.² The senior local officials sought only to minimize if not completely suppress the facts in order to prevent them from reaching the authorities in Calcutta. Charles Currie, the officiating secretary to the chief commissioner,

¹ Circular no. 1911, from GOI, Financial Department, to Chief Commissioner of Oudh, 31 March 1869, file no. 1919, part IV, BROG, UPSA. Emphasis in the original.

² Letter no. 1014 [no author given; probably written by the Deputy Commissioner, Lucknow] to the Secretary to GoI, Foreign Department, 22 March 1861, file no. 1919, part II, BROG, UPSA.

actually tampered with the report that Barrow, the police chief, prepared on the subject; he confessed to having "omitted what you [Barrow] say about 'so much discontent which has been expressed' as it might excite the attention of the G.G. [Governor General] and an explanation be called for."¹

For the most part, the press was silent on the issue; only one local paper, the Oudh Gazette, wrote frankly about the Asharfabad Affair. But not with impunity. Its representative had investigated the matter in the mohalla itself and interviewed eye-witnesses. This provoked the authorities into issuing warrants of arrest for the owners of the paper.² The paper was also forced to published the official rebuttal and a denial of its own coverage. The Oudh Akhbar published an Urdu translation of the deputy commissioner's letter to the Oudh Gazette.³ It was an unequivocal apologia for Ram Dayal, claiming that he had not violated the law. It stated that an enquiry conducted by the Central Intelligence Department revealed that "no man entered the zenana, no one was insulted and no one was beaten. Statements to the contrary published in the Oudh Gazette are clearly fabricated and it is clear that it is an enemy of the government."⁴ Barrow's enquiry, as we have seen, contained enough evidence given by witnesses and by the imprisoned themselves to classify the last assertion as a categorical lie, though consistent with the official stand on the matter.

¹Hand written note by [Charles] Currie to Barrow, 19 June 1860, file no. 1919, part I, BROG, UPSA.

²Oudh Akhbar, 20 June 1860.

³The source here is the Oudh Akhbar as I did not find a copy of the Oudh Gazette in question nor a copy of the letter written by the deputy commissioner; I have translated the Urdu back into English.

⁴Oudh Akhbar, 27 June 1860.

While the controversy raged in the pages of the Oudh Gazette, the Oudh Akhbar, which had a milder, pro-government tone on most issues, decided to speak out against the "corrupt and unscrupulous" Ram Dayal. It did not put the blame on the government for condoning his actions, but blamed the extra-assistant commissioner for his mis-directed sense of loyalty. It also warned the public that if they tried to organize any support for the Oudh Gazette they would surely "serve their term in jail." It also reported that the government was soliciting witnesses to the "affair" to testify against the Gazette in court.¹

The final act in this drama was that Ram Dayal was legally vindicated. He sued the management of the Oudh Gazette for libel, produced several witnesses who testified in his favour, won his case, and collected his expenses and three thousand rupees in damages from the paper. The Oudh Gazette spent ten thousand rupees on the case and went out of business.² Ram Dayal had already proved his ingenuity in intimidating the residents of Asharfabad mohalla to collect tax from them; that he did not scruple to use it again to persuade witnesses to testify on his behalf can hardly be doubted.

The Asharfabad riot proved that the chances of citizens organizing a successful and widespread economic or political protest were severely limited. The bureaucracy, the police, and the native officials were well orchestrated to cope with the resistance offered. The resistance of the tax payers was unsuccessful in part because the protagonists were the local usurers (notorious for the exploitation of their debtors) who would not

¹Oudh Akhbar, 15 August 1860.

²Ibid. It did manage to resurrect itself as the Lucknow Times later but with a rather more docile editorial policy.

have been able to mobilize "grass roots" support. It is in fact difficult to determine to what extent this resistance was organized. It appears not to have spread to neighbouring mohallas even though there were rastogi money lenders in every bazaar of the city.¹ In this instance open defiance of the tax collector had failed. Careful planning and the use of the caste network might have generated a more effective and pervasive resistance.

The timely arrival of the armed constabulary amongst the disarmed resisters probably dissipated the crowd very quickly. Only 62 individuals defied orders long enough to be arrested; fifty-seven of these buckled after one horrifying night in jail, and only five were kept for nine days in confinement before giving in.² The vast majority of those dissatisfied with the assessment had taken the legal way out. They filed complaints with the deputy commissioner, and of the 323 cases he received he made remissions in the demand in more than fifty percent of them.³ The threat of attachment of property was by far the most effective deterrent and this lesson was not lost on the authorities.

The very fact that fresh taxes were imposed soon after this "affair" subsided and apparently raised no fresh storm underscored the triumph of the civic machine. Already in the next year, the central government secretly urged the chief commissioner to enhance the salt tax by half a rupee per maund (one maund equals approximately 80 lbs.) and to "devise as many local [urban] taxes as possible" which should not "be high enough

¹Hoey, A Monograph on Trade, p. 26.

²Ms. copy of the "Return Showing the Coercive Measures resorted to in the City of Lucknow for collection of Trade Tax to end of January 1861," file no. 1361 of 1861, BROG, UPSA.

³Ibid.

to oppress and therefore unite the people in opposition."¹

The real crunch for new sources of income came with the abolition of octroi duty on foreign goods in 1868. The committee cast around for new levies and came up with a tax on houses and private conveyances and a municipal income tax. The five per cent tax on all houses above the value of two thousand rupees was especially coolly received by the Indian members of the committee. Daroga Mir Wajid Ali submitted a memorandum expressing their collective displeasure, but when the subject was brought to a vote the official line was upheld by a majority of three.² Although the tax included houses in the cantonment and the civil lines, very few Europeans were affected, as the officials did not own the houses privately but were given free lodgings as part of their remuneration; only the non-official European community was affected by this tax (but they were excused from paying the conveyance tax). The Europeans would pay five per cent "on rental" in the civil lines and four per cent in the cantonment.³

It was calculated that the house tax would yield approximately Rs. 68,000. This, it turned out, was based on property values that had been determined "in a very arbitrary manner" often without reference to "the nature or condition of the tenement," and "a large portion was assessed on houses which have since fallen into ruins or been destroyed."⁴ Yet, the

¹Letter no. 3135 (Confidential), from Secretary to Government, Financial Department, to Chief Commissioner, 16 March 1861, file no. 1919, part II, BROG, UPSA.

²Proceedings of the Special General Meeting of the Municipal Committee, 12 January 1869, PMC, MCRR.

³Ibid.

⁴Memorandum entitled "Following Demands Unrealizable," 5 February 1869, PMC, MCRR.

reaction of property owners was muted and played itself out in a deluge of appeals and petitions to the appropriate authorities. Membership on the committee had given the members status and some patronage but no real political power. The newspapers too commented more in dismay than in anger on the new wave of economic distress that engulfed the pauperised people of the city.¹

The native members swallowed their defeat on the issue of the house tax and concentrated their energies in passing on the real burden of municipal income tax to the lower income groups in the city. They divided all individuals with incomes above a hundred rupees a year into seven categories. Those with incomes of twenty thousand "and above" would pay the maximum tax of twenty-five rupees a year. This would have been a comfortable arrangement for the richest members of the society but the total collection at this rate would have amounted to a negligible 5,600 rupees.² The sub-committee on municipal taxes reconvened on the same day and revised this schedule drastically, producing a scale that created twenty income brackets, raising the ceiling to incomes of a lakh and above and the maximum tax to five hundred rupees.

The administrative set-up for assessing the tax divided each of the city's six municipal wards into four circles in each of which the residents elected four panchayats (that is, twenty people in each circle who acted in groups of five). The panchayats, assisted by the committee member for the ward and a tehsildar (revenue officer) determined the bracket into

¹ Nayir-i Akbar (Bijnour), 23 June 1870, VNR.

² Proceedings of the Sub-Committee appointed by the Special Committee, 5 February 1869, PMC, MCRR.

which each householder's income fell. So these 480 panchayat members, by virtue of becoming an informal wing of the municipal government, exercised some influence over all income producing residents of the city. But this power, granted to the indigenous elite to enlist their cooperation, was at best encapsulated: the officials on the committee reserved for themselves real political power by retaining the majority in every sub-committee and the power of veto.

The newspapers continued their verbal onslaught against pusillanimous native members who were more interested in occupying "chairs in the Municipal Committee room" and enhancing their prestige than in improving the plight of their overtaxed fellow citizens.¹ The public gathered to denounce the city income tax on June 11, 1870. Leading men of the city made speeches in which the tax "was strongly censured and its evils described in vivid colours."² It was also reported that the house and municipal taxes were being collected "with great severity and the least delay is visited by a penalty." Resistance had proved futile and taxes were grumblingly accepted as a fact of life.

What emerges, then, is a paradigm for taxation in "mutiny"-torn cities where the colonial presence was expanded. Lucknow was taxed because keeping it clean and safe consumed vast quantities of money. The taxes were heavy and the citizens were angered both at the necessity of paying them and at the methods of assessment and collection. The newspapers articulated this anger for the sullen majority who had no choice but to pay and wrote about the few who protested but suffered because of their temerity.

¹ Oudh Akhbar, 9 February 1869, VNR.

² Nayir-i Akbar (Bijnour), 23 June 1870, VNR.

New taxes were constantly being added to take care of the expanding municipal costs of health and sanitation. Though the officials were firm, they were also occasionally sympathetic, but the imperial system had no room for such emotion. Even a British officer could clearly see the oppressiveness of the system:

Much is said about the people of India being taxed so lightly in comparison with the people of England. For my part I think that something may be said against that position. The native is lighter taxed only because his wants are fewer and there is less about him to tax. When the new imposts become law the ordinary native will pay on everything he consumes except the air he breathes. The grain he eats is taxed, for the land that produces it is taxed. The clothes he wears are taxed for the weaver who spun the cloth and the tailor who made them pay for their licenses. His salt is taxed, and very highly, so is his opium, if he can afford to eat any, and lastly his tobacco is taxed. He has not yet to pay a tax on the birth of his children, that is all that can be said.

But admitting that he is lightly taxed in comparison I would answer, so he should be. There is a wide difference between the two populations. The taxes of the people of England are self-imposed, those of the people of Hindoostan are imposed by their conquerors.¹

Such voices spoke out only occasionally and always in vain.

¹Memorandum on Tobacco Tax, Ms., undated, signed "Mr. W." [c. 1860], file no. 1919, part I, BROG, UPSA, Lucknow.

CHAPTER V

THE CITY MUST BE LOYAL

And it is in Lucknow, the beautiful and ever-green city, the most European of Indian cities and yet the most Indian, the home and temple of the aristocratic policy . . . that the grand work of integration seems destined to begin. In the shadow of the shot-ridden but proud and unconquerable old Residency, where English and loyal Indian [fought] side by side . . . the seeds of coalition will find congenial soil. The visitor to the Residency, who muses on the past and the future, may note that upon the spot where the enemies' assault was hottest twin hospitals for Europeans and Indians have been erected by Oudh's premier Talukdar, the Maharaja of Balrampur; and as the sun sets over the great city, lingering awhile over the trim walls and battered walls, which link the present with the past, a strong hope may come to him, like a distant call to prayer, that old wounds may soon be healed, and old causes of disunion may disappear, and the Englishmen and Indians, knit together with loyalty to their beloved Sovereign may be as brothers before the altar of Empire. . . .

-- Sir S. Harcourt Butler¹

In looking at the process of an indigenous city being adapted and governed to satisfy the needs of the colonial rulers, we examined in previous chapters the spatial and morphological change prompted by strategic and defence requirements, and the growth of the municipal institution that controlled and regulated matters of health and sanitation and collected taxes.

¹S. Harcourt Butler, Oudh Policy, the Policy of Sympathy (Allahabad: Pioneer Press, 1906), p. 50.

By these means the city would become, in the estimation of its new policy makers, safer and cleaner and more habitable.

Yet this was not enough to depend upon. The very nature of colonial rule where a handful of British civilians replaced the Oudh court in a city where a great rebellion had only recently been suppressed made it precarious, and the search for local allies and collaborators that much more urgent. Not only had a political vacuum at the top to be filled, but the new power structure required a solid buttress composed of local men whose loyalty to the Raj would be above suspicion. The nature and composition of the buttress and the social engineering that was required to make it strong will be examined in this chapter. The recruitment of stalwarts who would constitute a group of new "courtiers" to cooperate in making the Raj viable and the weeding out of the old malcontents based on their alleged conduct during the rebellion will be discussed to show the composition of the "new" civic elite.

These two decades also saw the transformation of the taluqdars, the larger landowners in Oudh, into an urban elite group; their infiltration into the civic arena was sponsored by the British, and they increasingly became absentee landlords with their political and social interests centered in the capital. Loyalty was the test that distinguished the good from the bad, the Ariels from the Calibans. The British confiscated and bestowed fortunes and with mercurial rapidity elevated families to refurbish the elite ranks with men who would have a large stake in the stability of the newly restored British authority in Oudh. And finally, this chapter will examine the various modes of mutual accommodation and survival adopted by the ruling and indigenous elite groups.

The Penal Tax

This was a unique tax imposed on the citizens of Lucknow, the fiscal implications of which were dealt with in the last chapter. We can now study it more closely since it was used to implement the principle of rewarding loyalty and punishing disloyalty. In the aftermath of revolt the British found that they were torn between conflicting emotions: as victors after a hard-won siege they were in a bitter, black and vengeful mood; as a tiny band of white rulers in a dreadful city they needed to be conciliatory and win adherents to their cause. The class that could afford to pay the penalty for rebellion, namely the "Nobility and wealthy Merchants" who owned "Palaces, Superior buildings . . . [the] better class of dwellings, shops and upper storied houses,"¹ was the very ones whose support the British wished to enlist. The monied and propertied class had provided material support to the rebels and had the wherewithal to finance another rebellion; it was crucial to warn and woo them at the same time.

The penal tax, as it turned out, worked brilliantly in this paradoxical situation. Chief commissioner Montgomery had conceived it in a spirit of "fixing a permanent punishment" on the rebellious citizens of Lucknow,² and since "the power of the Asiatic for good or evil depended on his wealth," it was wealth that would best indemnify the loss of "European blood murderously shed."³ In practical effect the penal tax penalised the

¹Ms. of Letter no. 2395, from Charles Currie, Secretary to Civic Commissioner, to Secretary GOI, Foreign Department, 9 October 1861, entitled "Provisions of the Lucknow Penal Tax and Maintenance of the City Police from Municipal Funds," Revenue A Proceedings, December 1861, nos. 25-26, p. 2, NAI.

²Ibid., p. 1.

³Ibid., p. 4.

citizens as well as it made it clear to them at the outset that the British were securely reintrenched and a quick acceptance of the political reality would work in their favour. The hand that punished also offered rewards in exchange for allegiance.

There was another inherent advantage in the decision to levy a penal tax. Lucknow could then be held as "a prize of war, the entire property therein becoming vested in the captors who were at liberty to dispose of it at their pleasure."¹ The city was emptied of its inhabitants who were asked to return within ten days of the ultimatum embodied in Viceroy's Canning's notorious proclamation of 25th March, 1858; those who failed to heed the order would do so "on pain of forfeiting their [property] rights."² The burden of the proof of loyalty and the reclamation of their lapsed rights fell upon the citizens when they gradually trickled back to their homes. Had the city not been cleared of its inhabitants the captors would have had the tiresome, if not impossible, task of evicting occupants and confiscating houses. Instead, those who returned -- and indeed there were a great many who did not -- were simply "held to have reoccupied their tenements on sufferance only and were considered liable to any terms the Government chose to impose."³ The judicial commissioner was requested to submit exhaustive lists of all persons of "rank and influence" who returned to the city who deserved either a reward for having "rendered aid to any European or Christian" -- and would therefore be well worth cultivating as

¹Ibid., p. 1.

²Ibid., p. 2. Delhi suffered a similar fate. Its inhabitants were driven out while homes were plundered by prize agents. (For a graphic account of this see Percival Spear, Twilight of the Mughuls (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951), pp. 218-221.

³Ms. of Letter no. 2395, from Charles Currie, Secretary to Chief Commissioner, to Secretary GOI, Foreign Department, 9 October 1861, Revenue A Proceedings, December 1861, nos. 25-26, p. 2, NAI.

supporters -- or punishment for unrepentant rebels. The latter were divided into two classes: Class A, or those who had "decidedly sided with the rebels," participated in the rebel darbar, or court, or had been "notably active" against the British; and Class B, or those who had remained inconspicuous in the rebellion "but had in no way sided with the British." These would require special surveillance.¹

A deluge of claims and counter-claims and of true and false testimony soon inundated the deputy commissioner's office, which dealt with returning citizens. The deputy commissioner decided, for the lack of an alternative, to conduct the investigations "in a very easy way" by relying upon the evidence that was "produced by the exculpated themselves" regarding their role in the rebellion.² It was an effective ploy in converting rebels to loyalists.

Several propertied begums, the ex-King's wives, and other female relatives were, however, treated as Class A rebels and were heavily fined even though they were patently non-combatants. Their claims were rejected on the grounds that "these Begums have endless brothers and nephews and male followers of every kind and were very powerful in Lucknow," and could have afforded to shelter Christian refugees and given other material aid to the British cause.³

The British exploited their unconditional right to dispose of rebel property to the fullest. The strongest and largest palaces and buildings

¹Ibid., p. 3.

²Letter no. 66 of 1858, from George Campbell, Judicial Commissioner, to T.D. Forsyth, Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, 27 July 1858, file no. 2241 (Mohammad Taki Khan Wishing to be Allowed to Collect War Tax) BRLD, UPSA.

³Ibid.

and nuzul holdings were retained as office space and the extra buildings were rented out by the government to private individuals; some houses were confiscated from "rebels" and bestowed upon "loyal" citizens as reward; in some cases confiscated property was "restored" and "amnesty" granted in exchange for abject submission and an oath of fidelity for the future.¹ The houses that were neither claimed nor could be profitably rented were sold in auctions.

The total proceeds from the penal tax was close to seven hundred thousand rupees; its disbursement was dealt with in the last chapter. The greatest gain, perhaps, from the administration of this tax was an intangible one. All persons of means, whether propertied or pensioned, who now lived in the city were on the deputy commissioner's list with his or her putative role in the rebellion clearly defined and their property and sources of income detailed. This systematically eliminated political confusion along with any lingering hope or belief in the cause of the exiled ex-King; his power was indubitably extinct. All favours, jobs, patronage, clemency and rewards now emanated from only one source: the British Raj in Oudh, and this simple reality, however unpalatable, had to be digested. It was manifest that loyalty -- with its reciprocal obligations -- even if it was more often than not an expression of enlightened self-interest mixed with hypocrisy on both sides, was the cement that would hold the new order together.

The collecting and tabulating of information on individuals -- both a condition and consequence of the level of political control ^{the} ~~so~~ situation

¹There are more than three hundred files in the Board of Revenue records of Lucknow District of individual claims on account of the penal tax which have survived the customary periodic weeding of files on settled cases. These conclusions are based on the general overview of these files; the more notable cases will be discussed in the course of this chapter.

demanded -- was the beginning of the numbers of registers and records that were compiled on the citizens of Lucknow. The trade and income tax registers, thana diaries, and other sources of information were assiduously maintained for the purpose of efficient administration and control of the citizenry.

The greatest undertaking of this nature was the survey of the city of Lucknow ordered by the chief commissioner in 1867 and entrusted with a very capable Indian extra-assistant commissioner, Dhokal Parshad. The result was embodied in 162 volumes, one for every mohalla, the most rigorous and intensive account of civic land and property. Each volume consists -- for 154 volumes of this record are extant and updated and used to this day as the final authority on property ownership to settle disputes in the civil courts¹ -- of a map of the mohalla with all the streets, buildings and plots demarcated and with numbers that referred to a corresponding description in the khasra, or text of the volume. The khasra records the type of property (house, mosque, shop, vacant plot, etc.), the name of the owner, the name of the occupant (if different), the caste² and occupation of the chief occupant, the composition of household by number, age and sex, the rent or tax paid on the property and the exact dimensions and quality (mud, brick, etc.) of the built-up area. The total area of Lucknow was 7,850 acres with 65,288 compounds, enclosures and separate measured plots, and every square inch of urban property was accounted for.³ This remarkable record represented

¹These Ms. volumes are kept in the record room of the Lucknow Collectorate.

²It is interesting to note that "religion" was not seen as a category by Dhokal Parshad. He records the "caste" of Hindus and Muslims, the latter appearing as "shaikh-sunni," "syyad-shia," etc. and the terms "Hindu" and "Muslim" are absent in the entire 162-volume record. This strengthens the argument I make on page 82, above.

³H.H. Butts, Report on the Settlement of Land Revenue in Lucknow District (Lucknow: Oudh Government Press, 1873) Appendix I, p. i.

the finality of the city bandobast or settlement after the protracted confusion and flux in property titles occasioned by the penal tax. This record was "not to open to appeal, but if any person felt aggrieved, remedy should lie in a Civil Suit."¹ The spur to litigation was built into the system and it generated revenue in stamp paper and bribes for the officials at various levels who handled the files. The municipality adjudicated the claims that arose from this settlement and was granted the authority to waive legitimate ownership rights if the house or vacant lot in question was required by the government either for strategic purposes or interfered with the drainage of conservancy plans of the area.² The dense masses that inhabited the city that had made it a frightening place during the days of the siege, were now reduced to a comprehensible set of data that could be consulted used, changed, and updated as time went on. Such undertakings aroused fear among the inhabitants because the purpose of such a thorough probe could not be supposed to be entirely that of administrative efficiency. In 1869, when the data for the census of 1869 was being gathered by the city police, wild rumours arose. It was believed, among other things, that the police were really making a count of virgin girls in each household who would later be abducted for the pleasure of the bureaucrats and soldiers.³ The fact that such an idea would gain wide enough currency to be included in the introduction of the census itself reflects the mistrust that prevailed in the city about the designs of the alien government.

¹Ibid., p. ii.

²Ibid.

³The Report on the Census of Oudh (Lucknow: Oudh Government Press, 1872), vol. 1, p. 2.

The war tax also gave the officers an inordinate amount of legal leverage, and often British "justice" was perverted by the influence of the extra-legal variable of "loyalty," which made the merits of the case of little consequence. For example, Saligram, a jeweller and shroff, who claimed that a dozen of his houses had been damaged, demolished or confiscated, submitted an appeal for a lakh of rupees in compensation. The claim was duly verified and the compensation demanded was considered "reasonable." Yet when his role in the rebellion was investigated, other jewellers testified that Saligram had been an accomplice of Yusuf Khan, a prominent rebel, and "was most active in pointing out the different wealthy Mahajuns [money lenders] and settle the amount of contributions they were expected to pay the rebels" in exchange for a waiver for himself.¹ This disqualified him as a claimant and Saligram moved his business to Kanpur, from where he continued, without luck, to petition the British government in Calcutta.² Technically Saligram was the only money lender who did not contribute money to the cause and claimed that he had been forced to give the names of other mahajans under duress (which sounds plausible) but it appears that the British had to ignore his pleas to secure the allegiance of the several jewellers who had testified against him. The city magistrate admitted that on the actual role of a particular individual in the rebellion

It was difficult to arrive at the truth. The greatest rebel, known to have been inimical to our Government can bring forward no end of witnesses to prove that he was praying for our return and that he remained all the time in his house, gave no assistance to the rebels,

¹Letter no. 248, from A.G. Wood, City Magistrate, Lucknow, to Col. Abbott, Commissioner and Superintendent, 12 May 1859, file no. 76, BRLD, UPSA.

²The Humble Petition of Saligram, formerly of the City of Lucknow, but at present at Cawnpore, Jeweller and Shroff to the Right Hon'ble Charles John Viscount Canning, Governor General of India; file no. 76, BRLD, UPSA.

and never joined them in anything, such testimony in my opinion is worthless.¹

The adherence to the principle of "loyalty," which was, of necessity, established on the flimsiest grounds, must have miscarried "justice" in innumerable cases since it is always easy for dishonest men to arrange for false witnesses and gain rewards and favours or recover their property.

Coercion, threats, and other inducements were freely used as extra muscle for the newly implanted judicial procedure in the courts of Lucknow, and it is difficult to reconcile the well-advertised notion that British justice treated all men as equals when we look at the typical post-"mutiny" cases. In the case of Bunda Ali Khan, a resident of the city and a landowner in Lucknow district, intimidation was used quite blatantly. His petition to recover his seized lands was answered thus:

You have not yet shown any good service to Govt. . . .
You are hereby ordered quickly to separate your men from the rebels and pay Govt. revenue to show your allegiance to Govt. and then you will be entitled to settlement of your Estate otherwise your Estate will be settled with others. Though Govt. has pardoned the offences yet many Rajahs like Rajah Goor Bux Singh, Rajah Hudut Singh, and Debee Bux do not present themselves to the British Govt. Explain to them that if they appear before the Govt. force goes in their Estate they will be entitled to every favour of Govt. and after that they will be uprooted and ruined.²

Yet, in another case, where Begum Mumtaz Mahal, the widow of King Nasiruddin Hyder (1827-1837), petitioned for compensation for the destruction of Sheesh Mahal ("Looking Glass Palace") during the fighting in Lucknow, the money was sanctioned without demur, even though her connection with the ex-royal family and therefore with rebels could hardly be concealed. Daroga Wajid Ali presented her case, smoothed out the wrinkles, and obtained for her the

¹Letter no. 248, from A.G. Wood, City Magistrate, Lucknow, to Col. Abbott, Commissioner and Superintendent, 12 May 1859, file no. 76, BRLD, UPSA.

²Official translation of Major Barrow's Perwanah of 2 June 1858, file no. 1340, BRLD, UPSA.

sum of Rs. 50,000.¹

This judicial capriciousness continued well into the next decade, as is clear from the case of Mohammad Tahir, an inn keeper in the city. He was in the process of adding an extension to his inn when his inn keeper's license was suspended for alleged "improper use" of the inn, and he was forced to stop construction. The impropriety, probably, was something on the order of serving liquor to European soldiers. When Tahir petitioned for the restoration of his licence he cleverly strengthened his case by "proving" that "he did some Service certainly in Rebellion [sic]" and this won him back his inn keeping privilege.² The case files are a bewildering jungle and they might well be the subject for further research and a statistical collation of the whole collection. My own impressionistic view is that the weight of "loyalty" -- whether genuine or fabricated -- suggested to the judge that the accused who spent the time and money to "prove" their "loyalty" could be counted on the side of the British and were exculpated by that effort alone. Loyalty then was the magic word; it tipped the scales of justice for those who understood this well and used it, and a great number of the verdicts handed down at this time begin to make sense only when viewed in this light. No despotism can survive without loyalty from its influential and wealthy subjects; the "mutiny" had touched this sense of survival with paranoia.

The Hooseinabad Trust Case

The few instances cited thus far concern individual destinies which may have made a few gaps in the upper stratum of Lucknow society but did

¹Letter from Commissioner and Superintendent, Lucknow, to Judicial Commissioner, Oudh, 30 August 1858, file no. 2290, BRLD, UPSA.

²Commissioner's Memo, on Report no. 32 from City Magistrate in the case of Agha Mohomed Tahir, 12 March 1864, file no. 10, part IV, BROG, UPSA.

not in any way radically alter the composition of that elite. If Mumtaz Begum received compensation there were several who were denied it, and if Saligram Jeweller left town there were the majority of bankers, like Shah Benarsi Das and Shah Makhan Lall who retained their status and business by lending their ready support to the British. While these smaller fry were being brought to book, there were other important interests in town that were outside the control of the new regime. There were, for example, very substantial fortunes locked into various charitable religious trusts or waqfs endowed by the Kings of Oudh and left in the hands of hereditary trustees, who could only be replaced on grounds of a serious breach of the trust reposed in them. The British, it appears, were vitally interested in gaining even an indirect control of the substantial annual incomes and dividends of the nawabi endowments, such as the Hooseinabad Endowment Fund, probably because they feared the money might be diverted, if an opportunity presented itself, to finance subversive activity. Since the Muslims were specially mistrusted,¹ and waqfs were exclusively Muslim endowments, the charities themselves were viewed with suspicion and it was logical to want to replace the nawabi appointees with men who might prove more amenable to British rule. The opportunity to do this was seized with alacrity in the course of the Hooseinabad Trust Case, a complicated and controversial struggle for control over the monies of the trust between the old trustees and the British Government. It began shortly after the rebellion subsided when the British were consolidating their political power in the city and extending their control into the social sphere of city life.

Briefly, the Hooseinabad Endowment Fund was created by Muhammad Ali

¹See T.R. Metcalf, The Aftermath of Revolt; India 1857-70 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 298-303.

Shah, King of Oudh (1837-42) to support the Hooseinabad Imambara built by him in 1838. Initially the King invested twelve lakhs of rupees in a single British Government promissory note at four per cent interest and executed a deed which pledged that the capital would always remain invested in government paper.¹ The interest drawn every year was to be disbursed on repairs and maintenance of the imambara, the upkeep of the road between it and the British Residency, the celebration of Mohurram, and the payment of salaries and stipends. The invisible hand of the resident guided all substantial fiscal commitments of the King, as is evident from the terms of the deed. Three hereditary positions were created to manage the trust and the King appointed his trusted courtiers and eminent Shiites, Rufeek ood Dowlah, Azeem oollah Khan, and Shurf ood Dowlah. In the absence of direct heirs, successors were to be elected from among the twenty stipendiaries by a three-fourths majority vote.

The original endowment swelled to a tidy 38.5 lakhs by a further donation of twenty-four lakhs by Mohammad Ali Shah in government paper and 2.5 lakhs by the trustees invested in four personally owned transferable notes. What made these subsequent infusions of capital into the trust more significant was the fact that the income from them was not regulated by deed and they were at the unconditional disposal of the trustees, together with the substantial monthly income from the commercial property attached to the imambara and the daily gifts and offerings of devotees and visitors. Besides this, the position of trustee not only commanded enormous respect and conferred status on its holder, but also gave him the unfettered control of a large annual budget

¹The summary of the case presented here is based on the voluminous documentation found in Despatch no. 1, 637, Hooseinabad Endowment Fund, from officiating secretary to Chief Commissioner of Oudh, 8 August 1859, Foreign/Part A, September 1861, nos. 300-316, NAI.

and patronage in the city. The total annual income of the trust was more than two lakhs of rupees,¹ which was a larger sum than two-thirds of the average annual municipal budget for the city of Lucknow in the eighteen sixties and seventies.

During the rebellion, the nine non-transferable government notes wound up in a highly speculative market and were sold far below their face value. Benarsi Das, the banker who was later appointed to the municipal body along with Mohsun ud Dowlah and Mumtaz ud Dowlah, bought one of these notes for a pittance. After the chaos subsided, the government indicted the trustees for a breach of trust for the alleged sale of notes. The key government witnesses were Benarsi Das, the banker, and Sukhmatullah Khan, alias Munno Khan (who were the purchasers of the notes in question) who deposed that they had been personally approached by the trustees to buy the notes.

Their testimony was refuted by that of seventeen out of the twenty stipendiaries of the trust. The latter endorsed, in separate written statements made in July 1858 to Colonel Abbott, the integrity of Rafeek ood Dowlah and Ali Baksh Khan (who had succeeded his father, Azeem ood Dowlah, as trustee). They maintained that the trust was looted by the rebels, who then tried to hawk the notes in the open market, and Benarsi Das and Munno Khan must have purchased them directly from the rebels. It was in the interest of the trustees to remain loyal to the British cause since the bulk of the funds were invested in British government paper and would become worthless if the British lost the war. For example, Nawab Manowar ood Dowlah, a stipendiary

¹Letter no. 1637, from Captain Andrews, Officiating Secretary to the Chief Commissioner to Secretary to GOI, Foreign Department, 8 August 1859, Foreign/Financial A, December 1862, nos. 3-10, NAI.

and witness for the defence, stated that there was "no doubt whatever that the rebels oppressed and coerced the Trustees . . . as they were considered to be very loyal to the British Government. . . . I have repeatedly heard of the fact that rebels plundered the endowment. . . ." ¹ His testimony is very important because he was one of those few selected nawabs with whom the British officers were on close social terms. Dr. Frayer, who went with him on several hunting expeditions, found him to be "the most perfect old gentleman, a keen sportsman, and great friend of the English. . . . [I] always met him with pleasure." ²

The two notable exceptions, who testified against the trustees, were the two nawabs, Mohsun ud Dowlah, grandson of Ghaziuddin Hyder (King of Oudh, 1814-1827) and Mumtaz ud Dowlah, grandson of Muhammad Ali Shah (King of Oudh, 1837-1842), who, as we have seen, were appointed by the commissioner to the municipal agency in 1862. They were stipendiaries of the trust and private pensioners of Muhammad Ali Shah by a provision in his will and received annuities of two hundred and six hundred rupees respectively. The former, a cousin of the ex-King, was an independently wealthy man who also hunted with British officers before the rebellion. His menagerie of ferocious beasts was widely admired. Nawab Mumtaz ud Dowlah was also a mulaqati (friend), "but had not the same frank manly nature as the others." ³ After the rebellion, Mohsun ud Dowlah was received, as one of three principal members of the ex-royal family, in a private audience by the viceroy during

¹The original statements (with official translations) of the stipendiaries who testified are attached to Foreign/Part A, September 1861, nos. 300-361. NAI.

²Joseph Frayer, Recollections of My Life (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1900), p. 88.

³Ibid., p. 89.

the darbar held on the 24th of October 1858 in Lucknow. After listening to flowery protestations of loyalty from these noblemen, the viceroy promised them his "protection and consideration" and "in return for that protection I look to their setting before the people of the City of Lucknow an example of order, loyalty and obedience in all things to the authority of the Queen."¹ The opportunity to set the expected example presented itself in the Hooseinabad Trust Case.

After a prolonged legal wrangle that drew into its vortex several eminent Shiite families in Lucknow, Col. Abbott, the commissioner of the city, pronounced his verdict.² He opined that the trustees had forfeited their own right to remain in office and the right of their heirs to succeed to their position by the flagrant breach of the very deed which had conferred upon them their rights. He stated that the trustees had reacted in panic and mistakenly assumed that the British government was at an end, and made a bid to salvage whatever little capital they could by the illegal sale. Rafeek ood Dowlah and Ali Buksh appealed against this judgment to the viceroy. The frail and blind Rafeek ood Dowlah submitted, in defence of his integrity, the several lakhs worth of his personally owned, transferable government notes which he had made no effort to redeem by sale. Therefore, they pleaded, Abbott's judgment, which had expelled them from their posts and denied their heirs their potential rights as future trustees, was unjust.

Nothing came of their bid to save these hereditary positions, and the chief commissioner laid the matter to rest by appointing nawabs Mohsun ud Dowlah and Mumtaz ud Dowlah as the two new trustees. The position of the

¹Foreign/Political no. 154, Darbar of 24 October 1859, NAI.

²The judgment is summed up in the Memorial of Nawab Rafeek ood Dowlah and Nawab Ali Buksh to H.E., Rt. Hon. Earl Canning, Viceroy of India, 18 August 1860, Foreign/Part A, September 1861, nos. 300-361, NAI.

third trustee was abolished, and instead a post of agent, to mind future investments of the trust, was created, and Munno Khan (the witness for the prosecution) was designated agent of the trust.¹

There the matter rested uneasily. The control of the most influential religious trust in the province, with substantial capital and a large running income, passed indirectly into the hands of the British via their faithful appointees. The two nawabs, who only received modest pensions from the fund, now controlled its income and patronage. Earlier in the year they had been coopted by the British as members of the municipal body, and Benarsi Das, banker, was also coopted as a Hindu "representative." It would be naive not to see the connection between cooperating with the British and receiving seats in the municipal agency. Shah Benarsi Das not only got out of the embarrassment and loss of having bought non-redeemable, non-convertible notes, but actually turned his folly to advantage by giving the evidence to bolster the charges against the old managers of the trust.

The case would have faded into oblivion and the truth of the matter would have lain suppressed in the files of the ex parte inquiry hastily conducted by Abbott had the old trustees not pressed the viceroy for a fresh investigation of the case in a regular court of law. The chief commissioner of Oudh was asked to ascertain whether the reopening of this matter could be justified. This led to the chief commissioner's office reviewing the files generated by Col. Abbott on the subject (which unfortunately are not extant today) and the officiating incumbent in that office wrote a startling confidential memo to the viceroy. After plodding "most carefully through the files of the case" Yule came to the conclusion that the inquiry conducted by Abbott was, to say the least, "informal and incomplete in the most

¹Foreign/Financial A, December 1862, nos. 3-10, NAI.

material points, affecting not only its legality, but the confidence to be placed in its results."¹ Yule discovered that witnesses had not been examined under oath, that though the accused had been put on the defence stand their lawyer had not been permitted to cross examine the prosecution witnesses or produce defence witnesses. The testimony of those that testified in favour of the accused was disregarded and the testimony recorded against them Yule found to be "weak and contradictory and . . . not to be relied upon even as it stands, while on trial [in a court of law] it would be contradicted by an immense amount of evidence to the forced consent of the Trustees . . . to the sale of paper . . . [and] we must, it seems to me, lose our case. . . ."²

The memo undoubtedly produced more than a little embarrassment in higher government circles in Calcutta, and the advocate general, who had earlier recommended a re-trial to bring this lingering matter to a tidy end, found himself eating his previous circumlocutions. "The advice of the case now taken by Mr. Yule differs widely from that which the Oudh Authorities had previously taken," he wrote, "and upon which my advice was founded, and in deference to Mr. Yule, I have carefully reconsidered my advice."³ More simply stated, he now considered it fatal to British interests to trot out the Abbott files in a court of British law. The plea of the deposed trustees was turned down and the whole business lapsed into a legal limbo until, in 1868 -- a memorable year of administrative reorganization

¹Memo (confidential) on the Hooseinabad Trust Case, from G.U. Yule, Officiating Chief Commissioner to Col. H.M. Durand, Officiating Secretary to GOI, Foreign Department, 3 September 1861. Foreign Department/A Proceedings, December 1861, nos. 120-126, NAI. The quotes in the following account are taken from the same memo.

²Ibid., no. 121.

³"Opinion by the Advocate General," Ibid., no. 126.

which saw the sanitary commission, the direct management of octroi, the "latrine revolution," etc. -- it resurfaced with the official scrutiny of other religious trusts and charities.

The question of waqfs in Lucknow would constitute a separate subject for scholarly research, since their magnitude and influence is not known, so suffice it to say that the British were interested in centralizing and controlling the managements of all the large endowments in the city. The Hooseinabad Trust was also subsumed under the same impulse; its new trustees were found wanting in managerial ability and it was recommended that the trust be put under the purview of "a very strong committee" that would oversee their activities."¹ Six other trusts, including the Shah Najaf and the Rud-oo-Muzalim (Manowar ood Dowlah's charity fund) were also placed under the direction of a committee, which comprised the commissioner and deputy commissioner as controlling heads and two nominees of the trustees of each endowment.² The justification for this undisguised erosion of the autonomy of these sacred trusts was that "all public bequests of this nature are judicially entitled to protection" from possible misappropriation or mismanagement by the trustees themselves -- which they knew to be "the case at times" -- and to ensure that the sums earmarked for distribution among the destitute in the city were in fact used for that purpose.³ A "General Committee of Management for The Special Pension and Charity Fund of Lucknow" was duly constituted to manage all seven charities under the collective

¹Letter, "Administration of Certain Endowed Charities in Lucknow," from Col. Barrow, Financial Commissioner, Oudh, to Major J.F. MacAndrew, Secretary to Chief Commissioner, 11 April 1868, Foreign/General A Proceedings, September 1868, no. 33, NAI.

²Ibid.

³Resolution no. 1485, by GOI, 5 September 1868, Foreign Department/General A Proceedings no. 34, NAI. The reference is obviously to the old trustees of the Hooseinabad Trust.

rubric.¹ Another small social revolution was bloodlessly accomplished and the once independent Hooseinabad Trust found itself tucked under the "protective" wing of the government, with the hope and prospect of a judicial re-trial of the conduct of its original trustees cleverly and permanently squelched by the new arrangements.²

The Making of a Loyal Elite

The Hooseinabad Trust had been preserve of the Shiite elite of the capital; it was tampered with politically and its trustees and their heirs were supplanted by other stipendiaries who were more cooperative and cordial to the British. On the surface the status and influence inherent in the position of trustee or even stipendiary remained the same; to belong to that tiny coterie of pensioners was, by definition, to be part of the twenty most prominent and esteemed Shiite families in the city. Yet, there was a qualitative change in their real position: their connections were to a dynasty that now longer existed, and their political efficacy became largely illusory. They had been chosen by the King to receive the stipends more as a mark of their place in the scheme of things than as a livelihood; now it was the pension that was crucial as a livelihood and as a psychological crutch when the very source of their "elitism" had vanished. This was the dilemma of the traditional elite group in the city with the radical change in the political structure. Who survived this change? Who did not? Did a

¹Ibid.

²Abbott's judgment was never publicly disowned by the British. In an interview, in February 1976, one of the present trustees of the Hooseinabad Endowment Fund, who assured me of his "accurate historical knowledge" of the Fund, told me how the British Government "rescued" this Fund from the hands of its corrupt trustees after the "Great Rebellion." So the above account explodes, at least, one cherished myth.

new elite fill in the gaps left by the old one? These questions are central this study and I will attempt to answer them by explaining the new combinations and alliances forged as a result of the formal transfer of power to the British.

Pensioners and Wasiqadars

The traditional urban elite in nawabi Lucknow was made up of the royal Shiite and commercial groups in a prosperous and populous capital.¹ In Lucknow the royal group could be further differentiated into members of the royal household of the reigning nawab and the older nobility that constituted a group of permanent, hereditary, and "guaranteed" pensioners called wasiqadars. The latter was "guaranteed" because they were recipients of stipends, granted in perpetuity, derived from the interest on the loans given in perpetuity to the East India Company by the Kings of Oudh.² These loans added up to some 520 lakhs of rupees (5.2 million sterling).³ In the last decade of the Oudh dynasty this distinction between the royal family and the wasiqadars became particularly meaningful because the first group was indiscriminately expanded by the romantic predilections of Wajid Ali Shah (1847-1856) who "fell in love" with "female palanquin bearers, courtesans,

¹The dichotomy is typical for urban elites in regional capitals such as Lucknow, Murshidabad and Mysore in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For a general discussion on traditional and new elites see Bernard Cohn, "Recruitment of Elites in British India" in Essays in Comparative and Social Stratification, ed. by Leonard Plotinov and Arthur Tuden (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1970), pp. 121-147.

²For details of these loans see Union Political Pensions in Uttar Pradesh Being a Historical Account with a Statement of the Present Position of Each Grant (Allahabad: Superintendent of Printing and Stationery, 1960) passim.

³Michael H. Fisher, "The Imperial Court and the Province; A Social and Administrative History of Pre-British Awadh (1775-1856)" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Chicago, 1978), p. 117.

domestic servants, and women who came in and out of the palace, in short with hundreds of . . . beautiful and dissolute women and soon dancers and singers became the pillars of state and favourites of the realm."¹ They enjoyed the confidence of the King and the lavish style of royal consorts. They received not only priceless gifts of jewellery and expensive accoutrements that went with the nawabi style of life, but came to control a substantial section of the city's prime real estate and rent-free jaghirs in the district which qualified them, by any standard, as a female elite with separate households, retainers, and dependents in the fashion of the other notables.

It was this group of influential and wealthy women who lost their guarantor in the person of the King and were most vulnerable to the stratagems employed by the British to resume their estates:

Adverting to the permission given to dispose maafee [rent free holdings] cases up to fifty acres by the rules laid down, I have the honour to solicit the Chief Commissioners's opinion as to the necessity of recognising grants in perpetuity given by the Ex-King -- many of these grants are given to singers and dancers, musicians and boon companions, invariably in perpetuity. By the first clause of the rules we are bound to respect the sunnud of the King, but really it appears to absurd to perpetuate these grants and sufficient to recognize them for the life of the incumbent.²

The chief commissioner heartily concurred with the commissioner as to the "absurdity" of such tenures but preferred to reserve the right to "resume or release life tenures" of fifty acres or more in his own office. These women were, it appears, never taken seriously as an important group, because they

¹Abdul Halim Sharar, Lucknow: The Last Phase of an Oriental Culture, translated and edited by E.S. Harcourt and Fakhir Husain (London: Paul Elek, 1975), p. 63.

²Letter no. 479, from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Lucknow Division, to Secretary of Chief Commissioner, 9 March 1860, file no. 15, BRLD, UPSA. My emphasis.

were "singers and dancers" and, therefore, in most cases from the lower stratum of society, and lacked "aristocratic" birth and breeding. More than that, perhaps, was the notion prevalent in the indigenous and metropolitan societies that women were not capable of managing lands and property and should therefore, be relieved of the unpleasant responsibility of ownership. It must have been difficult to accept the idea of female ownership, especially since these women were in purdah and their access to the outside world was through their male dependents, and a hopeless task to convert this curious female elite into a loyal and conservative force that would support the very Raj that had exiled their husband. By the end of 1858 a "thorough" examination of all the maafee holdings was completed and a list prepared of all the estates that would be resumed or confiscated; needless to say, the majority of the victims on this list were the ex-King's wives and favourites.¹ These women who had been suddenly raised to the social summit of the court, became, by British action, a single-generation elite.

The wasiqadars, on the other hand, were an established royal elite of nearly a thousand families sharing a combined and guaranteed income of a million and a half rupees annually.² The transition for them was smoother because their rights were vested, by treaty, in the East India Company. The company had gradually carved a competing political and legal jurisdiction in the capital, and the wasiqadars came under this protective umbrella as its exclusive legal charge and were immune to the authority of the King. In fact they were notorious for "constantly arraying

¹Letter, from Secretary to Chief Commissioner, to the Commissioner, Lucknow Division, 28 April 1863, file no. 41, p. 488, BRLD, UPSA.

²This was the 4% interest on the massive loans given by the nawabs of Oudh to the East India Company. Great Britain, Sessional Papers (Lords), 1859, Session 2, vol. 8, 433, paper 74, p. 476.

themselves against the King's authority under cover of that of the resident "while the latter exploited the support and allegiance of this influential group."¹

The grave economic dislocation experienced first with the annexation of the province in 1856 and then with the rebellion that followed affected the two groups within the royal elite rather differently. The first group, constituting the family, household, and administration of the King, found themselves in severely straitened circumstances. The source for the direct support for some 7,000 families of judicial military and household servants that the King had maintained at a basic cost of some 87 lakhs annually in salaries alone, dried up entirely.²

The King took a sizeable number of the royal elite, drawn primarily from the first group, with him into exile to a suburb of Calcutta, Matiya Burj, and supported them from his monthly "pension" of a lakh of rupees. His immediate entourage was made up of a thousand people, including thirty-seven wives and several scores of his favourite courtiers.³ Abdul Halim Sharar, whose family joined the court of the ex-King in 1862 and who lived there himself for ten years from 1869 to 1879, claims that Matiya Burj grew into a flourishing township, complete with fine palaces, a menagerie, bazaars, imambaras and mosques; indeed, "a second Lucknow" was refabricated from bits

¹H.C. Irwin, The Garden of India, or Chapters on Oudh History and Affairs, 2 vols. (1880; reprint edition, Lucknow: Pustak Kendra, 1973), vol. 1, p. 102.

²"Memorial of Sir Maharajah Maun Singh and Eleven other Inhabitants of Oudh to Hon'ble John Strachey, Chief Commissioner of Oudh," 24 August 1868, General A Proceedings, Foreign Department, September 1868, No. 33, NAI.

³Letter no. 148, from the Military Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, to Secretary to GOI, Foreign Department, 1 September 1859, Foreign/Political, 9 September 1859, nos. 275-277, NAI.

and pieces of the old. "Even the shopkeepers and moneylenders in Matiya Burj," remarked Sharar, "were from Lucknow and there was not a single product of Lucknow which was not there in its very best form."¹ The exodus from Lucknow to Matiya Burj amounted to "more than forty thousand souls" and another ephemeral nawabi civic microcosm was spawned.²

Those who remained in Lucknow, particularly the begums, courtiers, and officials, were the official responsibility of the new government, and the victims of a slow but steady emaciation in terms of their status and finances. For fifteen months after annexation not one family of these pensioners of the government received a single pice.³ The India Office in London was puzzled and annoyed at the protracted delay which was "as conspicuous for its impolity, as for its injustice," and did much to "embitter the feelings of the upper classes" against a government "so neglectful of the welfare and respectability of those whom circumstances had placed under the immediate protection of the State."⁴ The blanket imperial policy after the rebellion was to cultivate the conservative and monied elite groups as loyal allies and collaborators of the new regime, but the workings of government at the local level were far more harsh with the civic elite; their loyalty was secured more from threats and withholding of pensions than from the application of the "policy of sympathy." Even after the sharp nudge from

¹Sharar, p. 75.

²Ibid., p. 74. For a fascinating description of the Lucknow court in exile see Ibid., pp. 65-75. The news stories from Matiya Burj reported in the Oudh Akhbar, 1860-1875, *passim*, also tell a vivid story.

³Extract from a Despatch from His Majesty's Secretary of State for India in the Political Department, no. 4, 13 October 1858, file no. 41, p. 6, BRLD, UPSA.

⁴Ibid.

the secretary of state to expedite payments to the royal pensioners, the Oudh officials were determined to settle matters only after their own curiosity about individual political conduct and moral character had been satisfied.¹ Not infrequently attitudes and policies that filtered down from Calcutta were quietly altered to meet the exigencies of the local situation.

The intrusion of the criterion of "moral character" had interesting repercussions on the wives and other female relatives of the ex-King. Those "females of the family" who were "well-known" to be "unchaste," "addicted to vicious pursuits," or "notorious characters" were dropped off the original list of pensioners.² By 1860, the several thousands who would have in the normal course of things been entitled to a pension for being bona fide dependents of the ex-King, were trimmed down to a compact nine hundred individuals whose names were recorded on a persons' list kept in the district commissioners' office.³ The total sum paid to this group was sixty-seven thousand rupees a month, derived from the imperial treasury, and the average pension amounted to seventy-four rupees a month.⁴ The ex-King managed to remit almost forty per cent of his pension every month "for distribution to different women" in Lucknow, which fact attracted the chief commissioner's attention and he came to the unwarranted conclusion that the ex-King "has the

¹Letter no. 157 from Deputy Commissioner, to Commissioner and Superintendent, Lucknow Division, 18 February 1859, file no. 41, p. 2, BRLD, UPSA.

²Ibid.

³"List of Pensions Granted to Members and Dependents &c. of the Oudh Royal Family since the Reoccupation of Oudh," 10 February 1860, Foreign Consultation Proceedings, Foreign Department, nos. 59-62, NAI.

⁴Ibid.


means to support them all."¹ The local officials showed great resistance, if not outright antipathy, to rehabilitating this group to their former status. Even in cases where pensions were paid they were inadequate and certainly not calculated to maintain the pensioners in the style that had distinguished them as an elite group. Instead they saw the ex-King's dependents as a parasitic group "to whom a small subsistence allowance may justly be conceded."² With neither their former political power nor the means to live in nawabi fashion, this group clung desperately to their old self-perceptions, courtly manners, and nostalgic memories of the nawabi to sustain themselves psychologically through the humiliation of their changed position.

The wasiqadars, on the other hand, emerged comparatively unscathed from the political chaos since it was their guarantor, the East India Company, which had managed to oust its competitor for civic patronage and win for itself a complete monopoly. This is not to say that the "guaranteed pensioners" escaped a scrutiny of their political conduct or that the British ignored the opportunity to reduce the liability from an honest debt. Wasiqadars were probably quite genuinely more loyal to the British cause since their livelihood depended on the interest paid on the loans to the company; yet there were more than a score of cases where wasiqas were cancelled because the recipients failed to report back to the city within Outram's ten-day ultimatum to the residents of Lucknow.³ Rufeek ood Dowla, the old trustee of the

¹Letter no. 125 from Secretary to Chief Commissioner to Secretary to Governor General in the Foreign Department, 14 March 1859, file no. 41, BRLD, UPSA.

²Letter no. 157 from the Deputy Commissioner, Lucknow, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Lucknow Division, 18 February 1859, file no. 41, p. 2, BRLD, UPSA.

³There are twenty names listed in "Pensions of certain Wuseekaedars," 22 October 1858, Foreign/Political, nos. 205-206, NAI, who lost their right to their wasiqas.



Hooseinabad Trust, whose conduct was found (erroneously) to be "anything but loyal," lost not only his position as trustee, but his wasiqa as well and had to pay a four thousand rupee fine before he could draw on the interest on his government promissory notes.¹

Yet, there were the majority who retained their wasiqas and therefore their feudal style of living. An average day in the life of the young wasiqadar, Mehdi Ali Khan (d. 1890), author and poet, who enjoyed a guaranteed pension of Rs. 1,800 per month and an addition Rs. 3,000 in rents from a jaghir in Lucknow district and property in the city, typifies the ideal, if not the real, way in which the nawabi elite spent their time and money in Lucknow after 1856. His biographer and librarian, Mir Ali Husain, records that Mehdi Ali usually began his day at 4 a.m.² After ablutions, Mehdi Ali said his morning namaz, or one of the five daily prayers required by Islam, and recited the Quran and other prayers, followed by a western-style breakfast of cereal, milk and fresh fruit. At seven-thirty he went horse riding with two servants in attendance, also on horses. He would either ride to his country estate or call on government officials to pay his respects. At nine he returned home and attended to his domestic affairs.

At ten he ate the first big meal of the day. The table was always laden with delicacies though Mehdi Ali ate little; he was renowned as a gourmet and a large number of skilled personnel, including cooks, pantrymen, and assistant specialists of various talents manned the kitchen. At eleven he held a darbar attended by the chief literary men in town. The gathering

¹Letter no. 351, from Secretary to Chief Commissioner to Judicial Commissioner, 22 July 1858, file no. 2732 (Wuseekadars) BRLD, UPSA.

²Mir Ali Husain, Ravayat-i-Burgania (Lucknow: Tahir Press, 1934). The account that follows is drawn from this work, pp. 1-30.

was, according to Mir Ali Husain, a very distinguished one; the latest poetical compositions would be read and critically appraised, and discussions on Persian and Urdu literature would ensue over refreshments and the hookah. The darbar adjourned at 12:30, and Mehdi Ali spent the next few hours in prayer. At four in the afternoon he rested for half an hour before he washed and changed and had a small snack of dried fruits and nuts -- choice imports from Kabul, Isfahan, and Kashmir -- and readied himself for the evening.

The evening brought the same assortment of pleasures. First a leisurely ride in a horse-drawn carriage on the new broad streets, the esplanade around the ruins of Machhi Bhawan and down the Strand, a new road that ran along the river connecting the old city with the new. Then at 6 p.m. (the biographer makes a great point of this one day divided strictly by the hours of the clock) he arrived at home and prayed. After this there was another assembly of friends and mohalla-walas (neighbours), where literary, social and religious matters were discussed. At eight o'clock dinner was served, and many of his companions stayed on for the meal. The repast itself was another round of Lucknow's famous haut cuisine that met the approval of the fastidious nawabi palates that partook of it. Then followed a post-prandial entertainment, often musical in nature, less high-brow, and the conversation enlivened with wit and banter among his select group of friends. The day ended with the final prayers and rest until the next day dawned. This schedule, the biographer insists, was strictly observed during most of Mehdi Ali's life, even though it does not account for the time he must have taken to write, or be with his family.

The lives the wasiqadars and other royal notables lived in their less splendid palaces must have once been microcosmic replicas of the Oudh court itself. These guaranteed incomes relieved the recipients, at least in the first

two or even three generations, from the onus of seeking a livelihood and paid for goods and service required for a nawabi-style existence, of which Mehdi Ali's household is almost an austere version. There might have been less piety and more gambling, pigeon-fancying, opium and narcotic eating, and entertainments by professional courtesans and their troupes in other households of comparable incomes, and such a portrait has been drawn by the contemporary novelist Sharshar in his classic Fasane Azad. Loyalty to the new regime "guaranteed" this life and it surely must have been a small price to pay in a city which had been so suddenly pauperized.

What eroded this comfortable world of the wasiqadars was time itself. Expensive litigation amongst the heirs of wasiqadars was the single biggest cause of the ruin most families within a few generations. "It is a matter of great regret," the judicial commissioner reported, "that family dissensions and disunion is found to prevail to a very great extent among the chief families of the Lucknow nobility."¹ Of the nearly four thousand civil suits in the province filed over the year, half of the suits and 98 per cent of the value of the property in litigation occurred in Lucknow.² The wasiqas were diminished not only by their natural division among a large number of heirs, but were frequently tied up in legal disputes that forced families into debt and the permanent clutches of the mahajans. Inflation compounded their financial problems even further.

In summing up the post-rebellion fate of these two groups that formed the royal elite it is possible to suggest that the Muslim upper class, negatively affected as they were by the departure of the Oudh court, began to

¹ Annual Report on the Administration of Oudh, 1859-60, p. 6.

² Ibid.

perceive themselves first as a community, and second, and more dangerously, as a threatened and vulnerable community. When pensioners or their designated representatives, and wasiqadars queued outside the treasury office to collect their monthly dues, they must have sensed how their political power had been circumscribed; the more progressive and productive elements of the society joked about their special relationship with the British as that of "kept" women.¹ Perhaps these monthly reminders of the straits to which the nawabi scions had been reduced engendered a negative communal identity that fed the later sentiments of separatism among the Muslims. This postulate is offered in support of the now widely accepted thesis that the Muslims of Uttar Pradesh began to organize and agitate for separate political rights because of the "threat of becoming backward" in comparison to the Hindus, "rather than [because of] backwardness itself."² In the score or so of years after the extinction of the Oudh dynasty political ambition among Muslims remained latent; they still hoped for redress through petitions and loyalty.

Yet, circumstances involved the Muslims as a community in many lingering causes that reinforced the religious and communal nature of their problems under the British. The conversion of the Friday mosque and the main imambaras of the city into barracks was one such "cause"; they petitioned for the restoration of the holy place in vain for twenty years. The closure

¹I gathered this impression in my frequent informal visits to the homes of present-day wasiqadars and pensioners and to the Hooseinabad Trust where these monies are now distributed. On the day of the payment the wasiqadars lined up in front of the office in the Hooseinabad Trust building. It was an important social event for this dispirited community even in 1976. The man who I accompanied receives a wasiqa of three rupees; it cost him more to hire a rickshaw to come to Hooseinabad and return to his home three miles away. He was proud of being a wasiqadar and was well-known in his neighbourhood for this distinction.

²Francis Robinson, Separatism Among Indian Muslims (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 346.

of the private burial grounds by Dr. Bonavia's edicts again affected only the Muslims as a community. Their inability to release the fifty-two mohalla mosques from the various profane uses to which they had been put after the rebellion rankled rich and poor muslims for two decades.¹ Moulvi Muzhur Ali's petition to the government reflects the cumulative rage and frustration of the Muslims. He alluded to Queen Victoria's proclamation of 1858 that had guaranteed freedom to all creeds, but pointed out that in Lucknow "some mosques are held by Hindoos and converted into tenements," some used as hospitals and others "converted in Havalats [prisons] for felons" and still others served as "stables or cattle pounds." In the immediate vicinity of another mosque "a slaughter house for pigs and for selling pork has been opened," the ultimate indignity to a Muslim house of prayer.² A government inquiry was ordered and it predictably resulted in a list of the fifty-two mosques and the unorthodox uses to which they had been put. Action, as usual, was tardy, and another decade was to slip by before these grievances were taken seriously. All these events foretold the communal slant the politics of the future would acquire.

The Commercial Elite

The commercial elite was made up of a mixture of Jain bankers and jewellers, Hindu bania groups such as rastogis and mahajans, who were also engaged in money-lending and jewellery retailing, and Muslim Sunni and Hindu khatri

¹Foreign/General B Proceedings, April 1869, nos. 98-101, NAI.

²Official translation of the "petition of the Moulvi Muzhur Ali and others, both rich and poor Mussalmans of Lucknow" to the Governor General, 1 April 1869, Foreign/General Proceedings, April 1869, nos. 98-101, NAI.

business men who owned the manufacturing and retail establishments of the luxury industry in the capital. They were the productive sector of the city elite who catered to the needs of the royal consumers, the nawabi elite. Their own pattern of consumption was comparatively austere, and this visible lack of panache and prodigality apparently put them in a class not quite at par with the nobility of the city. During the Ashrfabad Affair the press had published several unflattering accounts of the bania community, and the popular image of the banker and money lender was one of a rapacious and miserly man who ruined rich and poor alike by charging exorbitant interest rates and demanding auctions of property for debts undischarged by the deadline. In Lucknow, at any rate, a prodigal nawab was loved and esteemed and the money lender feared and disliked.

This bias, it appears, became stronger after the annexation since the nawabi elite were even more dependent on the local money lenders, because the King's generosity was no longer available. The bankers too, found their profits from banking and exchanging money progressively dwindled after the introduction of British banks and the abolition of the Oudh mint, and they came to depend almost exclusively on the profits from money lending and pawn-broking. Suroor, the once prosperous literateur attached to the Oudh court and now a pensioner on fifty rupees a month, wrote to his friend, Syed Ali Hussain, at the court of Alwar:

My heart is weary of Lucknow; there is nothing new here now. I owe five hundred rupees to a Rastogi and every-day this burden increases daily. Please try and get me a position in the court of Maharajah Sheodin Singh so that I can save my honour [*izzat*]. . . . Grain is very dear here . . . the Maharajah of Patiala came to attend the funeral of Mirza Husain Beg [Suroor's patron and friend] -- what a tragedy his death is to me -- and

gave me a pair of bracelets which I had to sell to discharge my debt. Now, once again, I am in debt. . . .¹

There is a convincing amount of evidence to show that many of the notables of Lucknow liquidated their assets to maintain, as long as it was possible, the style to which they were accustomed, that many of the ex-King's wives muddled through life pawning pieces of jewellery, selling silver, and even the furnishings of their once splendid homes while the mahajans turned this disaster into an opportunity for obtaining vast hoards of wealth.² They now had recourse to British courts of law and the machinery that enforced the law to recover their loans or force auctions of the debtors' assets. The more prominent bankers in the city, like Benarsi Das, Makhan Lall and Girdhari Lall, by dubious acts of "loyalty" -- like testifying against the old trustess in the Hooseinabad Trust case -- found themselves in chairs in the municipal committee and elsewhere serving as the Hindu "representatives" of the people of Lucknow.

The Taluqdars

Though the royal elite did not vanish with dramatic suddenness, they found themselves generally reduced in substance, status and style; only the materially fittest survived as an "elite" at all. The fittest among the economic survivors were those who acknowledged the new political reality and sought to be reckoned among the local allies of the British

¹Mir Ahmad Ali, ed., Insha-yi Suroor (3rd ed.; Lucknow: Newal Kishore Press, 1887), p. 17. This is a collection of Suroor's letters in Urdu edited by his son.

²Ibid., pp. 30-34. Also see the intercepted correspondence between the ex-King and members of his family left in Lucknow, Foreign/Secret, 27 August 1858, no. 230, NAI and Karnamah, 13 October 1873 and 2 February 1874. In interviews in 1976 Karbalai Nawab of Chowk and his several male relatives blamed the banias more than the departure of the Oudh court for the ruin of the noble families.

government. Their supremacy as an "aristocratic" group, however, was challenged by a new group that made its appearance on the urban scene only after 1858 and that steadily became the stalwart urban elite group in British Lucknow: these were the taluqdars of Oudh. This transformation of these rural rajahs, into an urban elite that dominated the mufussil just as the nawabi elite had dominated the court, was an interesting process which took more than four decades to accomplish. We will examine the early stages of the structural and functional changes within this group, and the attitudinal changes of the government of Lucknow which made this transformation possible. The taluqdars of Oudh have received very adequate scholarly attention as a rural elite.¹ I hope to reconstruct their impact on the city itself.

A reorganization of landholdings in Oudh was undertaken in 1858 to rectify the error made immediately after annexation, when land and revenue was settled with the ryots. The reorganization reinstated the landlord. The result was the "talukdari system,"² which was not unlike

¹For a detailed discussion of the taluqdars of Oudh, see the following works: T.R. Metcalf, The Aftermath of Revolt; T.R. Metcalf's two chapters, "From Rajah to Landlord" and "Social Effects of British Land Policy in Oudh," in Land Control and Social Structure in Indian History, edited by R.E. Frykenberg (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), pp. 123-141 and 142-161; Peter Musgrave, "Landlords and Lords of the Land: Estate Management and Social Control in Uttar Pradesh 1860-1920," Modern Asian Studies 6,3 (1972), pp. 257-275; E.I. Brodtkin, "The Struggle for Succession: Rebels and Loyalists in the Indian Mutiny of 1857," Modern Asian Studies 6,3 (1972), pp. 277-290; Eric Stokes, The Peasant and the Raj; Studies in Agrarian Society and Peasant Rebellion in Colonial India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); and Elizabeth Whitcombe, Agrarian Conditions in Northern India, vol. 1: The United Provinces Under British Rule 1860-1900 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972).

²The explanation of this sytem is summarized from the works cited in the previous footnote, chiefly Metcalf's Aftermath of Revolt, pp. 134-173.

the Zamindari Settlement in Bengal in 1793. The immediate reaction of the British, after subduing the insurrection in the province in 1858, was to punish the obstreperous taluqdars around whom, according to the British, the reactionary peasantry (with whom they had so generously settled the land in 1856) inexplicably rallied against British forces. But the folly of pursuing a vengeful policy that would alienate the taluqdars further and preserve them as enemies of the state was quickly sensed by General Outram, who had succeeded Montgomery as chief commissioner of Oudh, and he managed not only to mitigate the harsh confiscatory clauses of governor general Canning's Proclamation but to convert them in practice into a veritable Magna Carta that enshrined the rights of this class of landholders. He assured the taluqdars that the reward for submission and future loyalty would be very generous: far from confiscating their property, the British government would recognise them as proprietors of their estates, consider claims that they had brushed aside in 1856, give them legal and military protection against neighbours, and bestow upon the best among them the authority to act as deputy magistrates. They would then be able to adjudicate civil and criminal disputes among the populace on their own estates. The making of these great concessions, which were seen by contemporaries as the pacification of belligerents rather than rebels, was the political masterstroke that ensured the loyalty of the taluqdars and gave them real cause to believe that their own rights and strengths were inseparable from the stability and strength of the Raj. In time they were extended additional legal protection by the passing of the Oudh Estates Act of 1869 that made the law of primogeniture applicable to the succession on taluqdari estates. This was intended to keep these estates from becoming fragmented over the years in much the same way as estates were preserved intact over generations

in Britain.

The other danger to a taluqdar's estate was his own profligacy and indebtedness that often led to the sale of the taluqas, or estates, to pay off creditors. So the bet was further hedged by the Encumbered Estates Act of 1870 by which any taluqdar could request government management of his debt-encumbered estate for up to twenty years. The taluqdar would receive a fixed maintenance allowance, and the surplus over the government revenue demand would be used to service the debt. Thus a landed, hereditary aristocracy was created "as a purely political measure" and subsequent legislation was designed to save from destruction "the great experiment being tried in Oudh, on which so much had been staked since the Mutiny."¹ The experiment had conspicuous success in Oudh; this unequivocal warranty of the taluqdars' rights and powers by the British won for them an almost sycophantic loyalty and grovelling affection from the taluqdars of Oudh. Such was the formal quid pro quo.

The taluqdari system, though ostensibly a restoration of the aristocracy, amounted, in substance, to a revolution in the role and definition of a taluqdar as they had been understood in nawabi Oudh. The taluqdar's pre-annexation role, that of a "locality leader or petty rajah found its last effective expression in the joint enterprise of 1857,"² when he still had some semblance of political power. The rebellion transformed Oudh into a conquered territory; the taluqdari forts were systematically demolished and the armed retainers attached to each rajah were disbanded. The British army, police, and law courts penetrated every district in the province, and the taluqdars found themselves abruptly relieved of their

¹Ibid., p. 160.

²Metcalf, "From Rajah to Landlord," p. 138.

former quasi-political functions. They were now "landlords" and they devoted themselves to exploiting their underproprietors, forgoing the traditional "deference" of people on their estates for increased rentals.¹

A similarly profound change informed the relationship of the taluqdars to the rulers in the capital city. In pre-annexation Oudh, the taluqdars, though they may have occasionally approached the ruler in Lucknow for protection against his provincial administrators, or for the reaffirmation of their rights and status, were often antagonistic to the government.² Those who had recurring problems with the court on account of revenue payments retained a wakil, or agent, to sort them out, thereby avoiding both unnecessary trips to the capital and acrimonious confrontations with the King's henchmen:

Not a member of the landed aristocracy ventures into the capital of Lucknow, or could I believe be induced to venture into it without the pledges of some powerful member of his order for his personal security and safe conduct back to his estate.³

Taluqdars and zamindars were often prevented from obtaining an audience with the King by threats and even physical molestation, and the guards stationed around the city and the palace gates were instructed to obstruct "complainants from the country" from gaining entrance into the court.⁴ Instead of being treated as the rural elite they were perceived as a villainous lot to be kept at bay. There was, in fact, an

¹Ibid., p. 127.

²Fisher, p. 204.

³Resident to Secretary to the GOI with the Governor General, 23 February 1849, Foreign/Political Consultations, 21 April 1849, no. 108. Cited in Fisher, p. 205.

⁴Resident to Secretary to GOI in the Secret Department, 1 May 1833, Foreign/Sectet Proceedings, 16 May 1833, no. 2. Cited in Fisher, p. 205.

entire absence of all sympathy, and . . . communication between the court and aristocracy of the capital, and the landed aristocracy of the provinces, or districts. . . . They [the aristocracy of the capital] would none of them be safe a single night beyond the capital or cantonments. They would be plundered and destroyed by the landholders.¹

In British Oudh, with the taluqdari system in effect, the taluqdars not only dared to venture with increasing frequency, but were always invited to the capital as the special guests of the new regime. They became a recognisable elite in the urban arena, and as the decades passed, more and more an absentee landlord group which had become politically dispensable which returned to the land only at harvest time to collect rents:

Socially they have been treated as honoured favourites of the Government, instead of its natural and, at best, its tolerated enemies. They enjoy a degree of personal liberty and consideration to which they were formerly strangers. They can come and go whither they will, they may array themselves in silk, and drive their carriages in the streets of Lucknow, privileges which were never conceded to them by the Nawabs or the Kings of Oudh.²

The creation of a British Indian Association in Lucknow in 1861 modelled on the Calcutta institution of the same name, gave this assortment of rajput and Muslim taluqdars and loyal parvenus who had been raised to the same status by the British, an institutional base. Metcalf concludes that though this Association had periods of great activity chiefly related to warding off threats to the rights of the taluqdars, it was dependent on the initiative of its Bengali "babu" founder and secretary, Dakshinranjan Mukherjee, and its vice-president, Rajah Man Singh of Ayodhya. But the

¹Resident to Secretary to GOI with the Governor General, 23 February 1849, Foreign/Political Consultations, 21 April 1849, no. 100. Cited in Fisher, p. 207.

²Irwin, Garden of India, vol. 2, p. 63.

Association failed as an institutional expression of the shared ties and values of a genuine aristocracy.¹ Metcalf's conclusion is sound, but it underestimates the practical and ceremonial role of this institution which brought together an hitherto recalcitrant group and reinforced the vows of loyalty that bound them to the British Raj. The Association had insinuated them into Lucknow society as an elite, with far more access to the British than their nawabi counterparts. It was also different in being a modern organization. The members were anonymous and could let the impersonal voice of the institution express their grievances. It gave the British the reciprocal advantage of keeping track of their collective opinion, channeled through this urban organization. With the taluqdars on their side, it is possible to understand the less generous treatment the British meted out to the nawabi elite. The political equation had been reversed. Instead of depending, as the King had done, on the civic gentry for loyal allegiance, the British depended more heavily on the rural gentry for support, and they converted them into urbanites.

The evidence of their enlarged responsibilities in the city and their urban presence has not been rigorously examined or interpreted. The taluqdars were gratuitously ensconced in one of the more splendid palace complexes in Lucknow, the Kaiserbagh, in November 1861, shortly after the Association was formed. One of the royal suites served as the Association office, and the remainder of the sprawling buildings were carved into several apartments where the taluqdars could reside on their expected trips into the city.² These apartments soon became the town houses of the country "gentlemen."

¹Metcalf, "Social Effects of British Land Policy in Oudh," *passim*.

²File no. 1, p. 2, BIA papers, JNML.

The Kaiserbagh had been built by the last King of Oudh, Wajid Ali Shah, to house his ever-growing harem, and it is ironic that the British, who set about so conscientiously to "woo" the taluqdars, should offer them these zenana suites as their first physical urban base.

The taluqdars lost no time in making judicious purchases of real estate, particularly of the large nuzul palaces which the government could spare, to substantiate their image as "aristocrats." The palace complex of Padshah Bagh was bought by the Maharajah of Kapurthala and that of the Moti Mahal by the Maharajah of Balrampore.¹ They also collectively petitioned and procured thirty acres of land just east of Hazratgunj to construct "a large, handsome building" to be called "Wingfield Manzil," in gratitude to Charles Wingfield, the chief commissioner of Oudh (1859-66) who had warmly aided them in the early phase of their transition from being an ill-respected and unwelcome group to a palace-dwelling elite in the city.² This building was endowed as a dharamshala, a combination rest house for travellers and home for the needy. The plans included the building of a large gunj along the Ghaziuddin Hyder Canal, near the manzil, for "public benefit." This was achieved by the eviction of the cultivators on this land by the municipal committee with the promise of compensation by the taluqdars.³ When the Maharajah of Balrampore also applied for a licence to build a gunj along the main road leading from the Macchi Bhawan fort to the railway station, the deputy commissioner demurred in sanctioning a

¹Karnamah, 26 May 1873, VNR.

²Memo no. 491 of 13 April 1864, basta no. 69, "Municipal," MCRR.

³Ibid.

project that would require the uprooting "of upwards of a hundred proprietors."¹ Acting in what appears to be in direct opposition to the deputy commissioner's wishes, the Maharajah arrived at a private settlement with the men whom his project displaced. The next we hear from the deputy commissioner is a brief acknowledgement simply that: "the gunje is being proceeded with."² The taluqdars, particularly the principal ones, were not averse to overriding the wishes of the civic authorities since the most senior provincial official, the chief commissioner, was their patron and protector.

The taluqdars' appetite for property in the capital increased with the passing decades. Not only was city real estate a good investment, but the attractions of city life, and its superior cultural, medical and educational facilities made these acquisitions as necessary as they were wise. By the 1920s a large area in the civil lines along straight broad roads had developed into a new complex of palaces and gardens built by the taluqdars.³ The Rajah of Jehangirabad extended the two ends of Hazratgunj market by adding two imposing double-storied, arcaded blocks of shops and flats and let them to European merchants for good rents. Jehangirabad became the single largest private owner of civic property in the civil lines, and these investments made him a far more prestigious taluqdar than the size of his estate would have warranted.⁴

¹Letter from Deputy Commissioner to Commissioner, Lucknow Division, 30 March 1861, file no. 446, BRLD, UPSA.

²Letter from the Deputy Commissioner to the Commissioner, Lucknow Division, 26 June 1861, file no. 446, BRLD, UPSA.

³After a survey of this area in 1976 I discovered that the taluqdars of Balrampore, Bhinga, Jehangirabad, Katesar, Kasmanda, Nanpara, Tikari, Tiloi, and Tirwa, to name only the prominent ones, maintain, to this day, these immense, turn-of-the-century architecturally curious "palaces."

⁴This information is based on an interview with a senior clerk of the Board of Revenue (who wished to remain anonymous) on 28 January 1976.

The taluqdars gathered and milled frequently in Lucknow for extended periods of time. They began simultaneously to acquire a taste for the luxury goods of local manufacture used by the nawabi elite, such as fine embroidered clothing, shoes, caps and perfume, as well as for the artifacts and household furnishings of the ruling elite, such as clocks, teacups and grand pianos imported from Europe.

Another civic institution they patronized was the courtesan. In an interview in September 1976, Gulbadan, a retired courtesan in her middle seventies, discussed the impact of the rural gentry on her profession. In the perception of the average courtesan, who had enjoyed the patronage of the nawabi elite, however, the taluqdars and zamindars were only "second best." "The problem was not money, for the taluqdars had plenty of that," she explained, "it was that they were dehati [villagers] who lacked refinement in speech and manners."¹ We [the courtesans] had been used to men with delicacy and good taste. These 'rustics' could not appreciate an evening of music or dance as the town notables could. But they were the men with money, so even we were forced to make our compromises. . . . Our houses would have become deserted ruins if it wasn't for the jaghirdars and taluqdars . . . we were invited to perform at the Baradari by the managers of the Anjuman [British Indian Association] to entertain the British officers who were their guests at several davaten [feasts] and jalsae [functions] but we were not appreciated. . . . We did our best but there was nothing to compare with a small private audience of cultured and appreciative people from nawabi khandan [family, lineage]."² The courtesans were frequently invited out to the

¹ Interview with Gulbadan, Lucknow, September 1976.

estates as well, and received extravagant gifts, but their hearts were in the musical soirees in the chowk of the old city. The courtesans, famed for their cultural snobbery, were the socially accepted guardians of the nawabi cultural and aesthetic standards. They are therefore a reliable indicator of the prestige and the degree of acceptance accorded to the rural elite by the natives of the capital. Gulbadan's analysis is a very sophisticated one, which accords with Sjoberg's claims that the urban character of the elite goes unrecognised by most social scientists:

They impute to the peasantry in traditional China, India and other societies a way of life that is realized fully only among the upper class, city dwellers par excellence. . . . We reiterate that throughout the preindustrialized civilized world the upper class, and above all the society's ruling stratum, is urban in nature.¹

He goes on to say that strong emphasis is given to manners, dress, and speech in the preindustrial city. "Speech," he states,

another personal attribute, is a highly sensitive status indicator in the feudal order. Upper- and lower-class persons employ quite divergent linguistic patterns, as do suburban groups within classes; ruralities vs. urbanities, men vs. women, old people vs. young people, and occupational groups too.²

This is particularly true of Lucknow, where the elite spoke a Persianized Urdu and the people in the dehat (countryside) spoke a dialect of Hindi called Awadhi.

The taluqdars and their British Indian Association sponsored other noteworthy institutions in the city, such as the Canning College (which later became the University of Lucknow), Colvin Taluqdars' College, and several charitable hospitals, trusts, and funds. With the passion of social upstarts

¹Gideon Sjoberg, The Preindustrial City (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 110-113.

²Ibid., p. 128.

for status and its symbols, they plunged into many civic-minded acts, that not only pleased the British since they signified loyalty (and hospitals made the city healthier), but were reported in the local newspapers and created a favourable, or at least less negative, image of them in the minds of the natives.

The Maharajah of Balrampore, for instance, went to Calcutta and observed the zeal with which the zamindars of Bengal acquitted themselves in public service and declared upon his return to Lucknow that he had finally "emerged from dark despotism."¹ Infected with the Calcutta spirit he consulted with the commander-in-chief of the Indian Army and reached the conclusion that Lucknow's most pressing need was a hospital built on a European model. The Rajah was pleased to finance it.² He gave two lakhs of rupees, one for the building and equipment and the other to be used as the endowment for operating expenses. It was to be a most modern and efficient hospital of sixty-two beds for both European and Indian patients. In May 1869 Chief Commissioner Davies laid the foundation stone of the Balrampore Hospital that would be a proud "ornament of the city."³ This was the climax of a decade of enthusiastic involvement by the taluqdars in bringing the European medical revolution to the city, to other provincial towns, and their estates. Donations for dispensaries and for the salaries of civil surgeons were generous enough to save the government its own rather modest contribution of five hundred rupees for provincial medical facilities.⁴

¹Pioneer, 31 May 1869.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Report on the Administration of Oudh, 1959-60, p. 45.

The invisible but firm hand of the government directed the taluqdars into public service oriented expenditure. The government chastised them for their "ruinous prodigality" in celebrating marriages and giving dowries, because they feared that this "would plunge every great family in Oudh into pecuniary embarrassment, and a needy landed aristocracy cannot discharge the duties of the position Government expected its members to occupy when it conferred on their estates in perpetuity."¹

The taluqdars responded generously to all government directives to give aid to ameliorate distress in the city or even abroad. During the American Civil War, for example, the mills in Lancashire lay idle and fourteen thousand workers became unemployed. The taluqdars promptly set up a Colonel Abbott's Fund -- Abbott being the commissioner -- to which they gave five thousand rupees each, a sum equal to the annual revenue payments of the smallest taluqdars. They also persuaded the gentry of the city to contribute liberally. Several lakhs of rupees were despatched for the relief of the cotton mill workers in Lancashire even though many in Lucknow could have used this "aid" far more urgently.² This philanthropy, it appears, was seen as an opportunity to reaffirm the rapprochement between the British and the men of "rank and influence" of Oudh, and an impressive gesture of the loyalty the taluqdars ungrudgingly gave to the British till the Raj collapsed in 1947. This loyalty was even further demonstrated when the

¹Letter no. 638 of 1863 from Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, to the Honorary Secretary, BIA, Oudh, 25 March 1863. Cited in the Report on the Administration of Oudh 1862-63, p. 37. The reference was to the wedding of Raja Rustumshah of Dera's niece where thirty-five thousand people were royally feasted for six days. The chief commissioner in a circular letter to all taluqdars strongly urged that the BIA should seriously consider measures that would limit wedding expenses that left the taluqdari estates crippled with debt.

²Oudh Akhbar, issues of 24 September, and 10 and 17 October 1862.

Prince of Wales became ill in 1871 and the "people of India were exhorted to bestow propitiary offerings for his recovery"; the notables of Lucknow and the "chiefs and princes, with one mind, engaged themselves in prayer and devotion . . . [which behavior] is a convincing proof of their loyalty and devotion to the Sovereign. . . ." ¹

With such a complete command over the men of wealth in the society, the colonial government never encouraged, or even hinted at the possibility, of productive investments in the city. The arrival of the full colonial establishment had severely damaged the business of native luxury industry; there was ample labour, capital and raw materials that could have been channeled into employment and goods producing ventures to replenish the sagging nawabi economy. However such honest initiatives were not dreamed of in the colonial philosophy. Instead the colonial government dictated the expansion of poppy cultivation on the taluqdari and zamindari estates to increase the production of opium² for their own trade and profit even though food shortages and famines were a constant problem.

The charities that existed in the city (see Table 7) were capable of providing temporary relief to some of the impoverished sections of the population but did not provide any long term solutions for people who had lost their jobs. The Urdu paper of the BIA was aware of the nature of the indigence in Lucknow and expressed the opinion that income from endowments, including the large religious endowments, "instead of being spent in the distribution of alms, might with advantage be laid out in establishing

¹Oudh Akhbar, 19 January 1872, VNR.

²Translation of a letter addressed to the Talookdars of Oudh, Government resolution no. 2090, 25 March 1870, file no. 1979, part IV, p. 917, BROG, UPSA.

TABLE 7

PRIVATELY ENDOWED CHARITIES RUN BY THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE IN
LUCKNOW, 1876

Name	Number aided annually	Purpose
1. New Charity Fund (endowed by Muslims)	13,973	Relief to the old and infirm of ex-King's family and other respectable families; not for the poor.
2. King's Charity Fund (Christian)	56,210	Monthly stipends are given to 162 pensioners and dole of grain to the poor.
3. Relief to European vagrants and poor	-	Pecuniary assistance to dis- tressed Europeans and "East Indians."
4. Baillie Fund	400	Monthly pensions to destitute widows of loyal sepoys.

Source: Report on the Administration of Lucknow, 1875-76, Appendix III, p. ccxxv. There was, in addition, Ghaziuddin Hyder's Poor House.

workhouses and industrial arts schools, which will confer a permanent and lasting good upon the poor."¹ Such seeds however were not encouraged to germinate because mill-made piece goods from Britain were a convenient substitute for falling local production. The feudal ideals reinforced by the British probably strengthened the aversion toward entrepreneurial activity among the taluqdars. It was also in the taluqdars' interest to concentrate on being loyal and to notice "with pleasure" such events as "the establishment, under the auspices of Sir George Couper, of a new alms-

¹Akhbar-i Anjuman-i Hind (Lucknow) 3 October 1874, VNR.

house in connection with the Hooseinabad in Lucknow, besides the Government almshouse introduced by General L. Barrow."¹

Members of the wealthy classes afflicted with the loyalty syndrome made massive investments in government paper, which they viewed with trust, and which indeed had become the only outlet for their "productive" investment. Almost all wasiqadars had some money locked into promissory notes, as did even the large royal trusts such as the Hooseinabad Trust. Over and above the monies of endowments invested in government paper (see Table 8), and all note of deposits held by banks, the citizens of Lucknow also managed to invest heavily in government securities. After his penetrating

TABLE 8

SAVINGS OF PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS INVESTED IN GOVERNMENT PAPER

Year	Rupees	Year	Rupees
1832-33	137,000	1865	1,182,900
1833-36	456,400	1870	74,500
1842-43	3,359,400	1872	326,000
1853-54	15,500	1878	16,500
1854-55	4,880,700	1879	116,600
		Total	10,565,500

Source: William Hoey, A Monograph on Trade and Manufactures of Northern India (Lucknow: American Methodist Mission Press, 1880), pp. 43-44.

survey of the condition of trade and industry in post-nawabi Lucknow, Hoey, the excise commissioner of the province, came to the conclusion that "there

¹Akhbar-i Anjuman-i Hind (Lucknow), 24 October 1874, VNR.

is more a want of field for the employment of capital in productive industry in Lucknow than a want of capital."¹

Urban Taluqdars

The argument so far has been that the taluqdars were slowly urbanized under the patronage of the British. They "improved" their image by philanthropic acts and acquired the status of a powerful elite group in a city where their presence was once anathema. It may be added that urban notables queued after taluqas -- now that they were safe investments protected by the British. The commercial elite of the city, like the bankers Benarsi Das and Makhan Lall, who accumulated lands by foreclosing the titles of lesser debtor zamindars with an annual jama [revenue] of Rs. 5,000² were admitted to the ranks of the taluqdars. These two appear to have been the de facto treasurers of the B.I.A., since the chief treasurer, the Maharaja of Kapurthala, lived on his estate in the Punjab. The maharaja probably was appointed to that office because he was one of the "big three" in Oudh, rather than for his ability in accounting.³ The secretary of the Association was a Bengali, Dukhinaranjan Mukherjee, who had come with the British baggage as they moved into Oudh in 1856 and was given part of the confiscated taluqa of Shankerpur in Rae Bareli district.⁴

¹Hoey, p. 44.

²The minimum revenue demand on land had to be Rs. 5,000 or more for a landowner to qualify as a taluqdar under the British.

³The other two of the "big three" were Maharaja Drigbijay Singh of Balrampur, who was president of the Association, and Maharaja Man Singh of Mahdaun, vice-president. See file no. 1 (in Urdu) BIA papers, JNML.

⁴Ibid.

By virtue of loyalty, new men were infused into old ranks, and the "taluqdar" group with its new image and influence made membership in it desirable even for those who had a niche in some other elite group in the city. The new esteem in which the "native aristocracy" or the "Barons of Oudh" were held by the British seems to have made the acquisition of a taluqa the capstone of a successful commercial career in the city. Estate management was increasingly passing into the hands of managers, or "lords of the land," from the "landlords" themselves. Since estates were often scattered in several districts, this was almost a necessity. The business of collecting rents was troublesome and expensive, so it was farmed out to thekadars, or rent farmers, who often belonged to urban money-lending and grain-trading groups. They, "in return for paying the correct amount of rent in cash in advance, were allowed a free hand in the management of estates."¹ Other estate owners engaged bureaucratic managers to husband their estates. This practice made it increasingly possible for the taluqdars to spend prolonged spells in the city, politicking with or entertaining the British and living lives of genteel leisure in a far more interesting environment than the mufussil where their presence was no longer necessary to enforce their rights. These were now formally, legally, and permanently embodied in their title. City bankers therefore could be taluqdars on the side.

The most interesting example of a man who combined taluqdari status with extraordinary commercial and public activity in the city was Daroga Wajid Ali. The story of the daroga stands out as the most spectacular success story of this troubled period, when nawabi servants were under suspicion and their financial condition was becoming progressively more dire. It also

¹P.J. Musgrave, "Landlords and Lords of the Land," pp. 266-267.

clearly illustrates the dynamics of "loyalty" as a force that changed the destinies of men. The daroga was one of the few men in the recaptured city who possessed indubitable proof of loyalty: he had saved the lives of the wife and daughter of the brave Captain Orr and of a Miss Jackson by a daring strategem vividly recaptured in the "instant-replay" style histories of the "mutiny."¹ He received -- "for his service in protecting certain ladies and offering them kindness at the time of their captivity and for shewing better feeling generally towards Europeans at a period of anarchy,"² -- a cash reward of a lakh of rupees. This launched him on a career of accumulating property and building gunjes, while still practicing his nawabi profession of a mahal daroga by helping distraught begums in their legal tangles with the new regime.

Daroga Wajid Ali mastered the art of what must be called "attrition by petition," and we have sampled a few of his petitions in chapter three. In one of his innumerable petitions to successive chief commissioners of Oudh, he requested "consideration" for his signal act of loyalty, and claimed that he had "purchased" an estate that, "by the kindness of your predecessors," had been entered into the taluqdars' list.³ This "purchase" was a curious one, and deserves to be looked at more closely.⁴

¹For the Daroga Wajid Ali episode see: G. Hutchinson, Narrative of the Mutinies in Oudh, Compiled from Authentic Records (London: Smith Elder and Company, 1859), pp. 223-236; and J.W. Kaye, A History of the Sepoy War in India, 1857-58, 3 vols. (3rd ed.; London: W.H. Allen & Co., 1865), vol. 3, pp. 290-292.

²Memo on Mir Wajid Ali's Case, No. 2403, 1 December 1965, file no. 864, P. 126, BRLD, UPSA.

³Petition of Daroga Mir Wajid Ali to Sir George Cowper, Bart., Chief Commissioner of Oudh, undated (probably July 1874), file 1931, BRLD, UPSA.

⁴Most of this is taken from file no. 864, BRLD, UPSA.

When the settlement commenced in certain villages near Lucknow -- "in the absence of zemindars" who had either joined the rebels or did not return to "take charge of villages overrun in 1858/59 by troops and much deteriorated" -- Wajid Ali "came forward" and "in some cases" remitted the arrears of rent and obtained leases for them as "moostajer" (rentier, lessee).¹ Once in possession of these, the daroga drew up a list of seventeen villages with the total annual revenue of nearly Rs. 10,000, and on that basis requested a taluqdari sannad, which would not only give him instant "aristocratic" rank but also confirm him as proprietor instead of a farmer. This petition² was stoutly opposed by Abbott, the commissioner, who had the claim investigated and discovered that for six of the seventeen villages he had only the rights of a thekadar, or lessee; three were mortgaged to him by a zamindar "by private bargain, which is likely any day to terminate, [and] cannot of course be included in the sunnud";³ two had been erroneously represented by a district officer "who did not report that they were merely held in farm and not in proprietary right";⁴ one had been claimed as compensation for a village that did not belong to him (but was farmed/leased by him) in the first place, but, the deputy commissioner conceded, that "we cannot well cancel that order now"; and two others "the Chief Commissioner . . . decides . . . cannot be given."⁵ This left only four villages to which he had any legitimate right at all,

¹Ibid., p. 126.

²Ibid., p. 1. "Humble Petition of Daroga Meer [Wajid Ali]" dated 9 December 1860.

³Ibid., p. 20. Abbott (Commissioner) to Wingfield (Chief Commissioner), 18 July 1861.

⁴Ibid., p. 21. This strongly suggests that the daroga was using his cash reward to "purchase" his estate in a rather indirect fashion.

⁵Ibid., p. 22.

and Abbott saw "no occasion on such holdings to constitute him a talookdar."¹

The indefatigable daroga appealed again to the chief commissioner and claimed that his rights in these villages were being wrongly construed as "mostajeeree" because they were rights given for loyalty and good services and such rights "could not be resumed."² He argued that he was basing his case not "on Outram's proclamation, which applied only to the city of Lucknow, but on the Governor General's proclamation of 10th March 1858 confiscating almost all lands in Oudh," and therefore, "under existing circumstances I cannot but be entitled to the sunnud of Talookaree which I beg you will be pleased to grant."³ On the 13th of March 1863, the "Darogah Sahib" was informed that the chief commissioner could not reverse the orders of his predecessor, so a sannad could not be granted to him.⁴

The daroga, as might be expected, went into appeal. In 1865, the commissioner, who prepared a memorandum on this complex case, tended to lean on the side of the daroga. He believed Wajid Ali's assertion that he had "attached no importance to this expression [moostajeeree]" and "if he had been aware of the farming clause he might have had the villages confirmed to him."⁵ He had also allegedly "spent a good deal of his Lac of Rupees reward on his lands, he has proved a good landlord, given up his idle court habits and taken to farming, he was one of the very few Court people who

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 98. Translation of Urdu petition to Chief Commissioner, Oudh, 11 April 1862.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., p. 106. Revenue Department Memo no. 700, 13 March 1863.

⁵Ibid., p. 128. Memorandum on Mir Wajid Ally's Case.

did any real service to the British Government."¹ The case dragged on, and though even the "discreditable rapacity on the part of the darogah to claim further compensation for lands," was noticed,² he was finally awarded the sannad on the basis of the commissioner submitting "in his No. 1522 dated 25th July/66 . . . an entirely different view of this claim to the Financial Commr. in which that officer concurred."³

(This "entirely different view" is not on file.) It seems that in the end it was a consideration of "his good services" that won out and all the objections based on the legal and real distinctions between rights of lessees and proprietors which were raised, only delayed, but did not stop, the daroga from getting onto the list of taluqdars.

Even a complete outsider, the bright, independent entrepreneurial genius Munshi Newal Kishore, who left his job at the famous Kohinoor Press in Lahore to set up an independent printing press, and having rapidly acquired enormous fame and a vast fortune, found himself angling for British titles and recognition to furbish his social standing. Munshi Newal Kishore, who might properly be regarded as the Dwarkanath Tagore of Oudh, not only made of his small printing shop the first and most prolific press in all Asia, with branches in Kanpur and Lahore, but he also launched and edited the famous Oudh Akhbar, established the Upper India Paper Mill, and the Lucknow Iron Works. The family's interests were expanded by the addition of two modern banks, the Newal Kishore Ice Factory, and prime real estate in the city. Yet his son saw himself primarily as a large landed proprietor with a zamindari

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 177. Capper to Barrow, Financial Commissioner, 29 December 1866.

³Ibid., p. 181. No. 111 of 1867 from Officiating Financial Commissioner to the Commissioner, Lucknow Division, 17 January 1867.

in Aligarh district.¹

Such cases are important to understand not only the change in attitude of the formerly rival urban group toward the "rustic" and rural elite group but also the growth of a new, active hybrid group -- composed of individuals of both royal and taluqdar groups -- that came to "represent" class rather than group interests. It was a handful of men who took the lead in the municipal committee, the British Indian Association, the Canning College, and any other collaborative venture between the rulers and the ruled in Lucknow. The existence of this class was underscored when the question of constituting special and general committees for the control of the endowed charities in Lucknow arose in 1868. Col. Barrow, now the financial commissioner of Oudh, recommended the names from among the "principal Natives of Lucknow, [who were] convinced of the benefits of . . . this charity [The Poor Fund], have been administering it well and [when] put on their honour to determine who the recipients would be, they work admirably."² The men named were members of the municipal committee, like Daroga Wajid Ali, Mirza Abbas Beg, and Agha Ali Khan, and the three principal taluqdars, "all liberal subscribers" to charitable causes, and were trustworthy enough by English standards to oversee the management of the native trusts.³ The taluqdars were now reckoned as a city elite, with the other city notables, and served on local committees.

¹Prag Narain Bhargava, ed., Who's Who in India, Containing Lives and Portraits of Ruling Chiefs, Nobles, Titled Personages and Other Eminent Indians, 2 vols. (Lucknow: Newal Kishore Press, 1911), vol. 2, p. 169.

²Report, from Col. L. Barrow, Financial Commissioner, to Maj. J.F. MacAndrew, Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, "Administration of Certain Endowed Charities in Lucknow," 11 April 1868, Foreign Department, General A proceedings, nos. 33-36, NAI.

³Ibid.

The Poor Fund had been inaugurated to combat the distress caused in Lucknow by the famine in Orissa (1868), "when the demand for grain" and its export "enormously increased the prices in Lucknow" and brought even the well-to-do sections of the population "to nearly a state of starvation."¹ Barrow was astonished by the taluqdars' response to this crisis:

The landed interest came forward with so large a permanent subscription to support the families of the fallen nobles of an extinct dynasty, for there has really never been anything in common between the nobles and the talookdars. In recognition of the benefits they [the latter] have received from our Government, they have liberally contributed towards the maintenance of those who have suffered by it.²

The generosity of the landed interests to a class which had been arrogant and antagonistic to it in the past may perhaps also be attributed to the change in its perceptions and values; they learnt to appreciate the "aristocratic" values and tastes, which they were forced to adopt to substantiate the British image of them as the "Barons of Oudh."

Education

The partnership between the British and their local allies was further cemented by the creation of Canning College. This institution, which introduced western liberal education for Indians, was endowed by the taluqdars, managed by solicitous bureaucrats, and staffed by European teachers. The government endowed Wards' Institution was an educational experiment in the same spirit. These institutions were part of an accelerated impetus for the dissemination of western education among the upper crust of native society, since the "mutiny"

¹Ibid., p. 4.

²Ibid., p. 5.

had proved that educated Indians were loyal subjects.¹

Canning College was conceived by the taluqdars as a memorial to the late Earl Canning and was to be supported by a perpetual endowment

from the profits of our Talooquas, a sum equal to One per Cent. upon the respective Sudder Jummas [government revenue demand] of our Talooquas, particularised as follows, That is to say, eight annas [half a rupee] for the expenses of the "CANNING COLLEGE," and eight annas per cent. for the expenses of the BRITISH INDIAN ASSOCIATION OF OUDH.²

The government agreed to give a matching grant-in-aid for the college, bringing its annual income up to Rs. 45,000.³ By 1869 it had 768 students on the rolls, of whom 62 per cent were sons of private and government servants, 18 per cent belonged to banking and professional families, and a disappointingly low six per cent were sons of landholders. The "poor" were not represented.⁴ The small numbers from taluqdari families did not seriously foil British purposes because all the other students belonged to those segments of society whose loyalty and cooperation was equally essential to the Raj.

The taluqdars enjoyed the status attached to being the founders of the foremost educational institution in the province, and were jealous of their power to constitute half the managing committee (the other half being

¹Metcalf, Aftermath of Revolt, p. 133. The wider question of education in Oudh in general and Lucknow in particular has been the subject of intensive scholarly analysis and controversy; cf. Paul R. Brass, Language, Religion, and Politics in North India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974); Robinson, Separatism Among Indian Muslims; and Metcalf, Aftermath of Revolt, pp. 92-133. The discussion here will be limited to the effect of education on the loyal elite.

²Deed of Endowment, dated 27 February 1864, BIA papers, JNML.

³Letter no. 1261, Secretary to GOI to Chief Commissioner of Oudh, 7 July 1864; attached to Deed of Endowment, 27 February 1864, BIA papers, JNML.

⁴The Gazetteer of the Province of Oudh, 3 vols. (Allahabad: North West Provinces and Oudh Government Press, 1877), vol. 2, p. 385.

government officials or their nominees) and the responsibility for its operation. They rejected the suggestion of amalgamating the college with the education department, even though this meant forfeiting government pensions for the teachers, P.W.D. maintenance of the physical plant, a grant from the government for future expansion, and supplements for professors' salaries. They feared that "their connection with the College will either cease or their power will be lessened,"¹ if they chose to let the college become a formal part of the government.

Whether the taluqdars founded the Canning College as a monument of their loyalty or as an expression of their own "wise leadership," it certainly brought them the unexpected dividend of enhanced power and prestige with the local urban elite. The latter were compelled to approach the B.I.A. or its individual members to admit their sons to the school. The government, too, added to the taluqdar's sense of prestige by lending their aura and expertise to the institution. The earlier "stringent interdict" against government expenditure on education was relaxed "so as to allow of support being given . . . to the superior schools for the education of the sons of talookdars and of the leading native gentry, which the Chief Commissioner [Wingfield] had laboured to establish . . ." since this would ultimately facilitate "freer intercourse" between officials and influential natives in the English language.²

The government pinned even greater hopes for moulding the character of the native elite on the Lucknow Wards' Institution, modelled after the

¹Letter for the Director of Public Instruction, Oudh, to Secretary, B.I.A., dated 4 September 1873, file packet no. 3, BIA papers, JNML.

²Report on the Administration of Oudh, 1859-60, p. 22.

Benaras Wards' Institution of the North West Provinces. The object of the Lucknow institution was the "Boarding and Education of minors under the care of the Court of Wards" and other sons of taluqdars that were sent to it.¹ It superintended "the moral training and the instruction" of its pupils. Since it was thought to be too ambitious to undertake to "provide for all the sons of the native gentry" it would be limited to those

whose conduct in the after life will be most powerfully affected and on whose future conduct the prosperity of the Province and enlightenment of the population most depend. That is to say that the sons of the great landed proprietors and such as are minors. . . . With this view we should lose no opportunity of bringing every boy born to a high position in life within the reach of its beneficial influence. . . .²

Government aid for this institution was prompt and lavish because it was seen as an opportunity to "improve" the moral and social habits of the "lads who will eventually hold high places and have the power of much good or evil in their hands"; and because it was the only way that they could be "brought up away from the influences of their homes."³ The idea was to have a boarding house "where the children of the wealthier classes could be brought together, their moral training, exercises, and habits be supervised, as they are in England, instead of boys being allowed to reside altogether under the influence of foolish mothers."⁴ The boarding house would

¹Regulations for the Management of the Wards' Institution at Lucknow (Lucknow: Oudh Gazetteer Press, 1864), file no. 18, BRLD, UPSA.

²Letter no. 350 of 13 February 1864 [from Secretary to the Chief Commissioner], to the Commissioner, Lucknow Division, file no. 18, p. 2, BRLD, UPSA.

³Letter no. 4290 [from Financial Commissioner, to Secretary to the Chief Commissioner], 8 July 1868, cited in the Annual Report of Wards' Institution 1867-68, p. 10.

⁴Letter no. 4896, from Colonel Barrow, Financial Commissioner, to Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, 29 July 1868, file 381, p. 17, BRLD, UPSA.

provide a very rigorous routine with a mixture of bookish instruction, physical training, and worship, with time allowed for dressing in the proper uniform for each occasion. The boys would be "treated as gentlemen" and it would be impressed practically on their minds that punctuality, "regularity, obedience, morality, and diligence in the pursuit of knowledge" were the attributes they should strive for.¹ Book knowledge alone was not sufficient to create the kind of Indian who would be loyal and responsive:

An educated native (look among our subordinate officials) is seldom seen even on horseback, he has no real activity about him, because he has been brought up in the very laziest habits, and in the most effeminate manners, and this is all because there is no attention paid to anything but cramming him with books. . . . Half the money [spent on education] would be better laid out in making a man of him.²

The experiment in social control enjoyed only limited success in the period under discussion, when it was new and the taluqdars were only finding their feet in the city, but gained in popularity in the coming decades. Horse riding, billiards, cricket, tennis, squash, and swimming were emphasised, as were athletics in the curriculum of Canning College and the Colvin Taluqdars' College. Excellence in sports was to become a cherished taluqdari ideal.³ The reporter for the Pioneer who was always

¹Regulations for the Wards' Institution, file no. 18, BRLD, UPSA.

²Letter no. 4896, from Colonel Barrow, Financial Commissioner, to Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, 29 July 1868, file 381, p. 17, BRLD, UPSA. Emphasis in the original.

³I visited every single taluqdari palace in Lucknow and invariably found sport trophies, cups, and shields displayed prominently in the show cases in the "drawing rooms"; antler heads and other stuffed animals and hunting trophies form a large part of the decor of taluqdari palaces, both in the city and in the districts.

an observer at the "tamashas" at Kaiserbagh wrote, presciently, of "the little colony" of taluqdars in Lucknow who "have their billiard table and cricket ground" and attend "the Canning College, like every petty Rothschild does in England." "Seriously speaking," he went on,

I think they will someday form the nucleus of a body in Oudh which will make it the model province it ought to be. The idea of making the present aristocracy of Oudh understand the true principles of political economy, or wean them from prejudices and bigotry, or to make them see that their own interests and that of the Government are identical. . . . is not to be accomplished in this generation. . . . It is to be done with the rising generation only.¹

For obvious reasons "the new, English-educated middle-class" did not make its appearance on the Lucknow scene till well beyond the period under consideration; the Canning College was only established in 1864 and it would be another two decades before there would be a generation of lawyers and professionals who would constitute an influential group of their own. The taluqdars would be instrumental, as patrons of Canning College, in its growth. English missionary schools where natives were admitted, such as the Christian College, were also founded in the early sixties and their impact, too, was felt later in the century. In the years 1858-77 the British created a conservative class whose consciousness transcended that of its component groups and which was maintained by its ties of loyalty to the government.

The Ruling Elite

The ruling elite were alien and aloof, with a mild distaste for the

¹Pioneer, 18 September 1865. Emphasis mine.

the ruled to begin with. The traumatic and bloody confrontation of the two races added a strong flavouring of mistrust and racial hatred to their sentiments for the "natives."¹ The British officials lived in the civil lines and the cantonments and socialized among themselves in their club, the United Services Club in the Chattar Manzil Palace on the banks of the Gomti. Official "events" such as departures and arrivals and changes and promotions were occasions for parties and gatherings that made up "the shifting scenery of Anglo-Indian society."² The social scene was "sociable, lively, and gay" the year round, judging from the animated comment in the regular "outstation gossip" column in the Pioneer,³ but went into a summer torpor. Then the action shifted to Nainital, the summer capital and Himalayan retreat, designed, as were other hill stations, by the ruling elite to resemble "home." In Lucknow the Queen's birthday always generated a week-long programme of dinners, balls, and plays, and even a "public dinner" where Indian notables were invited and would dutifully but awkwardly attend.⁴

The foreign community kept themselves amused in their club reading or gaming rooms, drinking, smoking, and gambling, or collecting in the music

¹That the "mutiny" is seen as a watershed in the relations between the two races is accepted as a well-established and documented fact among India scholars. For a concise discussion of this, see Metcalf, Aftermath of Revolt, pp. 289-327, and Michael Edwardes, Bound To Exile (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970).

²Pioneer, 15 March 1865. There has been no effort made to distinguish individuals among the ruling elite because the colonial system shifted them around; they seldom held a particular post for more than three years. They tended to become transferable abstractions for the people -- a group of peripatetic "sahibs" with changing names and faces.

³Pioneer, 24 May 1865.

⁴Ibid.

room, around a grand piano and roaring fire, singing nostalgic songs and telling stories. They played croquet, so that the memsahibs could also take part, but cricket -- with two important matches: the annual John Company vs The World and the Cantonment vs Civil Lines cricket -- was the favourite station sport. Charity balls, fetes, fairs, and small amateur theatrical events, where light-hearted drawing-room comedies, such as "Faint Heart Never Won a Lady," were organized with zest and spiced the life at Lucknow station.¹ The race course in the cantonment drew large Sunday crowds all winter long where the Lucknow Derby, and other racing events such as the 8th Lancers Cup, 55th Regimental Cup, and the Native Gentlemen's Purse, brought enthusiastic British officials from the mufussil.²

Lucknow's social life matched its political importance as a regional capital and a regimental headquarters. Here elegant flower shows and full dress balls made the segregated world of the British elite less dull. And yet, the shadow of the "mutiny" never faded, stalking the officials even into the "high noon" of the Raj. Wheeler, a correspondent for the Central News, visited Lucknow in 1876 and visited the Services' Club in the Chattar Manzil. He was surprised to find that many of the members talked only about the "Mutiny of '57" -- repeating thrilling anecdotes touched with bitterness -- even as they smoked their cigars, sipped their brandy, or played billiards.³

The points of contact with the "native" were few, well-regulated, and

¹Pioneer, 27 December 1865. For other interesting social "gossip," see the issues of 16 February 1866, 30 July 1866, 4 January 1867, and so on through to 1877.

²Pioneer, 18 February 1867, 20 February 1867, 22 February 1867, 24 February 1867.

³George Wheeler, India in 1875-76; The Visit of the Prince of Wales (London: Chapman and Hall, 1876), p. 231.

and official; even the "entertainments" at the Kaiserbagh hosted by the taluqdars or the "public dinners" given by the chief commissioner on rare and special occasions were mutual, quasi-official obligations -- that were fulfilled out of political necessity and wisdom rather than personal warmth. Even at the races where the "Nawabs and Barons of the British (Oude) Indian Association laboured to the ropes in everything vehicular"¹ the conviviality appeared to be contrived. And when Miss Donnelly, "a young lady of irreproachable character," embraced Islam "under the auspices of a Mahomedan Rajah of Oudh," the event stuck out as an exception which only reinforced the atmosphere of racial antipathy and separation.² The servants -- who, in their menial capacity, were the only natives who intruded into the closed world of the ruling elite -- were bound by regulations: "The question of protecting ourselves against our native servants has now been to some extent solved here," the Pioneer informed its readers, since the superintendent of the city police opened a special office for the screening and "registration of all khansamas [cooks], ayahs [nursemaids], &c." to check domestic "annoyances" and "crime."³ There were also native public servants in the lower rungs of the administration, but the belief in their innate inferiority was a key tenet of the philosophy of the ruling elite. When the post of the assistant civil surgeon fell vacant in Lucknow, the Pioneer stated the case against employing a native for the job with passionate simplicity:

On an average he [the assistant surgeon] has to appear at least four or five times a week in the criminal court to give evidence in cases of life and death. . . . Now

¹Pioneer, 11 January 1871.

²Pioneer, 17 January 1871.

³Pioneer, 30 July 1866.

I would ask any unprejudiced person, or any officer of judicial experience in this country, whether a Native Doctor, by education, experience or instinct, is so well fitted for this great responsibility as a European, and whether justice can be dispensed upon such evidence with the same clear conciseness and truthfulness as upon that of a European gentleman.¹

The British civil servants sat atop a gigantic native pyramid, and episodes like these were to make it an increasingly uneasy perch. This then was the psychological and emotional backdrop against which feelings of loyalty and their ritualistic expression, the darbars, must be viewed.

Darbars

We have, all chapter long, examined the effects of loyal and disloyal political conduct on the destinies of prominent post-"mutiny" individuals and groups; we can now turn our attention to the rituals of loyalty, the pomp and show of the darbars, the title giving and gift receiving, and the dazzling, periodic pageants that occurred in Lucknow. The darbar of Oudh, in its quotidian nawabi format, was the holding of court: the King granted audience, theoretically, to all his subjects. In practice, access was limited to members of his family, notables, and officials of the court and administration, civilians and officers of the East India Company, and a sprinkling of visitors from beyond Oudh, and the daily events were recorded by a chronicler or akhbar-nawis.² At the darbar, the ruler received individuals who came to complain or petition, present nazars, (gifts from inferiors to a superior) and receive khillats (the regalia of honor), and trans-

¹Pioneer, 4 February 1867.

²Fisher, p. 93.

act the business of state.¹ The practice declined, however, as royal control over matters of state was slowly circumscribed by an increasingly assertive resident, and the last three Kings held darbars only very infrequently.²

There were also special darbars to commemorate a political event, like the coronation darbar of Ghaziuddin Hyder in 1819 where an amalgam of Mughal, Hindu, Shia and British symbols were drawn upon to create a "complex and unique ceremony."³ The British resident had established, for some years, the practice of holding a rival weekly darbar, but this was discontinued in 1833. These darbars were "attended with as much pomp, and state as the Resident's establishment . . . could furnish. . . . They were also held on a few other festive days when these . . . Vakeels of Oude, Princesses, the guaranteed nobles [wasiqadars] and other individuals . . . presented nuzzers to the Resident."⁴

The British brought in, as we have observed in the course of this study, their own "modern" administrative machinery where the "office hours" of the English bureaucrats functionally replaced the daily darbar. The British used the darbar only sparingly and with dramatic effect. A brief analysis of the four darbars held between 1856 and 1877 is necessary to understand the interaction of the new ruling elite with the indigenous elite.

After the collapse of the rebellion, as we have seen, there ensued on

¹Mrs. Meer Hasan Ali, Observations on the Mussalmauns of India, edited with notes and an introduction by W. Crooke (1917 [original edition: 1832]; reprint edition, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 140-152

²Fisher, p. 102.

³Ibid., p. 70.

⁴Resident to Secretary to Government in the Secret and Political Department, 2 May 1833, Foreign Secret Proceedings, 16 May 1833, no. 3A. Cited in Fisher, p. 115.

the one hand an obsessive witch hunt for disloyal nawabi notables and on the other a tireless drive, that winked at the Proclamation of 1858, to conciliate the taluqdars. Lord Canning, the viceroy, was himself converted to a "policy of sympathy" by Montgomery and Wingfield, the chief architects of the compromise with the taluqdars of Oudh.

The British needed to reinaugurate their regime in Oudh, since the annexation of Oudh had been rejected out of hand by the rebellion. Now as conquerors it would be easier to be accepted as legitimate rulers. So a grand, full-scale darbar was planned for the 26th of October 1859 to seal the political fate of Oudh. There are unfortunately no detailed eye-witness accounts of this darbar, but an attending official, Prichard, described it as a "large darbar" for which Lord Canning "made a state entry into the capital of the province,"¹ There was fanfare and glitter, the taluqdars received sannads, the permanent titles to the lands and villages for which they had been granted proprietary rights. The attending taluqdars brought nazars, which were generally gold coins in a velvet purse, and received khillats from the new rulers. The finest of the khillats given away on this occasion was that given to Digvijay Singh, Maharaja of Balrampur. He had received the taluqa of Tulsipur to enlarge his already vast estate, a "priceless" shawl, and two guns from the military commander-in-chief for his loyalty during the revolt. At the darbar, he was assigned the "No. 1 chair" and, having received the judicial and revenue powers of a first-class honorary magistrate, he was presented with a ceremonial khillat.² The sixteen pieces

¹Iltudus Prichard, The Administration of India From 1859 to 1868, 2 vols. (London: Macmillan and Co., 1869), vol. 1, p. 34.

²Siddiq Ahmad, Tarikh-Anjuman-i-Hind, 3 vols. (Lucknow: Newal Kishore Press, 1935), vol. 3, p. 465.

of the khillat are worth noting to see how the western and oriental effects were combined: (1) a kalgī (jewel brooch for the turban), (2) sarpaich (a jewelled crescent, also worn on the turban), (3) a necklace of pearls, (4) a British sword, (5) a British shield, (6) a clock, (7) binoculars for hunting, (8) a full carriage with two British horses, (9) a fine doshala (double shawl), (10) an embroidered scarf, (11) a turban, (12) earrings, (13) a cummerbund, (14) an embroidered belt, (15) full robes, and (16) a handkerchief.¹

Mrs. Meer Ali describes the "splendid articles" given in khillats at the Oudh court in the early nineteenth century. A comparison of nawabi and British khillats is instructive:

Swords with embroidered belts, the handle and scabbard either enamelled or embossed silver, often set with precious stones; . . . shields studded with silver; kirrich (dirk) the handle and sheath equally as rich as the swords; embroidered or gold cloth chupkunds (coats); shawl-stuff labaadahs (petisses), trimmed with sable; turbans of shawl or muslin; ornaments for the turban of diamonds and emeralds, the inferior of paste; strings of pearls and emeralds for the neck; shawls always in pairs, of more or less value; shawl-kerchiefs; shawl cummerbunds (girdles); shawl lahaafs (counterpanes); gold cloth, gold and silver muslins and shawl stuff each being sufficient to form a dress. . . . In some instances, the King confers one hundred and one pieces in a khillat; in others seventy-five, and down to five articles, which is the lowest number given in this much prized dress of honour. . . . I have also observed that the higher the numbers rise the quality of the articles increased in value. . . .²

The style of the new government was parsimonious since colonial government with its global imperial commitments could not afford to squander funds locally on oriental-style ostentation. The symbolic effect of the ceremonial

¹Ibid.

²Mrs. Meer Hasan Ali, p. 149.

darbar, could be achieved on a smaller budget. The standards of the new rulers were modest, since their "best" khillat was but a few notches above the most meagre of the nawabi.

At this darbar, the crisis of legitimacy -- which had engulfed the British and the taluqdars alike -- was resolved, and this darbar was seen as a major political event that finally accomplished the pacification of Oudh. It was, however, thinly attended. At the time of the announcement of the darbar not many taluqdars trusted British intentions of inviting them into the capital, and many absentees were fined. Many taluqdars misunderstood the purport of the occasion:

It is a pity that His Excellency's visit to Lucknow should be associated in the minds of many of the talookdars with fines and penalties. . . . The Talookdars were not ordered to meet His Excellency in Lucknow. They were invited to do so and though, in Asiatic acceptances, an invitation from the Chief Commissioner is equivalent to an order it is hardly in accordance with English notions to punish the neglect of such an invitation as disobedience.¹

Wingfield, the chief commissioner, attributed the absence of the taluqdars to "pertinacious mistrust" and suggested that Canning should permit him to reconsider the fines and return them as an "act of grace and favour" while at the same time "duly admonishing the Talookdars for the want of respect for His Excellency's wishes."² One absentee was fined Rs. 2,000, to be paid within the month; the "excuse" of sickness was not accepted in another case the "invitation" was referred to as "a summons."³ It could not realis-

¹Note by Foreign Secretary, Foreign Department, Foreign Consultations, 24 February 1860, nos. 152-158, NAI. Emphasis in the original. I am indebted to Professor Bernard S. Cohn for this reference.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

tically be expected that the "mistrust" would evaporate instantaneously. It does take time for hair to sprout on a "round head" before he can change into a "cavalier."

Canning, with his "sonorous voice and truly majestic manner,"¹ read to the darbar a speech of which not one word made sense to the listeners; an interpreter then read the Urdu version of the speech, which called him their patron, and the chief commissioner their "best advisor" and "trusted friend."² The notables of Lucknow, though present at the darbar, were not, it appears, included in the address. Three representatives of the ex-Royal family, including Nawab Mohsun ud Dowlah, were received privately and exhorted to be loyal and obedient.³ The darbar brought to an end the era of mistrust of the British by the landowners and began the era of collaboration that continued uninterruptedly until nationalist forces outside the arenas of collaboration disrupted it.

The other three Lucknow darbars of this period -- the first in 1867 to honour Viceroy Sir John Lawrence's visit to Lucknow; the second in February 1870 for the Duke of Edinburgh; and the final one in 1876 to honour the visit of the Prince of Wales -- are all of a piece. They came off as well-rehearsed theatrical events, being similar in outward form and style.

They began with the glamorous and extravagant parade that dazzled the tens of thousands that thronged Victoria Street to see the endless train of lumbering, caparisoned elephants, horses, and camels bearing eminent personages from the railway station to the ruins and grounds of the residency,

¹Prichard, The Administration of India, vol. 1, p. 34.

²Ibid., p. 35.

³See above, p. 189.

which were now a spectacular monument set in a splendid garden. Each visiting dignitary was treated to sumptuous feasts and entertainments in the evenings by the taluqdars at Kaiserbagh, the nawabs at Hooseinabad, the Europeans at the Lal Baradari in the Chhattar Manzil palace complex. But the details of each varied enough to represent a symbolic evolution that reflected the real political and social change over these twenty years.

The 1867 darbar, which began a week-long frenzy in the city, marked a decade of peace since the "mutiny." No observer of the pageant could fail to make the comparison:

What a difference to think these [Indian] hosts friends and not besiegers!! . . . Then the din of war, now a gorgeous parade in the time of peace. . . . Could the rebels of 1857 have risen out of their graves, . . . they . . . would not have believed the change . . . what was once a place of hurriedly dug graves is now a blooming and lovely garden of Roses.¹

The entire spectacle of Lucknow ten years after the terrible war, and not the parade alone, evoked deep awe. The new roads, the new bridges, the "iron horse that snorts," "the vast cantonment with endless rows of barracks, all mark the 'tight grasp' we have on this once unruly city."² The taluqdars were not just on parade as men of status; they also saw for themselves the power and might of the new rulers on prominent, deliberate display:

The boom of the salutes too, told that there was no want of powder at Lucknow; whilst the Infantry force was strongly represented by endless bayonets. Where were the rebels now: Britain had long ago set her house "in order," and today was selected for the native to "know their lawful lord" and the scene told them (better than words) that all they saw

¹Pioneer, 18 November 1867.

²Ibid.

at Lucknow was a drop in the ocean compared with the immense military power ever at the immediate disposal of the viceroy.¹

It also clarified the relative status of native elite groups to each other and the supremacy of the British elite. Their place in the processional order symbolised their place in society. The chief guest and the chief commissioner and other top Oudh officials preceded the three leading taluqdars. The Maharajas of Kapurthala and Balrampur, both of whom had already received the imposing title of "Knight Commander of the Order of the Star of India" (K.C.S.I.) at the 1866 Agra darbar, and Man Singh of Ayodhya, who was to receive his K.C.S.I. at a special investiture ceremony at the present darbar on the 12th of November 1867, led the native contingent. Behind them were the nobles and the ex-Royal family and several "last relics of the two defunct dynasties," "men like Mohsun ood Dowlah and Mumtaz ood Dowlah "who could look back to a long ancestral lineage, and who would consider it an indignity to ride cheek by jowl with the mushroom Talookdar of yesterday's creation."² Finally came "the long array of elephants and glittering howdahs" carrying their less august riders, and the "poorer Talookdars rather marred the effect of the scene by riding in on animals of hybrid shape and stunted growth."³

The taluqdars paid for this entire extravaganza and the rivalry between the Maharaja of Ayodhya and the Maharaja of Balrampur must have put some temporary life into the luxury industries as they competed in getting the finest and best of everything from the trappings of their elephants to

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

the caps that adorned their heads.¹ The time and money spent on such seeming trifles was useful because "the izzut [honour] of these men has been raised ten-fold. To be a Talookdar in Oude is with some to be better than a prince of the blood."² These men made the most of a glorious opportunity to bask in the warmth of their enhanced status, while all Lucknow watched.

And what did this gigantic tamasha mean for the "teeming population" of the city? At one level it meant business where commerce had been sluggish. This enormous invasion of big-time spenders who had to be fitted out for the occasion, whose elephants' and horses' saddlery and ornaments needed repair or refurbishing, must have added up to a decent living for Lucknow craftsmen after years of being in the financial doldrums. The "buniyads on Victoria Road are in a perfect furore to exhibit themselves and their wares to the best advantage."³ Shopkeepers were ordered to "show a good front" by whitewashing the portion of their shops or houses that face the road. Almost a month in advance the public and private buildings in the city were being whitewashed, domes gilded, and gardens tended, to look their best. The Imperial Hotel was booked to capacity in advance by the visiting dignitaries.⁴

The parade too was to have another meaning for the populace: the men whom they supported during the rebellion -- the taluqdars and the nawabs -- were now riding docilely behind the British viceroy. They were not longer the political elite. The taluqdars who had once competed for political power now

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Pioneer, 1 November 1867. Emphasis in the original.

⁴Pioneer, 16 October 1867.

competed for the quality of their caps. It seemed as if the meaning and nature of the ostentation of the darbar was in inverse proportion to the "real" power of the taluqdars.

Above all, the darbar was to illustrate the enlightened attitudes of the new rulers; a native observed:

Truly . . . the magnanimity of the English is great. Within a few yards from his brother's grave [Sir Henry Lawrence's grave in the Residency] the Governor-General of India receives, seated before him in Durbar, many of those very men whose bullets helped to cause that grave to be dug.¹

To demonstrate forgiveness for the bloody past was politically astute. The foundations of the future were also symbolically laid in the placing, in that darbar week, of the foundation stone for the building for the Canning College. The darbar was truly an impressive piece of political drama -- native and western symbols and idioms were harnessed to depict the stability of the British Raj.

The darbar of 1870 is important because it dispensed with the symbolic core of the event: the exchange of the nazars and khillats. This practice was discontinued because it was considered wasteful.² The nazar was transmuted into what the British Indian Association files call an "admission fee."³ This was "fixed" at 25 asharfis (gold coins) and there are taluqdars' applications on file asking for a discounted admission. The taluqdar of Rampur, for example, pleaded that the utmost he could afford to pay was nine asharfis and asked to remit the balance later. But he wrote that he had to be permitted to

¹Pioneer, 18 November 1867.

²The Educational Gazette (Agra), 30 January 1870, VNR.

³File no. 1, Durbar Papers, 1867-1869, BIA papers, JNML.

attend the darbar.¹ This sumptuary measure must have curbed the extravagance and competition amongst the richer taluqdars. Their wakils had often been despatched to the jewellers in Chowk to find out what articles had been commissioned by their "rivals" as nazars.² A collective gift for the visiting personage for which all taluqdars contributed replaced the individual nazar. In 1870, the "Rajgans [royalty] of Lucknow," the taluqdars, "caused to be manufactured a most beautiful Hindu sword, studded with jewels and valued at two lakhs of rupees [20,000 pounds] for presentation to his Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh."³ Two lakhs of rupees, when shared among 276 taluqdars, or fewer if absentees are taken into account, would make the individual cost approximately just under eight hundred rupees for the gift. (We do not know if the cost was shared equally.) To this one can add the cost of admission and travel, the expense of their entourages in the city, and the total cost amounted to a sizeable investment undertaken chiefly to show oneself off as a loyal darbari in Lucknow, an expense the taluqdars did not have in the time of the nawabi. If the rulers displayed their power in the tangible shape of a parade of their armed forces, the taluqdars and nawabs tried with their extravagant feasts, illuminations, firework displays, and glittering "nautches" to dazzle and overwhelm the rulers.

By 1876, the whole show was a carefully organized event. Those receiving titles had special instructions describing their precise role. When Munshi Newal Kishore was to be honoured, he received a formal printed invitation card

¹Ibid.

²Interview with a jeweller of Chowk whose family supplied many pieces of jewellery to be presented as nazar and khillat. September 1976.

³The Educational Gazette, 30 January 1870, VNR. It is interesting to note that the taluqdars were referred to as the royalty of Lucknow in a vernacular newspaper.

(with the blanks filled in by hand) that read:

Admit (Newal Kishore) to the Chapter of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India to held in the Encampment on the Maidan on Saturday, January 1st 1876. Seats to be taken not later than 8:30 a.m.

(sd) [illegible] (Cooke)

Instructions:

The holder of this ticket must approach the Encampment from the road opposite the Cathedral and must alight at flag bearing the color and letter (G) of this ticket. The police in attendance will direct the driver where he is to remain with his carriage during the Chapter. No carriage will be called up till the Grand Master has taken his departure. No person, when once seated, can leave or change his or her seat during the Chapter.¹

The British had indeed infused the darbar with their own notions of formality and protocol.

Though the darbar had acquired this "modern" flavour in terms of planning and organization, there was a memorable and spontaneous request by the Prince of Wales that almost destroyed the grandeur of the planned pageant and shattered a few bureaucratic nerves. He demanded that the loyal sepoys who had defended the Lucknow residency and were still living be produced in front of him. There was a hurried scramble to find some of these men in the old city and finally a rather piteous assortment of them were brought out to march before the Prince.² The men who arrived were "a mixed band of decrepit warriors" in a single file:

Some of these soldiers had been taken from their sick beds to have their swords touched now by the Prince of Wales. In some cases their bodies were supported by their friends and their palsied arms were

¹Newal Kishore papers, in the possession of Rani Ram Kumar Bhargava, Hazratganj, Lucknow. The reverse of the invitation has a detailed diagram of the seating and entrances.

²Wheeler, pp. 227-228.

with difficulty made to give a last salute. There was one man with a single leg, another so paralysed that he saluted the Prince from a crawling position on the ground, and many who looked mere bags of bones -- so shrunken was their flesh with age.¹

The officials were embarrassed, since the truly loyal had been apparently overlooked. The Prince "would not allow them to be hurried by; he spoke to each one, ragged as he might be, squalid or unclean."² This wretched looking "muster of the brave"³ probably made the gaudy pomp of the parade ring false. A native contemporary, who also witnessed these darbars, remarked:

The relation between the ruler and ruled is wholly artificial and superficial. Now loyalty means empty salaaming. It is shown in illuminations, explodes amidst fireworks and is eaten up in state banquets. . . . Active loyalty is gone with the local prosperity, and hollow deeds are followed by hollow effects . . . for the loyalty is a huge sham which is not grounded in patriotism. Loyalty now is nothing but indirect selfishness.⁴

Loyalty then was a complex phenomenon that guided urban policy. The penal tax and the taluqdari settlement were both political measures -- one to punish the disloyalty of the prominent townspeople and the other to ensure the future loyalty of the taluqdars of Oudh. The city notables received noticeably less sympathy because the source of their wealth and influence,

¹Ibid.

²W.H. Russell, The Prince of Wales' Tour: A Diary in India (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle and Rivington, 1877), p. 395.

³Wheeler, p. 227.

⁴P.C. Mukerjee, The Pictorial Lucknow (unpublished galley proofs, dated 1883), unpaginated section, U.P. Sanghralaya, Lucknow.

the Oudh dynasty, had been vanquished. The taluqdars on the other hand were made into a favoured and protected group because the source of their power lay in the people who lived on the lands they controlled and was therefore unvanquishable. Their past was forgiven by their pledges for future loyalty. So they were assiduously cultivated, their rights in the land and dues to the government made permanent (which gave them the power to be more tyrannical and exploitative of the peasantry). Their presence in the capital was welcomed and was necessary to guarantee their fidelity to the Raj. Ironically, the British won the allegiance of the taluqdars with a strategem that closely resembled that used by the King to extend his romantic alliances: they gave them palaces to live in, guaranteed their incomes and made it quite clear that infidelity would cost them their position and prestige. For the future generations there were to be nurseries, boarding schools and universities to produce loyal natives, but this policy was to have mixed results.

And finally there were the periodic rituals to express this primitive political emotion: the ceremonial darbars with dignitaries that represented that alien unseen and almost mythical Queen Victoria. The darbars were gradually transformed to suit the tastes of the new rulers. They stopped giving khillats but distributed knighthoods and other exotic titles to add to the vanity of the upper classes in the city. Many a native O.B.E., K.C.S.I., K.C.B. and Rai Bahadur graced the small elite circle in Lucknow.

The darbar of 1876 was the last darbar Lucknow was to see for a long while. Oudh was amalgamated with the North West Provinces early in the following year and Lucknow lost its special status as a regional capital. The nawabi city was now a provincial town.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

The city of Lucknow was the large and impressive artifact of the geographical relocation of the Oudh court in 1775. It declined precipitously with a change of masters in 1856. The "mutiny" and rebellion of 1857, a violent expression of the cumulative resentment of sepoy and ryot alike of the British interference in Indian social and political practices, converted it into a battlefield, until it was finally recaptured. In the next two decades, its physical and social environment was adapted for the needs of the relatively small colony of British soldiers and administrators who replaced the Oudh court. The city's political fortunes reached their nadir in January 1877, when Oudh was absorbed by its larger neighbour to form a new administrative entity, the North Western Provinces and Oudh, with Allahabad as its capital.

This amalgamation, like the earlier annexation, was presented as a fait accompli to the people of Oudh. The amalgamation had been considered, fitfully, as a possibility since 1868, when the British hold on Oudh seemed fairly secure. The measure was part of the budget trimming that was seen necessary in view of the enormous military costs added to the Indian budget after the "mutiny." For the officials in Oudh, whose possibility of promotion was restricted by the smallness of the provincial administration, it was a welcome expansion of their career opportunities.

The chief commissioner of Oudh, Sir George Couper, was the first to

hold the joint position of lieutenant governor of the North Western Provinces and the chief commissioner of Oudh. He moved to the new capital; the remainder of the Oudh administration remained in Lucknow. The high court for the new province was located in Allahabad. This caused a great deal of inconvenience to Lucknow citizens, who had to travel to Allahabad for any case that was not resolved to their satisfaction in the local courts. The better lawyers in Lucknow moved to Allahabad for employment. Allahabad was consequently to become the most important city in the Hindi-speaking heartland of India, and it is no accident that several future national leaders, such as the Nehrus, Sapru, and Malviya, would be successful lawyers based in Allahabad.

In Lucknow there were serious misgivings about the implications of this move. The taluqdars had to be reassured that the amalgamation would neither materially affect their rights and privileges,¹ nor would they have to rebuild their urban base in the new capital. The local protest in Lucknow was widespread and the deputy commissioner allegedly held an enquiry and sent a full report on public reaction in Lucknow to the viceroy.² The people especially resented the excuse of economy as justification for the union, since it did not actually produce "any great saving in public expenditure," and the "revenue of the province is far in excess of the cost of its administration. . . . The balance of Rs. 19,500,000 finds its way to the imperial treasury every year. . . ."³ All the vernacular newspapers, except the Oudh Akhbar, condemned the action as arbitrary and unnecessary.⁴

¹T.P. Chand, The Administration of Avadh (1858-1877) (Varanasi: Vishwavidyala Prakashan, 1971), p. 248.

²Karnamah, 9 July 1877, VNR.

³Ibid.

⁴Akhbar-i-Tammanai, 10 October 1877, VNR.

The subject was apparently never even brought up in the municipal committee.¹ A politically significant move was made without the benefit of the opinions of the local representatives of the people.

In earlier decades the rise and fall of inland regional capitals had been directly related to the transfer of the courts of the indigenous rulers. After the coming of the British, the determining factor in urban growth was the railway network that linked the hinterland to the nearest port city. Lucknow was a victim of these twin circumstances. Allahabad was the government's post-"mutiny" choice as the capital of the North Western Provinces because it was easily defensible and had direct rail links with Calcutta.² It superseded Lucknow for much the same reasons in 1877. The growth of Kanpur as a commercial and industrial centre, and the decline of Agra, both located in the same Gangetic plain, can also be understood in terms of their physical relationship to the colonial infrastructure.

In addition, cities like Lucknow and Delhi paid for having become maelstroms in a sea of hostility in 1857-58. Not only were they thoroughly and brutally sacked after they were recaptured, but their survivors, particularly the Muslims, were victimized. The "mutiny" proved, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that the Indian empire was held by force and would depend on force even more heavily in the future.

The "mutiny" was the unprecedented crisis in Britian's colonial experience in India. It did much to transfigure the subsequent colonial experience in India. Lucknow lends itself as a paradigmatic case of the

¹The entire proceedings of the municipal committee of 1876 do not betray any sign of such a move in the offing.

²C.H. Bayly, The Local Roots of Indian Politics; Allahabad 1880-1920 (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 19.

post-"mutiny" colonial experience in the urban context. The implications of many of the policies of political and social control implemented in Lucknow have their parallels in other cities. The case of Delhi has been explored by Percival Spear, Narayani Gupta, and Anthony King. It may not be too rash to suggest that these determinants for urban policy and planning in the urban arena in Lucknow -- strategic safety, health and sanitation, and loyalty -- governed urban policies in other cities. Research in cities like Kanpur, Meerut, and Agra, would probably lead to similar conclusions. A morphological and institutional "system" of colonial urbanization emerged in response to the widespread crisis.

The internal dynamics of the colonial provincial town stood in sharp contrast to those that had existed in the nawabi city that it replaced. A trim, modern, alien bureaucracy replaced the traditional administrative elite. Its relationship to its hinterland was also radically altered though it was still seen as a regional centre for political control over the hinterland. The city had, via the consumption of its nawabi elite, lived parasitically off the revenues of all Oudh. The imperial treasury succeeded in supplanting the city of Lucknow in its role of preying upon the Oudh countryside and brought with it an appetite nearly twice as large as its predecessor's. For Lucknow, this abrupt snapping of ties and a contraction even of administrative jobs within the city spelled economic disaster. Its luxury industries that had catered to the nawabi elite lost their vitality and Lucknow and its large population of both non-productive nawabi dependents and skilled craftsmen was gradually pauperised. The new administration, with its trim and economical ways, did not replace the court in its function as civic patron. The provincial town had to pay for itself from local taxes; it was economically

isolated from its previous provincial base. It was now a link in the larger colonial marketing and transportation network and connected by rail to the largest cities in the colonial system -- the port cities of Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras. The changing economy of the hinterland -- where a commercial revolution in agriculture was brought about by the increased acreage under cash crops such as opium and sugar cane -- was connected to the larger enterprise of the British empire, while becoming increasingly disconnected from the logic of regional needs and consumption patterns.¹ Lucknow perhaps is the most striking example of urban decay in traditional regional centres in the latter half of the 19th century.

The new administrators and the large European military force lived in their new quarters in the civil lines and cantonment of the city and created, as the nawabs had once done, an alien and exclusive cosmos that was based on the culture and value system of the metropolitan society. Members of the new ruling elite were itinerants and therefore not many stayed long enough to impress the city with an individual stamp. The colonial system had brought in its barracks and bungalow architecture, its clubhouse and its wide roads as the permanent infrastructure of colonial occupation.

The need for taxes and sanitation created a civic body that evolved into a major institution for local government. It raised taxes on urban incomes and property and smoothed its task by involving local notables in the process. These selected men found themselves in command of status and

¹This commercial revolution is persuasively argued as the cause of the frequent famines that devastated the Indian countryside in the second half of the nineteenth century in B.M. Bhatia, Famines in India: A Study in Some Aspects of the Economic History of India 1860-1965 (2nd ed.; Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1967), pp. 5-130.

some leverage with patronage and government contracts, but had little scope for exercising any political power, which was exclusively in the hands of the official members. The bodies never overcame the spirit in which they were conceived. Even with the liberal reforms and "elected" membership they remained unsatisfactory arenas for serious political change. Jawaharlal Nehru, who resigned in frustration after two years as the elected chairman of the Allahabad municipal board in the mid-1920s provided a memorable indictment of such bodies:

The main interest of Government in municipal administration is that "politics" should be kept out. Any resolution of sympathy with the nationalist movement is frowned upon. . . . [The Government attempts] to keep out political opponents from all municipal and local services. . . . It prefers and pushes on the lap-dog breed and then complains of the inefficiency of the local bodies. . . . We have an all-pervading atmosphere of authoritarianism, and the accompaniments of democracy are lacking. . . .¹

Structurally, these bodies are autocratic to this day, since it is possible for the officials -- albeit Indian officials -- to supersede the elected councils. The colonial legacy happily sustains the Indian Administrative Service even today.

The police were by far more efficacious in repressing political disturbances or enforcing sanitary laws than in controlling crime. The sanitary laws were best enforced in the cantonment and civil lines, and the differential treatment of the "native" and European sections of the city did not go unobserved by the citizens of Lucknow. A conscientious civil surgeon could help upgrade the general sanitation of the city by designing drains and latrines and improving conservancy arrangements, but

¹Jawaharlal Nehru, Toward Freedom: The Autobiography of Jawaharlal Nehru (New York: The John Day Company, 1941), p. 119.

some measures, such as the removal of burial grounds to the outskirts of the cities, rode rough-shod over native sensibilities. The civic administration and the police functioned most efficiently as an agency to collect taxes. The truncated police force, it might be added, worsened the unemployment situation in the city. The nawab kept thousands of people on his payroll more to honour his obligation to keep as many of his subjects employed than to staff the departments of his government as efficiently as possible. The connection between unemployment was an obvious one which the British apparently chose to ignore because the nature of the crimes in the city did not endanger their lives or property.

The moral of 1857 for the British, it has been argued by most Indian historians, was to abstain, in future, from interfering in the social customs of the "natives" however barbaric they might appear to the metropolitan culture; they scrupulously eschewed reform legislation of the social "evils" (such as widow burning, female infanticide, hook-swinging, etc.) that had raised such a violent storm of protest. Queen Victoria's proclamation of November, 1858 expressly guaranteed legal and official protection and toleration for the ancient customs and usages of Indian society. Be this as it may, this study has explicitly and persistently demonstrated that social control took on a far more subtle and therefore invidious form. There were no longer Acts of Parliament legislating the moral uplift of the people of India; now there were municipal committees with native participants who framed innumerable bye-laws that would insure the safety and security of the colonisers. These amounted, inasmuch as they involved the control of house design, location of burial grounds, instructions for disposing of the dead, control of religious procession routes, the registration of prostitutes, central agencies for liquor manufacture, fines for committing nuisances,

locations of tanneries, butchers, and other matters that affected the way of life in Lucknow, to a far more comprehensive and deeper penetration of Indian society than had hitherto been experienced. The legislation was no longer inspired by "concern" for their benighted subjects, but by a pragmatic concern with their own survival in a hostile environment. If this entailed very meddlesome legislation, they expected that the involvement of Indians at the local level would certainly serve as an effective barometer to help them gauge and possibly influence public opinion. The new measures for political control, by and large, limited the expression of discontent to the innocuous mode of petitioning the rulers. So, while the era of social reform was theoretically proclaimed at an end, the policies pursued after the crisis interfered even more in the lives of the ordinary citizen.

The government was alien and autocratic -- it needed local support to survive, especially after the crisis. The nawabs had also been despots, and they had needed the loyalty of their subjects. The loyalty of the nawab's subjects was based on their having "eaten his salt"¹ -- i.e., on the fact that the nawab or one of his dependents employed or supported his personal retinue who owed him this basic loyalty. Disloyalty -- expressed as namak harami (betrayal of this "salt eating" relationship -- was shameful and condemned strongly by the indigenous value system. Thus loyalty had always been the cement of autocratic structures and the British obsession with loyalty is not surprising. They had already introduced the notion of guaranteed pensions in the nawabi era and carved out a constituency of loyal wasiqadars among the civic elite; they now had to pacify the rural chieftans

¹The closest Hindi or Urdu equivalent to the concept of loyalty is the obligation owed to the master whose salt ("namak") one has eaten. Salt is used figuratively for sustenance -- since it is basic to even the simplest need.

and ensure their future support. The taluqdari system of guaranteed land tenures and fixed revenue demand was the masterstroke that changed rebels into supporters. These taluqdars became the pillars of the new order and a respected elite group in the city. The taluqdars traded their former political freedom for fixed rents and the freedom to enforce their will on the peasantry. Their loyalty was depersonalized by the creation of the representative institution, the B.I.A., that expressed the collective fealty of the sannad holders to the chief commissioner who was, through the conduit of the viceroy, a representative of the Queen. The symbols and function of the darbar were adapted to express support for the Raj rather than a personal bond with the ruler.

The colonial system transformed not only the physical environment out of strategic necessity but the political and social structures in order to make a rebellious city the bastion of the Raj.

SOURCES CONSULTED

Records of the Government of India; National Archives of India, New Delhi

Foreign Department Proceedings

Foreign Consultations, 1856-1860
Secret Consultations, 1856-1860
General, 1860-1877
Judicial, 1860-1877
Political, 1860-1877
Revenue, 1860-1877

Home Department Proceedings

Educational, 1857-1877
Judicial, 1857-1877
Public, 1857-1877
Revenue, 1857-1877

Records of the Government of Oudh; Uttar Pradesh State Archives, Lucknow

Board of Revenue, Lucknow District, Proceedings, 1858-1880.

Board of Revenue, Oudh General, Proceedings, 1858-1880.

Deputy Commissioner's Office, Abstract of Proceedings, 1858-1877.

Judicial Commissioner's Office, Abstract of Proceedings, 1858-1860.

Records of the Government of Oudh; Lucknow Collectorate

Lucknow City Settlement [1869 Bandobast], 162 volumes.

Records of the Lucknow Municipal Committee; Municipal Corporation
Record Room

Proceedings of the Municipal Committee, 1862-1877.

Bastas [cloth bundles]

Conservancy
Military
Nuzool
Police
Public Works Department

Despatches to and from India; India Office Library and Records, London

Educational
Foreign Department
Political
Public Works Department
Revenue

Private Papers

At the India Office Library

Brayne Papers
Butler Papers
Kaye Mutiny Papers
Lawrence Papers
Moorsom Papers

Begum Malika Gaiti Papers (in the custody of Prince Sartaj Mirza,
Nakhas, Lucknow) .

British Indian Association Papers (B.I.A. Office, Kaiser Bagh, Lucknow,
and Jawaharlal Nehru Museum and Library Record Room, New Delhi) .

Daroga Meer Wajid Ali Papers (in the custody of Wazir Agha, Golagunj,
Lucknow) .

Papers of Sultan Jahan's Imambara (in the custody of Fida Hussain,
Lucknow) .

Printed Official Sources

Census of India: 1881, 1891, 1901, 1911 .

Parliamentary Papers .

Report of the Lucknow Municipal Board Enquiry Committee, 1942 .

Report of the Municipal Taxation Committee, U.P., 1908-1909 .

Report on the Administration of Oudh, 1860-1861 through 1875-1876 .

Report on the Census of Oudh, 1872, 3 volumes .

Report on the Civil and Criminal Justice in Oudh, 1864-1865 through
1875-1876 .

Report on the Engineering Operations at the Siege of Lucknow in March 1858 [Robert Napier's Report] (British Museum).

Report on the Police Administration of Oudh, 1865 through 1875-1876.

Report on the Settlement of Land Revenue in Lucknow District, 1873.

Selections from Vernacular Newspapers Published in the Punjab, North Western Province, Oudh and Central Provinces, 1864-1877.

Union Political Pensions in Uttar Pradesh Being a Historical Account with a Statement of the Present Position of Each Grant, 1960.

Newspapers

Friend of India (Calcutta).

Oudh Akhbar (Lucknow).

Oudh Punch (Lucknow).

Pioneer (Allahabad).

Times (London).

Books and Articles

Ahmad Ali (Mir), ed. Insha-yi Suroor. 3rd ed. Lucknow: Newal Kishore Press, 1887.

Ali, M. Ahmad. Historical Aspects of Town Planning in India and Pakistan. Karachi: AC-ATA Foundation, 1971.

Ali, Mrs. Meer Hasan Ali. Observations on the Mussalmauns of India. 2 vols. London: Parbury Allen, 1832.

Ahmad, Siddiq. Tarikh-i-Anjuman-i-Hind, Avadh. Lucknow: Newal Kishore Press, 1935.

Baird, J.G.A., ed. Private Letters of the Marquess of Dalhousie. 2nd ed. Edinburgh: Blackwood and Sons, 1911.

Ballhatchet, Kenneth. "Race, Sex and Class Under the Raj, 1887-1905." European Conference on Modern South Asian Studies, Leiden, 1976.

Barr, Pat. The Memsahibs: The Women of Victorian India. London: Secker and Warburg, 1976.

- Bartram, R.H. A Widow's Reminiscences of the Siege of Lucknow. London: 1858.
- Bayley, David H. The Police and Political Development in India. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969.
- Bayly, C.H. The Local Roots of Indian Politics; Allahabad 1880-1920. London: Oxford University Press, 1975.
- The Beauties of Lucknow; Twenty-four Portraits of the Most Celebrated and Popular Living Historic Singers, Dancers and Actresses of the Oudh Court and of Lucknow. Calcutta: Central Press Company, 1874.
- Bhadra, Gautam. "Some Socio-Economic Aspects of the Town of Murshidabad (1765-1793)." Unpublished M.Phil dissertation, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 1972.
- Bhargava, Prag Narain, ed. Who's Who in India, Containing Lives and Portraits of Ruling Chiefs, Nobles, Titled Personages and Other Eminent Indians. 2 vols. Lucknow: Newal Kishore Press, 1911.
- Bhatia, B.M. Famines in India: A Study in Some Aspects of the Economic History of India, 1860-1965. 2nd ed. Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1967.
- Bhatnagar, G.D. Awadh Under Wajid Ali Shah. Varanasi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1968.
- Bird, R.W. [pseud.: Samuel Lucas]. Dacoitee in Excelsis; or the Spoilation of Oude by the East India Company. London, 1857; reprint ed., Lucknow: Pustak Kendra, 1974.
- Blake, Stephen P. "Dar-ul-khilafat-i-Shahjahanabad: The Padshahi Shahar in Mughal India, 1556-1739." Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, The University of Chicago, 1974.
- Brass, Paul R. Language, Religion and Politics in North India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974.
- Briggs, Asa. Victorian Cities. New York: Harper and Row, 1963.
- Briston, Edward J. Vice and Vigilance: Purity Movements in Britain Since 1700. Bristol (UK): Gill and Macmillan, Rowman and Littlefield, 1973.
- Brodkin, E.I. "The Struggle for Succession: Rebels and Loyalists in the Indian Mutiny of 1857." Modern Asian Studies 6,3 (1972), pp. 227-290.
- Butler, S. Harcourt. Oudh Policy, the Policy of Sympathy. Allahabad: Pioneer Press, 1906.

- Butter, Donald. Outlines of the Topography and Statistics of the Southern Districts of Oudh, and of the Cantonment of Sultanpur-Oudh. Calcutta: Huttman, 1839.
- Butts, H.H. Report on the Settlement of Land Revenue in Lucknow District. Lucknow: Oudh Government Press, 1873.
- Calkins, Philip. "The Role of Murshidabad as a Regional and Sub-Regional Centre in Bengal." In Urban Bengal. Edited by Richard L. Park, South Asia Series Occasional Paper no. 12. East Lansing: Michigan State University Asian Studies Center, 1969.
- Case, (Mrs). Day by Day at Lucknow: A Journal of the Siege. London: Richard Bentley, 1858.
- Chand, Tej Pratap. The Administration of Avadh. Varanasi: Varanasi Vishvavidyalaya, 1971.
- Chaudhury, Nazir Ahmad. The Great Rising of 1857 and the Repression of Muslims. Punjab Government Record Office Publication, Monograph no. 22.
- Church, Roderick. "The Politics of Administration in Urban India: Citizens, Municipal Councillors and Routine Administration in Lucknow." Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Duke University, 1973.
- Cohn, Bernard S. "Recruitment of Elites in India Under British Rule." In Essays in Comparative Social Stratification. Edited by Leonard Plotinov and Arthur Tuden. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1972.
- _____. "Urbanization and Social Mobility in 'Early Modern' India: An Exploration." Conference on International Comparisons of Social Mobility in Past Societies. Institute for Advanced Studies, Princeton, N.J., 1972.
- Crooke, William, ed. Hobson-Jobson; A Glossary of Colloquial Anglo-Indian Words and Phrases. . . . by Henry Yule and A.C. Burnell. 1903; reprint ed., Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1968.
- Currie, Fendall. The India Code of Criminal Procedure. Act X of 1872. 5th ed. London: John Flack & Co., 1874.
- Curry, J.C. The Indian Police. London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1932.
- Datta, Kalinkar. Reflections on the Mutiny. Calcutta: University of Calcutta Press, 1967.
- Dodgson, D.S. General Views and Special Points of Interest of the City of Lucknow, etc. (pp. 8, 11 plates). London: 1860.

- Dunham, Daniel. "The Courtyard House as a Temperature Regulator." The New Scientist (8 September 1969), pp. 663-666.
- Edwardes, Michael. Bound to Exile; The Victorians in India. New York: Praeger Books, 1970.
- _____. Season in Hell; The Defence of the Lucknow Residency. New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, 1973.
- Fisher, Michael H. "The Imperial Court and the Province; A Social and Administrative History of Pre-British Awadh (1775-1856)." Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, The University of Chicago, 1978.
- Fitchett, W.H. The Great Tale of the Mutiny. 2nd ed. London: John Murray, 1912.
- Fordman, R.D. Brief History of the Government Horticultural Gardens, Lucknow, and the Government Botanic Gardens, Saharanpur. Allahabad: United Provinces Department of Agriculture, 1939.
- Forrest, G.W. Cities of India. New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1903.
- Forrest, G.W., ed. Selections from Letters and Despatches and other State Papers preserved in the Military Department of the Government of India, 1857-58. 4 vols. Calcutta: Military Department Press, 1902.
- Fox, Richard G., ed. Urban India: Society, Space and Image. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Programme in Comparative Studies in Southern Asia, 1970.
- Frayer, Joseph. Recollections of My Life. Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1900.
- Frykenberg, R.E., ed. Land Control and Social Structure in Indian History. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969.
- Gay, J. Drew. The Prince of Wales in India; or From Pall Mall to the Punjab. Toronto: Belford Brothers, 1877.
- Gillion, Kenneth L. Ahmedabad: A Study in Indian Urban History. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968.
- Grierson, A.E.P. Influence of Parks and Gardens and Open Spaces in Civic Development. 2nd ed. Allahabad: U.P. Government Press, 1928.
- Gubbins, M.R. An Account of the Muntinies in Oudh and the Siege of the Lucknow Residency. London: R. Bentley, 1858.
- Gupta, Narayani. "Military Security and Urban Development: A Case Study of Delhi, 1857-1912." Modern Asian Studies 5,1 (1971), pp. 61-77.

- Harris, G. A Lady's Diary of the Siege of Lucknow. London: 1858.
- Harrison, J.B. "Allahabad: A Sanitary History." Unpublished paper presented at "The City in South Asia." Seminar, School of Oriental and African Studies, London University, 1975.
- Hay, Sidney. Historic Lucknow. Lucknow: 1939.
- Heber, Reginald. Narrative of a Journey Through the Upper Provinces of India. 3 vols. 4th ed. London: John Murray, 1829.
- Heitler, Richard. "The Varanasi House-Tax Hartal of 1910-11." Indian Economic and Social History Review, 9, 3 (1972), pp. 239-257.
- Hibbert, Christopher. The Great Mutiny: India 1857. New York: The Viking Press, 1978.
- Hilton, Edward H. Hilton's Guide to Lucknow and the Residency. Lucknow: 1934.
- Hobsbawm, Eric. Revolutionaries: Contemporary Essays. New York: New American Library, 1973.
- Hoey, William. Monograph of Trade and Manufactures of North India. Lucknow: American Methodist Mission Press, 1880.
- Hovrath, Ronald J. "In Search of a Theory of Urbanization: Notes on the Colonial City." East Lakes Geographer 5 (1969), pp. 69-82.
- Hunter-Weston, G.R. A Report on Some of the Forts in Oudh A.D. 1858. Limited ed. of 12 numbered copies. By the author, 1900.
- Hutchinson, G. Narrative of the Mutinies in Oudh Compiled from Authentic Records. London: Smith, Elder and Company, 1859.
- Inglis, Julia Selina. The Siege of Lucknow: A Diary. London: 1892.
- Innes, McLeod. Lucknow and Oudh in the Mutiny. London: A.D. Innes & Co., 1895.
- Irwin, H.C. The Garden of India, or Chapters on Oudh History and Affairs. 2 vols. London, 1880; reprint ed., Lucknow: Pustak Kendra, 1973.
- Jafri, Rais Ahmad. Hazrat Mahal. Lahore: Sheikh Ghulam Ali, 1969.
- Jafri, Syed Qamqam Husain. Tahqiqi Navadir. Karachi: Urdu Acadmey, 1974.
- Jocelyn, J.R.J. A History of the Royal and Indian Artillery of the Mutiny of 1857. London: John Murray, 1915.
- Joyce, Michael. Ordeal at Lucknow: The Defence of the Residency. London: John Murray, 1938.

Kaye, J.W. A History of the Sepoy War in India, 1857-58. 3 vols.
3rd ed. London: W.H. Allen & Co., 1876.

King, Anthony. "The Bungalow in India: Its Regional and Pre-industrial Origin." Architectural Association Quarterly 5, 3 (September 1973), pp. 8-22.

_____. Colonial Urban Development. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976.

Kipling, Rudyard. Collected Verse of Rudyard Kipling. New York: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1918.

_____. Kim. In Kipling; A Selection of his Stories and Poems.
By John Beecroft. 2 vols. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1956.

_____. Soldiers Three. New York: Doubleday and McClure, 1889.

Knighton, William. The Private Life of an Eastern King. 2nd ed. New York: J.S. Redfield, 1855.

_____. Elihu Jan's Story, or the Private Life of an Eastern Queen.
London: 1865.

Lawrence, H.M. Essays on the Indian Army and Oudh. Serampore: Serampore Press, 1859.

Lucknow Municipal Committee for Public Convenience. A Brief History of Lucknow with an Account of its Principal Buildings, etc. Lucknow: Newal Kishore Press, 1862.

McNeill, William H. Plagues and People. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Book, 1976.

Mason, Philip. A Matter of Honour: An Account of the Indian Army, its Officers and Men. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974.

_____. The Men Who Ruled India. Vol. 1: The Founders. New York: Schocken Books, 1964.

Maude, F.C. and Sherer, J.W. Memories of the Mutiny. 2 vols. 2nd ed. London: Remington and Company, Ltd., 1894.

Mecham, Clifford Henry. Sketches and Incidents of the Siege of Lucknow. London: Day and Son, 1858.

Metcalf, T.R. The Aftermath of Revolt: India 1857-1870. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964.

_____. "From Rajah to Landlord" and "Social Effects of British Land Policy in Oudh." In Land Control and Social Structure in Indian History. Edited by R.E. Frykenberg. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969.

- Mir Ali Husain. Ravayat-i-Burgania. Lucknow: Tahir Printing Press, 1934.
- Mukerjee, P.C. The Pictorial Lucknow. Unpublished galley proofs dated 1883.
- Musgrave, Peter. "Landlords and Lords of the Land: Estate Management and Social Control in Uttar Pradesh 1860-1920." Modern Asian Studies 6, 3 (1972), pp. 257-275.
- The Mutinies and the People or Statements of Native Fidelity Exhibited During the Outbreak of 1857-58. Calcutta: Stanhope Press, 1859.
- Napier, H.D. Field Marshal Lord Napier of Magdala. G.C.G, G.C.S.I. London: Edward Arnold and Company, 1927.
- Napier, H.D., ed. Letters of Field Marshal Lord Napier of Magdala. London: Simpkin Marshall Ltd., 1936.
- Napier, Robert. "Reports on the Defences of Lucknow." Professional Papers [of the Royal Engineers] New Series, vol. 9 (1860), pp. 17-38.
- Nehru, Jawaharlal. Toward Freedom: The Autobiography of Jawaharlal Nehru. New York: The John Day Company, 1941.
- Nigam, M.N. "Evolution of Lucknow." National Geographic Journal of India (6 March 1960), pp. 30-46.
- Norton, John Bruce. The Rebellion in India: How to Prevent Another. London: Richardson Brothers, 1857.
- "Oude." The Asiatic Journal and Monthly Register (Calcutta), vol. 15, New Series (September-December, 1834), p. 215-217.
- Oude: Papers Relating To. London: Harrison and Sons, 1856.
- Parkes, Fanny. Wanderings of a Pilgrim in Search of the Picturesque. 2 vols. London: P. Richardson, 1850.
- Paton, John. An Abstract of the Political Intercourse between the British Government and the Kingdom of Oudh, 1764-1835. Edited by Bisheshwar Prasad. Allahabad: Allahabad University Press, 1944.
- Prichard, Iltudus. The Administration of India From 1859 to 1869. 2 vols. London: Macmillan and Company, 1869.
- _____. The Chronicles of Budgepore, or Sketches of Life in Upper India. London: Richard Edward King, Ltd., n.d. [ca. 1880]
- de Planhol, Xavier. The World of Islam. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1959.

Pott, Janet. Old Bungalows in Bangalore, South India. London:
Published by the Author, 1977.

Robinson, Francis. "Nation Formation: the Brass Thesis and Muslim Separatism," and Reply by Paul R. Brass. Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 15, 3 (November 1977), pp. 215-234.

_____. Separatism Among Indian Muslims. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973.

Rouse, G.H., ed. The Lucknow Album. Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press, 1874.

Ruggles, John. Recollections of a Lucknow Veteran, 1845-1876. London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1906.

Russell, W.H. My Diary in the Years 1858-59. 2 vols. London: Routledge, Warner and Routledge, 1860.

_____. My Indian Mutiny Diary. Edited by Michael Edwardes. London: Cassell and Company, 1957.

_____. The Prince of Wales' Tour: A Diary in India; with some account of the Visits of His Royal Highness to the Courts of Greece, Egypt, Spain, and Portugal. London: Sampson, Low, Marston, Searle and Rivington, 1877.

Ruswa, Muhammad Hadi. Umrao Jan Ada; The Courtsean of Lucknow. Translated by Khushwant Singh and M.A. Husaini. Calcutta: Orient Longmans, 1961.

Safdar Husain Syed. Lakhnau ki tahzibi miras. Lahore: Bargah-yi adab, 1975.

Sharar, Abdul Halim. Lucknow: The Last Phase of an Oriental Culture. Translated and edited by E.S. Harcourt and Fakhir Hussain. London: Paul Elek, 1975.

Sharshar, Rattan Nath. Fasane Azad. New Delhi: Maktabah-yi Jami'ah Ltd., 1970.

Shekh Tassaduq Husain. Begamat-i Avadh. Lucknow: Kitab Ghar, n.d.

Sjoberg, Gideon. The Preindustrial City, Past and Present. New York: The Free Press, 1960.

Sjoberg, Gideon. "The Rise and Fall of Cities: A Theoretical Perspective." International Journal of Comparative Sociology 4, 2 (September 1963), pp. 107-120.

Sleeman, William Henry. A Journey Through the Kingdom of Oude, in 1849-1850. 2 vols. London: R. Bentley, 1858.

- _____. The History of the Reigning Family of Oude. Unpublished ms.
- Spear, Percival. Twilight of the Mughuls. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951.
- Steel, Flora Annie. On the Face of the Waters. 3rd ed. London: William Heinmann, 1897.
- Stephen, J.F. "Foundations of Government in India." Nineteenth Century 39 (October 1883), pp. 541-568.
- Stokes, Eric. The Peasant and the Raj; Studies in Agrarian Society and Peasant Rebellion in Colonial India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.
- Stocqueler, J.H. The Military Encyclopaedia. London: W.H. Allen, 1853.
- Theobald, William. The Acts of the Legislative Council of India, From 1856 to 1859. Calcutta: Thacker, Spink and Co., 1961.
- Tinker, Hugh. Foundations of Local Self-Government in India, Pakistan and Burma. Bombay: Lalvani Publishing House, 1967.
- Verney, Gerald Lloyd. The Devil's Wind: The Story of the Naval Brigade at Lucknow; from the Letters of Edmund Hope Verney. London: Hutchinson and Company, 1956.
- Wheeler, George. India in 1875-76. The Visit of the Prince of Wales. London: Chapman and Hall. 1876.
- Whitcombe, Elizabeth. Agrarian Conditions in Northern India. Vol. 1: The United Provinces Under British Rule 1860-1900. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972.
- Wilson, Thomas Fourness. The Defence of Lucknow: A Diary by a Staff Officer. London: Smith, Elder and Company, 1858.

CURRICULUM VITAE

Veena Talwar Oldenburg was born in Lucknow, India on September 5, 1946. She attended Loreto Convent College in Lucknow, receiving her B.A. in 1965, and holds an M.A. in Western History from the University of Lucknow, with a First Class First (completed in 1968), and an M.A. in History from the University of Bridgeport (completed in 1972). Having passed her Ph.D preliminary examinations at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in 1975, with a distinction in Indian History, she conducted her Ph.D research in England and India from July 1975 to January 1977, receiving grants from the American Institute of Indian Studies and the History Department of the University of Illinois.

Ms. Oldenburg was Lecturer in European History at Loreto Convent College from 1968 to 1970 and also served as Dean of Studies in 1969-70. She has been a teaching assistant at the University of Bridgeport (1970-72) and at the University of Illinois (1972-74), and is currently a teaching associate in the History Department at Columbia University and a consultant to the South Asia sub-committee of the Social Science Research Council, New York.



